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Abstract 
 
 
It is clear that unmarried cohabitation is increasing in 
Chile. It is less clear what unmarried cohabitation is and 
why is it rising. In Latin America cohabitation is common 
among low income groups, and has been described as a 
surrogate marriage for the disadvantaged. Cohabitation in the 
region entails conventional gender roles and having children. 
It has been explained by colonial dominance, poverty, 
kinship, and machismo. The evidence amassed here indicates 
that although in practice cohabitation is similar to 
marriage, they are not the same. In fact, cohabitation has 
decreased social visibility. Cohabitation does not entail any 
social ceremony or rite. As it is not institutionalised it 
remains concealed from both social recognition and social 
scrutiny. Thus it tolerates partners who are dissimilar, or 
can be sustained despite a higher level of difficulties in a 
relationship. The findings validate previous research as 
cohabitation is sparked by pregnancy, parental tolerance - 
mainly through not enforcing marriage -, a close mother-son 
bond –which inhibits marriage-, and the material costs of 
marriage. The research follows a life course perspective. It 
is based on twenty four qualitative life histories of urban 
deprived young people, women and men, involved in a 
consensual union and with children.   
In Chile from the 1990s onwards cohabitation started 
to show a sharp increase. Prevalent views explain rising 
cohabitation as an outcome of processes of 
individualization, democratization of relationships, and 
female emancipation. This research suggests that rising 
cohabitation, among young people from low income groups in 
Chile, is linked to enhanced autonomy (i.e. declining 
patriarchy), and to social benefits targeted to single 
mothers. Young people are gaining autonomy as union 
formation is increasingly an outcome of romantic love and 
not of being forced into marriage. Furthermore cohabitation 
rose right at the end of Pinochet’s dictatorship, at a time 
of enhanced freedom and autonomy. By contrast, rising 
cohabitation does not seem to be related to female 
emancipation. Interviewees themselves reproduce 
conventional gender roles, and social policies targeted to 
the single mother are based on conventional views on 
womanhood. 
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 INTRODUCTION  
 
 
 
Unmarried cohabitation is a distinctive feature of family 
life in Latin America (Therborn 2004). It has been 
customary in the region from colonial times, and it is 
particularly common among young and deprived groups. People 
with low educational attainment and from low income groups 
tend to cohabit more frequently than those more educated 
and better off (Castro Martín 2002; García and Rojas 2004; 
Rodríguez Vignoli 2005). In addition, unmarried 
cohabitation is linked to early partnering and pregnancy, 
and it usually involves childbearing (Castro Martín 2002; 
Rodríguez Vignoli 2005). Owing to these features, 
cohabitation has been described as a surrogate marriage for 
the disadvantaged (Castro Martín 2002).  
The region is seen as having a unique marriage regime, 
which mirrors its enduring inequalities. Those more 
educated and with better economic prospects marry formally, 
and those less educated and with poor economic prospects 
enter into unmarried cohabitation as a kind of substitute 
marriage (Castro Martín 2002:36). Unmarried cohabitation is 
variously referred to as cohabitation, consensual unions, 
informal marriage, non-legal marriage, informal unions, or 
concubinage; and its practitioners (partners) are often 
described, in Spanish, as juntados or convivientes. 
Throughout the text all these concepts will be used as 
synonyms for unmarried cohabitation. 
Consensual unions are a cause for concern in the 
region. Evidence shows that they might be related to poorer 
child development, to increased women’s subordination, and 
to enhanced marginalization of deprived groups by social, 
educational, and financial institutions. Unmarried 
cohabitation is a fragile arrangement. The weakness of its 
bonds translates into a lower rate of survival when 
compared to formal marriage (Goldman 1981; Heaton and 
Forste 2007); and seem to produce fragile families 
 2 
(Larrañaga and Azócar 2008:137). This feeble commitment is 
linked to poorer parenting, particularly in the case of 
fathers (Castro Martín 2002; Castro Martín, Martín García 
et al. 2008). Cohabitation is connected to higher child and 
infant mortality (Carvajal 1978), to poorer children’s 
nutrition (Desai 1992), and to low educational attainment 
in children (Larrañaga and Azócar 2008).  
In addition, consensual unions are believed to be 
disadvantageous for women. Castro Martín (2008), reports 
that unmarried cohabitation increases women’s chances of 
being subject to domestic violence. The probability of 
violence is enhanced by cohabitation, even after 
controlling for a range of demographic and socioeconomic 
variables. Furthermore, it is difficult to enforce family 
obligations upon men involved in a consensual union. Women 
in a cohabiting partnership will also face difficulties in 
gaining financial support from their partner, if the 
relationship ends (Castro Martín 2002:50-51). Accordingly, 
cohabiting mothers are more apprehensive apprehensions 
about economic vulnerability than married ones (Larrañaga 
and Azócar 2008:138).  
Lack of institutionalization promotes discrimination 
and marginalization (Rodríguez Vignoli 2005:13-14). Couples 
who live together informally are not given the same rights 
as married couples. They are excluded from social benefits, 
and face difficulty in accessing services. For example, 
cohabiting couples may not be covered by social welfare, or 
may not qualify to apply for loans, perform financial 
operations, or share in bequests. Their children can be 
rejected by educational institutions on the grounds of 
their parents’ cohabitational status. 
Unmarried cohabitation, albeit widespread, is not 
evenly distributed across Latin America. On average, 
consensual unions account for around two fifths of total 
unions in the region. Yet in some countries they represent 
around 60 percent of total unions. The Dominican Republic 
shows the highest proportion of cohabitation in the region, 
with 64 percent of its partnerships composed of cohabitees. 
At the other end of the scale, there are countries where it 
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is less significant. Mexico, Uruguay, and Chile show the 
lowest levels of cohabitation in the region, at around 20 
percent (see figure I.1). In the case of Chile, low 
incidence of cohabitation has been explained with reference 
to two main factors. First, it is suggested that there may 
have been a relatively stronger influence of the Western 
European model of marriage, due to Chile’s reception of 
significant European migration in the second half of the 
19th century (see Chapter 2). Second, introduction of social 
welfare at the beginning of the 20th century is held to have 
led to an increase in marriage, with a correspondingly 
lower proportion of cohabitation (see Chapter 1). 
 
 
Figure I.1: Consensual unions in Latin America, around the year 2000 (percentage of women aged 
15-49 in a partnership at the time of data collection) 
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Data sources: For all countries except Belize: Castro Martín (2008:Figure 1). For Belize, Castro Martín (2002:Figure 1) 
 
 
 
Unmarried cohabitation follows a geographical pattern of 
concentric circles (see distribution map, below). The core, 
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within which unmarried cohabitation represents 50 percent 
or more of total unions is formed almost exclusively by 
countries located in the Caribbean and Central America1. 
Accordingly, as can be seen from figure I.1 and the 
distribution map, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Panama, 
Colombia, El Salvador, and Nicaragua score higher than 50 
percent for rates of cohabitation. Surrounding the core we 
find a ring of countries with moderately high levels of 
unmarried cohabitation, accounting for between a third and 
half of all unions. This group is formed by Venezuela, 
Peru, Cuba, Belize, Guatemala. Finally, the countries where 
unmarried cohabitation represents no more than one third of 
total unions are geographically located in the outer 
circle.2 Thus, the countries with relatively low rates of 
cohabitation are Brazil, Paraguay, Bolivia, Argentina, 
Mexico, Uruguay, and Chile.  
 
 
                     
1
 With only one country located outside of these regions scoring over 
50 percent (Colombia, in the Andean region).  
2
 With the sole exception of Costa Rica, with a low score of 29% 
despite its location in the inner circle (core). 
 5 
Distribution map: Consensual Unions in Latin America, circa the year 2000 (percentage of women 
aged 15-49 in an unmarried partnership at the time of data collection). 
  
Elaborated using data from figure I.1 
 
 
 
For the purposes of this study I identify four main 
approaches to the study of cohabitation. These are, 
respectively, the socio-historical, modernization, kinship, 
50% and more  
34-49% 
0-33% 
No information 
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and ‘machismo’ approaches. The socio-historical approach 
explains the geographical distribution of cohabitation as 
mirroring different cultural and economic trajectories. 
This perspective asserts the existence of a dual marriage 
system, based on race and sex, imposed by white elites in 
colonial times (Smith 1996a; Therborn 2004). This dual 
marriage system was held to be stronger in plantation 
economies and where large parts of the population were 
classified as ‘coloured’, meaning either Black, indigenous, 
or of mixed race. To this day, consensual unions remain 
more frequent in those countries with a plantation heritage 
and a significant coloured population: a category which 
would include large parts of Central America and the 
Caribbean. 
A second approach links cohabitation with 
underdevelopment. The theory of modernization, focused on 
industrialization and urbanization, links consensual unions 
with lack of development. Cohabitation is therefore 
expected to be more common among less developed countries. 
Plotting data for rates of unmarried cohabitation against 
2010 Human Development Index figures (HDI), we can, indeed, 
observe a pattern of negative correlation, in which higher 
rates of cohabitation are accompanied by lower HDI scores 
(see figure I.2). The suggestion that cohabitation is 
mainly an outcome of unequal development may also be borne 
out by its predominance among the more disadvantaged groups 
within each country (Castro Martín 2002; Larrañaga and 
Azócar 2008).  
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Figure I.2: Scatterplot of levels of unmarried cohabitation against the Human Development Index, 
HDI, in Latin America 
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Data sources: data on cohabitation is taken from Figure I.1. HDI scores for 2010 are taken from the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP 2011) 
Unmarried cohabitation is significantly negatively correlated with HDI, rs = -.532, p<.05 
 
 
 
A third approach explains cohabitation in terms of a system 
of kinship based on blood ties (Lomnitz 1977; Lomnitz and 
Pérez-Lizaur 1984; Fonseca 1991; Smith 1996b). That blood 
ties are relevant is manifest in the relatively strong 
significance of the extended family in the region. 
Consensual unions, as a weak sexual bond, are consonant 
with this system of kinship, as they do not challenge blood 
ties. In fact there is a positive correlation between 
unmarried cohabitation and the extended family. The 
extended family is defined, for these purposes, as a 
household in which one or both parents, with or without 
children, lives together with other relatives (Arriagada 
2006). As is illustrated in figure I.3, cohabitation tends 
to be more frequent in those countries with relatively 
large numbers of extended family households. 
 
 
 8 
Figure I.3: Scatterplot of cohabitation against extended family households in Latin America 
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Data sources: data on cohabitation is taken from figure I.1. Data on extended households is taken from Arriagada 
(2006: table 1) 
Unmarried cohabitation is significantly correlated with extended family households, rs = .807, p<.01 
 
 
 
A fourth perspective relates unmarried cohabitation to the 
predominance of traditional gender roles (Rodríguez Vignoli 
2005:19). In this view a sexist, sexually rapacious, and 
violent ‘macho’ is seen as the hegemonic model of 
masculinity. Macho men are believed to reject marriage and 
favour cohabitation, because the latter neither demands 
paternal responsibility nor limits satisfaction of their 
sexual appetites. Women, it is claimed, are socialized to 
be attentive and submissive to men, and to find solace in 
motherhood. If we explore this hypothesis by plotting 
levels of cohabitation against the Gender Inequality Index 
(GII), we find a positive relationship in which high 
incidence of cohabitation is indeed associated with 
pronounced gender inequality (see figure I.4). 
 
 
 
 
 9 
Figure I.4: Scatterplot of cohabitation against Gender Inequality Index scores for in Latin America 
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Data sources: data on cohabitation is taken from figure I.1. GII data for 2010 is taken from UNDP (2011) 
Unmarried cohabitation is significantly correlated with GII, rs = .634, p<.01 
 
 
 
 
Recent changes in cohabitation nonetheless call into 
question each of these approaches. From around 1970 to 
around 2000, cohabitation increased in every country of the 
region except Guatemala (see figure I.5). Yet cohabitation 
grew faster in those countries where it was not very 
significant to begin with. Thus Chile and Brazil show the 
steepest growth rates, with cohabitation quadrupling over 
the three decades. Argentina, Colombia, Uruguay, Peru, and 
Costa Rica also show a substantial increase. By contrast, 
countries with a historically high incidence of consensual 
unions have experienced smaller increases.  
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Figure I.5: Changes in levels of cohabitation in Latin America between circa 1970 and circa 2000 
(percentage of women aged 15-49 in an unmarried partnership at the time of data collection) 
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Data sources: Data for 1970 taken from Castro Martín (2002: table 2). Data for 2000 taken from Castro Martín (2008: 
figure 1). 
 
 
 
In present day Latin America, cohabitation is becoming more 
frequent in those countries which are relatively more 
developed, less gender unequal, and in which the extended 
family is less relevant. Evidence also shows that rates of 
cohabitation are going up in every socioeconomic group. 
Furthermore, this increase has been more pronounced among 
groups with higher educational attainment (Rodríguez 
Vignoli 2005:32). Scholars have turned to the theory of the 
second demographic transition, SDT, to try to explain these 
recent changes (Castro Martín 2002; García and Rojas 2004; 
Rodríguez Vignoli 2005).  
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The SDT attempts to explain rising cohabitation in 
developed countries as an outcome of cultural change due to 
the process of modernization (Lesthaeghe 1995). As with the 
first demographic transition, which was linked to the 
theory of modernization, SDT theory is connected to current 
debates on modernity and secularization. But while the 
focus of the first demographic transition was on processes 
of industrialization and urbanization, the SDT focuses on 
cultural transformation, albeit without abandoning 
structural economic factors, (1995:56). In particular, SDT 
theory states that increased cohabitation is linked to 
female emancipation and increased individual autonomy. 
Cohabitation in Latin America is not generally 
believed to be a modern arrangement which involves 
individual autonomy, gender equality, or female 
emancipation (Castro Martín 2002; García and Rojas 2004; 
Rodríguez Vignoli 2005; Castro Martín, Martín García et al. 
2008). As Castro Martín asserts, ‘the large majority of 
consensual unions [in Latin America] correspond to the 
"traditional" type, and can be best characterized as a 
substitute for formal marriage among social strata with low 
education and poor economic prospects’ (2002:36). Some 
studies have nonetheless described patterns of cohabitation 
among educated groups in the region as modern, suggesting 
that more highly educated people cohabit as a trial period 
before marriage (Parrado and Tienda 1997). Cohabitation has 
also been associated with lower fertility, another supposed 
indicator of modernity. Latin American societies have 
accordingly been conceptualized as dual systems, in which 
affluent elites are seen as following a modern pattern of 
cohabitation, while the majority of the population is 
believed to continue to reproduce a traditional type. 
In this research I question the adequacy of this 
particular variant of the modernization approach, asserting 
as it does that Latin American societies are essentially 
bifurcated between modernity and tradition. In my opinion, 
such categorical distinctions between modern and 
traditional behaviours do not advance our understanding of 
social phenomena. To classify the upper class style of 
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cohabitation as modern, by contrast with a lower class 
style categorised as ‘traditional’ , does not in itself 
tell us much about cohabitation itself. Moreover, 
differentiating between modern and traditional cohabitation 
does not help us to discover the concrete social mechanisms 
by which cohabitation is produced and reproduced; nor does 
it throw much light on the phenomenon’s possible 
implications.  
Even though current approaches have been challenged or 
called into question by recent changes in cohabitation, 
these approaches continue to provide valuable insights. 
Thus I seek to conduct a grounded account of cohabitation, 
drawing on contributions from previous research 
complemented and extended by the results of the present 
investigation. From the existing literature on 
cohabitation, I borrow, firstly, the idea that cohabitation 
implies a specific sexual order; secondly, a recognition of 
the importance of kinship and of gender roles, and, 
thirdly, the hypothesis that living conditions affect union 
formation. This research will show that we should also 
study cohabitation in relation to the influence of previous 
generations, patterns of social welfare, sexuality, and the 
relative social visibility of different kinds of 
partnership. 
 
 
 
The case of Chile is of particular interest for the field. 
Cohabitation has increased in Chile in a context of 
accelerated socioeconomic change. Advances that have been 
made in the situation of the national population as a whole 
across t by the beginning of the twenty-first century can 
be summarized as below (and see (Tironi 2003)). The Chilean 
population has improved its general levels of wellbeing as 
measured by increased access to new opportunities, goods, 
and services. These improvements have been especially 
relevant for poorer groups (Raczynski 2000). Successful 
social policies have contributed to the inclusion of 
traditionally excluded groups, and massive rural-to-urban 
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migration has ceased. Primary and secondary education has 
become almost universal, and average educational 
qualifications among the labour force have also increased. 
The service sector has become the most important economic 
sector, increasing demand for qualified workers.  
Women’s role in Chilean society is changing. Female 
employment is growing, fertility rates have dropped, and 
average ages at marriage and first birth have risen. The 
extended family is becoming less ubiquitous. Family law has 
also changed, with new legislation restricting men’s and 
parents’ authority in accordance with greater recognition 
of women’s and children’s rights. Marriage has also lost 
some of its previous privileged status, with legal 
discrimination against children born out of wedlock 
eliminated, and a divorce law introduced.  
Despite improved living conditions, there are ongoing 
problems. Poverty has declined, but remains significant, 
and the poverty line has been challenged as an adequate 
indicator (Raczynski 2006; Larrañaga and Herrera 2008). 
Moreover, Chile presents pronounced income inequality in 
relation to its level of economic development (CEPAL 2010). 
Economic growth has not been accompanied by an improvement 
of the labour market, as unemployment, informal employment, 
and short-term employment are endemic (Sehnbruch 2006a). 
Social welfare has also contributed to the reproduction of 
inequality by promoting a dual labour market, hampering 
female employment, and excluding the most deprived groups 
(Valenzuela 2006b). Only in recent decades have social 
policies begun to reach disadvantaged groups. In addition 
traditional attitudes, in particular in relation to gender, 
remain prevalent (PNUD 2010). 
On the whole, Chile is a privileged case for the study 
of unmarried cohabitation. On the one hand, as elsewhere in 
Latin America, Chile presents consensual unions that 
involve childbearing and are more prevalent among young, 
deprived groups. On the other hand, cohabitation has 
experienced a sharp increase in a context of profound 
economic, political, social, and cultural change. Hence a 
primary aim of this study is to understand the meaning of 
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cohabitation from the point of view of cohabitees 
themselves. The questions I will address include: Why and 
how do people come to live together without marrying? How 
do cohabitees experience their relationship in relation to 
marriage? What future expectations do they have for their 
relationship? A secondary aim is to find out why 
cohabitation has increased in Chile in recent decades. I 
seek to offer a tentative explanation for rising 
cohabitation not only among deprived groups, but also among 
the general population.  
The study of cohabitation is difficult, as the term 
can refer to and involve diverse living arrangements. It 
can refer to couples living together permanently, but also 
to couples who live together occasionally, whether because 
one partner already has another family; for work reasons; 
or because each partner keeps a different residence. 
Cohabitation can also involve children, stepchildren from 
previous relationships, or no children at all. Although 
cohabitation might be a common practice, it does not have 
legal recognition. It is more of a process than an event, 
and usually culminates either in marriage or in the 
separation of the couple. Unmarried cohabitation is 
accordingly a personal, and frequently temporary, 
arrangement. These characteristics suggest something that 
is not openly acknowledged, which entails a challenge for 
the researcher. 
In Latin America, consensual unions receive less 
protection than marriage or no protection at all (CRLP 
1997:11). Yet the trend is towards gradual recognition. New 
legislation is being enacted to enhance the protection of 
consensual unions, although this protection is still less 
than for married couples (CRLP 1997). In the case of Chile, 
the current government has proposed giving legal 
recognition to both heterosexual and same-sex unmarried 
couples, through civil partnership. It is however too soon 
to know if this proposal is going to prosper. 
The coding of marital status in Latin America is 
problematic, as it creates a false dichotomy between 
marriage and all other kinds of informal relationships (De 
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Vos 1999). On the one hand, cohabitation is a loose 
definition, as it can refer to visiting partnerships, trial 
marriages, and surrogate marriages, to name but a few 
possibilities. On the other hand, cohabitation is a limited 
concept because it does not record past relationships, as 
such as the case of people who were previously married and 
then separate. Nor does it capture other types of 
partnerships, such as visiting unions.  
In Chile, the national census codes consensual unions 
as marital status, despite their lack of actual legal 
status. Thus we have no information about the exact legal 
marital status of people who report for census purposes 
that they cohabit. It is at least possible that respondents 
largely report only legal marital status for census 
purposes, with cohabitation thereby concealed or 
underreported. However, as the census is focused on 
households, it does at least tend to identify those 
partners who regularly live together in the same household. 
The exact magnitude of cohabitation nonetheless remains 
unknown, and there is no sampling frame from which to draw 
a statistically representative sample. To obtain such a 
sampling frame would require conducting a large survey, 
based on a probabilistic sample, so as to collect an 
adequate number of cases. Such an alternative exceeds the 
possibilities of the present research. 
Current research on cohabitation in the region takes a 
macro approach, based on quantitative analysis of 
demographic data (De Vos 1998; Castro Martín 2002; García 
and Rojas 2004; Rodríguez Vignoli 2005). This demographic 
approach predominates in Chile (Herrera 2006; Herrera and 
Valenzuela 2006; Salinas 2009; Salinas 2011), in 
combination with economic perspectives (Irarrázaval and 
Valenzuela 1993; Larrañaga 2006a). A focus on the macro 
level nonetheless makes it difficult to identify how broad 
tendencies such as increased cohabitation relate to changes 
taking place at intermediate and micro levels. A micro 
level approach is more adequate for the discovery of 
possible mechanisms that link these different levels. 
Moreover, attention to the micro helps to account for human 
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agency, which is particularly relevant in intimate matters, 
such as union formation. Another problem with existing 
research is that it is mainly based exclusively on women 
(Castro Martín 2002; Larrañaga 2006a; Salinas 2011). 
As a consequence, I have conducted exploratory 
research based on the in-depth study of a few cases. My 
focus was on the most typical kind of cohabitation in 
Chile: I selected never-married young people who have had a 
child with their cohabiting partner, and who face no legal 
restrictions to marriage. The sample was formed by twenty-
four cases recruited from Cerro Navia and La Pintana, which 
are the two most deprived boroughs of the Greater Santiago 
metropolitan area. Half of the interviewees were women, and 
the other half were men. Information was collected about 
each participant, their partner, and their parents. Two 
interview sessions were conducted with each interviewee, 
lasting on average three hours in total. The fieldwork was 
carried out between September 2008 and January 2009.  
For the purposes of the study, I adopt a working 
definition of cohabitation as an intended action, and I 
follow a life course perspective based on qualitative 
biographies. The qualitative approach and the life course 
perspective are two methodologies which share a focus on 
human agency, or the capacity to act in pursuit of certain 
goals. The qualitative approach also emphasizes the study 
of meanings, or the cultural dimension of human behaviour, 
and is typically characterised by in-depth study of a 
limited number of cases. The life course perspective 
underscores the significance of individuals as located in a 
particular time and place, of social ties as intermediate 
agents, and of timing as the element that brings all these 
aspects together.  
My view of the social realm is shaped by elements 
highlighted by the qualitative approach and the life course 
perspective. I seek to account for continuity and change, 
intended action, self-reflection, and the role of the past 
in the present. In addition, I want to avoid both 
methodological individualism and structuralism. I consider 
the social sphere to be formed by three interconnected 
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levels: macro, intermediate, and micro. At the macro level, 
culture, power relations, and social structures both enable 
and determine human action. At the micro level, individuals 
have the capacity to perform purposive actions, or actions 
that are guided by particular meanings or intentions. 
Social ties, family bonds in particular, mediate between 
the macro and the micro level. Purposive actions produce 
intended and unintended consequences, which, in turn, bring 
about social reproduction and change. The time flow brings 
everything together. Time also enables individuals to 
reflect upon the past, assess the consequences of their 
actions, and to change their conduct. This reflective 
capacity is of particular relevance to the introduction of 
social change. 
I collected the data for the present study through 
life histories, defined as in-depth interviews focusing on 
people’s lives, their significant experiences, and the 
meanings that people attach to those events. Life histories 
convey the influences of historical events, and of 
economic, political, and social conditions. Personal 
accounts are also social, since people share similar 
experiences across variables such as age, gender, and 
social class. Personal accounts also capture the effect of 
time on people’s lives. As people report their past 
experiences, it is possible to find out how those events 
have shaped their current self-understanding. Personal 
accounts also consider relations and mediations between 
structures and personal lives, since they are populated by 
other people including relatives, friends, and colleagues. 
These personal ties are crucial in terms of how people are 
affected by and deal with their living conditions, and how 
they relate to both older and younger generations. 
I adopt a pragmatic view in relation to validity. I 
seek to increase the validation of this research, not its 
validity. I aim to show that the research results are 
convincing interpretations based on what is known, rather 
than claiming them to be  ‘true’ in the sense of reflecting 
a pre-existent and immutable reality. I wanted to question 
prevalent views about consensual unions in the region. I 
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will suggest an alternative and tentative perspective to 
account for changing cohabitation in Chile. Yet the test 
for the potential usefulness of this research will be 
whether it helps to stimulate and/or illuminate other 
studies. 
 
 
 
In Chapter 1, I review the main changes experienced by 
Chile in the closing decades of the previous century, and 
the beginning of the current century, in relation to 
factors that may be relevant for cohabitation. I often also 
go further back in time, as a longer historical perspective 
often helps to shed light on current trends. The chapter 
focus firstly on the demographic context in which rising 
cohabitation is taking place. It moves to consider the 
economic background, paying attention to issues of economic 
development and labour market changes, including female 
employment. Educational attainment is also analysed in this 
section. The third part of Chapter 1 deals with the 
relevant normative framework in terms of specific women’s, 
children’s, and family legislation. The chapter closes with 
an analysis of social policies and how they might have 
affected changing cohabitation. In Chapter 2, I explain and 
critique the existing approaches to cohabitation already 
mentioned above (the socio historic approach focused on 
race and sex; kinship and the importance of family 
obligations and the extended family, machismo, and how 
gender roles connect the intimate with social structures). 
I also consider views on modernity and development in 
relation to cohabitation. Chapter 3 gives an overview of 
the research design, explaining the sample selection 
criteria, the instruments used to collect the data, the 
analytical approach utilised, and ethical considerations. 
 The first results chapter, Chapter 4, shows how 
unmarried cohabitation is linked to precarious living 
conditions and gender. The labour market and provision of 
social welfare are analysed as support networks, as is the 
wider family. Gender roles, especially womanhood, are also 
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considered, as they introduce significant differences in 
terms of employment, social benefits, and family relations. 
In Chapter 5 I focus on how families of origin affect 
subsequent family formation. I begin by describing the 
families in which the young people in the study were 
reared, and discussing their reports of their own 
relationships with their parents. This background is useful 
for understanding young people’s experiences of family 
life, as it provides a backdrop against which they are 
starting their own families. I also explore how daughters 
and sons are given different family obligations, which 
impact on their own willingness and capacity to form a 
family. In the last section I turn my attention to older 
generations, parents in particular, and their role in 
shaping younger generations’ possibilities for and styles 
of partnering. 
Chapters 6 and 7 are focused on how young people come 
to live together, and on how the actual experience of 
cohabiting differs from marriage. First, I examine how 
views on gender, sexuality, birth control, and pregnancy 
influence union formation. The core of chapter 7 consists 
of an exploration of issues of gender, power, and 
visibility, as I examine what cohabitation entails for 
young people, and their expectations about the future of 
their partnership.  
In the conclusion, I summarize the research results 
and discuss existing literature on cohabitation in the 
light of research results. I also analyse the wider 
implications of the study, in particular for public policy.  
I also suggest further possible lines of research on the 
subject of consensual unions.  
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Chapter 1 - CHILE: SOCIAL CHANGE AND FAMILIES 
 
 
 
 
Family life does not take place in a vacuum, as the privacy 
of family relations is affected by very public forces. 
Intimate matters such as sex, love, partnering, and having 
children are shaped by social structures. Cohabitation is 
not exempt from the influence of social conditions. Even 
those who choose to live together because they do not 
desire institutional intervention are subject to broader 
conditions. The focus of this chapter is on how these 
changing conditions have affected Chilean families, in 
particular in relation to cohabitation. The aim is to 
understand how different structures might be connected to 
patterns of cohabitation, and what kind of cohabitation 
might be encouraged by those conditions. 
I will begin by reviewing the demographic context in 
which rising cohabitation takes place. The focus is on the 
possible drives of changing unmarried cohabitation. Changes 
in relation to fertility, out of wedlock births, and 
marriage are analysed. I go on to discuss economic 
development, employment in particular, and its relation to 
cohabitation. The structure and quality of the labour 
market is the single factor that has the greatest impact on 
the survival of families. I focus here on unemployment, 
short-term employment, female employment, and on how social 
welfare has affected the labour market. In the third 
section I delve into the trajectory of family legislation 
over time: from the nineteenth century to its radical 
transformation in the twentieth century. In the last 
section I study social welfare more generally. Social 
welfare impacts upon families because of its capacity to 
provide a safety net, and through the criteria used to 
decide who should be assisted and who should not. I study 
the social welfare provision from its origins at the 
beginning of the twentieth century to its decisive 
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modification by Pinochet’s dictatorship and the following 
democratic governments of the Concertación. I will show 
how, thanks to neoliberal reforms marriage began to be 
displaced as the privileged form of access to social 
welfare for women/ mothers not involved in formal 
employment. 
 
 
 
Nuptiality and Fertility 
 
 
The immediate demographic context of rising cohabitation in 
Chile shows significant changes in relation to fertility 
and union formation. On the one hand, the majority of 
births are now out of wedlock. On the other hand, marriage 
is declining. Thus it would be possible to assume that 
rising cohabitation is the main factor promoting out of 
wedlock childbearing. Yet, as I will show here, this would 
be an erroneous conclusion.  
In this section I will analyse the demographic drivers 
of the recent increase in cohabitation, as well as 
describing the main features found among those who cohabit. 
The section deals first with assessing the adequacy of the 
demographic transition for explaining declining fertility 
in Chile, and on how cohabitation and childbearing are 
linked. Then the focus is on the increase of out-of wedlock 
births and its connection to rising cohabitation. I go on 
to discuss how patterns of marriage and cohabitation are 
related to issues of first sexual intercourse, first union, 
and first birth. The final part of the chapter gives a 
portrait of socio demographic characteristics associated 
with people who cohabit. 
 
 
 
Chile was one of the first countries in Latin America to 
experience a sharp decline in the overall fertility rate. 
In 1960, the number of children per woman was 4.3.  This 
 22 
decreased to 2.4 in 2000 (Larrañaga 2006a: table 1). As in 
the rest of Latin America, lower fertility in Chile has not 
followed the pattern predicted by the demographic 
transition (Guzmán 1996).  
The demographic transition theory relates demographic 
growth, through both birth and death rates, to development 
or modernization. It asserts a two-step movement that 
starts with high birth rates and high death rates, 
producing a low-growth population. Then there is a 
transitional phase where death rates go down and birth 
rates remain high, leading to a significant growth in 
population. Finally, birth rates decrease, and the 
population reaches a new low growth equilibrium (Das 
1980:9; Therborn 2004:229-230). According to the 
demographic transition, industrialization reduces death 
rates by improving living conditions. Industrialization 
also transforms society, producing an urban industrial 
society which values small families, leading to a decrease 
in birth rates (Therborn 2004:230).  
In the case of Chile, evidence suggests that between 
the 1960s and the 1980s, declining fertility was not 
prompted by economic growth, higher levels of women’s 
education, or increased female employment (Larrañaga 
2006a). In fact, women from low socioeconomic groups 
account for most of the drop in fertility in that period. 
At that time Chilean women, especially married ones, 
limited their fertility primarily thanks to access to 
contraception and, to a lesser extent, to lower child 
mortality. Though women’s schooling doubled between 1960 
and 2000, it was only in the 1990s that it translated into 
higher female employment. Therefore it was just in the 
1990s that female employment began to have a negative 
effect on fertility.  
 
 
 
In Chile the proportion of children born outside marriage 
has a U shape for most of the twentieth century, but with a 
sharp increase at the turn of the century (see figure 1.1). 
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In 1930 out of wedlock births accounted for a third of 
total births. From then up to 1960 out of wedlock births 
declined reaching a lowest of 16 percent in that year. In 
this period non marital fertility remained stable, so out 
of wedlock births did not decrease because unmarried 
mothers limited their fertility (Valenzuela 2006a). In 
fact, married mothers were the ones who increased their 
fertility, and, as a consequence, the proportion of 
children born out of wedlock decreased. In addition, in 
this period the proportion of unmarried women declined, 
thus further contributing to fewer out of wedlock births.  
 
 
Figure 1.1: Out of wedlock births, Chile 1930- 2010   (as percentage of total births)   
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Data sources: Years 1930 to 1955: Valenzuela (2006a: table 3). Years 1960 to 2000: Larrañaga (2006a:table1). Years 
2006 and 2010: Servicio de Registro Civil e Identificación (2011)  
 
 
Between 1960 and 1990, the proportion of out of wedlock 
births began to increase again, reaching a level similar to 
the beginning of the century in 1990 (around a third of 
total births). Between 1960 and 1985 non marital fertility 
continued to be stable so it did not lead this decline (see 
figure 1.2). By contrast, as said above, by the mid 1960s 
marital fertility began to decrease. Hence declining 
marital fertility is the main driver of increased out of 
wedlock births from 1960 to 1990 (Larrañaga 2006a).  
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Figure 1.2: Birth rate by marital status, Chile 1960-2003 
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Source: Larrañaga (2006a: table 1) 
 
 
The sharpest increase in out of wedlock births took place 
from the 1990s onwards (see figure 1.1). A similar 
tendency, although starting earlier, in 1970, has been 
described for the Latin American region as a whole. In 2000 
out of wedlock births accounted for more than 50 percent of 
births in the region (Castro Martín, Cortina et al. 2011). 
In the case of Chile, this further rise in out of wedlock 
childbearing cannot be fully accounted for by lowered 
marital fertility (Larrañaga 2006a). From 1990 the 
proportion of unmarried women began to increase and so to 
contribute to non marital childbearing. Unmarried women 
increased as an outcome of delayed and declining marriage, 
which was paralleled by single and cohabiting mothers 
becoming more frequent (see below). A slight increase in 
non-marital fertility in the 1990s also helps to explain 
the latest increase in unmarried childbearing (see figure 
1.2).  
 Available evidence shows that in Chile in 2003, 
unmarried mothers reached 46 percent of total mothers 
(Larrañaga 2006a: table 12). More recent evidence suggests 
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that the proportion of cohabiting mothers continues to 
grow, as in Santiago in 2009 unmarried mothers reached 52 
percent of total mothers. This in turn mirrors a tendency 
present across the country as a whole (Salinas 2011: 
Footnote 8).  
 If we turn to the issue of the marital status of the 
mother of out of wedlock children, available research shows 
that in Chile in 2002 children born to single mothers were 
in the majority (Castro Martín, Cortina et al. 2011: figure 
2). However, the biggest single increase has been in the 
proportion of births to cohabiting women. Between 1970 and 
2002, the proportion of births to cohabiting women 
increased fourfold, from 5 to 20 percent of total births. 
In the same period, births to single women increased by 
almost three times, from 9 to 25 percent, and births to 
married women decreased from 86 to 54 percent of total 
births.  
Cohabitation in Chile, as in the rest of Latin 
America, usually involves childbearing (Rodríguez Vignoli 
2005; Herrera and Valenzuela 2006). Indeed census data from 
2002 show that 86 percent of cohabiting women have children 
(Herrera and Valenzuela 2006: table 13).  
 In Chile, age at first union (defined as marriage or 
cohabitation) has increased for both, women and men. In 
1970 the average age at first union for men was 26, and for 
women 23. In 2002, ages at first union increased to 28 and 
25, respectively (UN 2009). It is reasonable to assume that 
increased age at first union has mainly been an outcome of 
delayed marriage, as evidence suggests that people in Chile 
enter into cohabitation at a younger age than into marriage 
(Rodríguez Vignoli 2005; Herrera and Valenzuela 2006; 
Larrañaga 2006a; Salinas 2009).  
Similarly, age at first birth has increased more among 
married women than among unmarried ones. Overall, women’s 
age at first birth has remained constant between 1960 and 
2003, at around 23 years of age.  However, the relevant 
figure for married mothers shows an increase from 24 to 27, 
while among unmarried mothers the increase was more modest: 
from 21 to 22. Thus married mothers are those who show a 
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clearer pattern of delayed motherhood (Larrañaga 2006a: 
table 9).  
On average, age at first sexual intercourse in Chile 
is 17 years old, according to figures for 2010 based on 
surveys of the 15 to 29 year old age cohort. Men report a 
slightly lower age of first intercourse than women: 16 and 
17 years, respectively (INJUV 2010: figure 169). Seventy-
six percent of people aged 15 to 29 reported having had 
sexual intercourse, of whom only 1 percent experienced 
their first sexual intercourse within marriage or 
cohabitation. The majority had their first sexual 
intercourse with a boyfriend or girlfriend. This category 
was more frequently reported by young women (84 percent) 
than by young men (57 percent) (INJUV 2010: figure 163 & 
table 119). 
 
 
 
A third realm of significant demographic change, together 
with declining fertility and rising out of wedlock 
childbearing, refers to union formation through marriage or 
cohabitation. In Chile the marriage rate has been 
relatively stable for most of the twentieth century, at 
around 13 marriages for every 1,000 people aged 15 to 64 
(see figure 1.3). Yet it is possible to observe that at the 
beginning of the twentieth century the marriage rate 
increased, owing perhaps to the introduction of social 
welfare. Later in this chapter I explore how the provision 
of social benefits might be related to marriage and 
cohabitation. The biggest change however took place in the 
last decade of the twentieth century, when the marriage 
rate dropped to almost half of its historical value. 
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Figure 1.3: Marriage rate, Chile 1920-2000 (per 1,000 people aged 15 to 64) 
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Source: Data from Herrera (2006: figure 2) 
 
 
In the same period, between 1990 and 2000, cohabitation 
began to rise sharply. Census data show that from 1950 to 
1990 cohabitation accounted for around 6 percent of people 
aged 30 to 59 who were in a partnership (Herrera and 
Valenzuela 2006). The lowest point of cohabitation was in 
1970, at around 4 percent. This was also a period when 
marriage increased. Yet between 1990 and 2000, cohabitation 
increased from around 8 to 14 percent in the same age 
group. Evidence suggests that rising cohabitation has not 
entailed an overall increase in partnerships, but has gone 
hand in hand with a decrease and also a delay of marriage 
(Herrera and Valenzuela 2006). 
 
 
 
As in Latin America as a whole, cohabitation in Chile has 
been more frequent among young people, low-income groups, 
and those with low educational attainment. Between 1990 and 
2000, cohabitation increased the most in absolute terms 
precisely among these groups. In that period cohabitation 
showed a sharp increase among young people, particularly 
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those aged 15 to 24, but also in the 25 to 34 age group 
(see figure 1.4).  
 
Figure 1.4: Cohabitation by age cohort, Chile 1992-2002 (percentage of people aged 15 or more in a 
cohabitation partnership at the time of data collection) 
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Data source: Herrera (2006:figure 11) 
 
 
Low income groups and those with only secondary education 
account for most of the increase in cohabitation, (see 
figures 1.5 and 1.6 respectively). It should however be 
emphasized that cohabitation is not restricted to the very 
disadvantaged. Cohabitation is present and fairly common 
across Chilean society, except the upper strata, meaning 
those with higher education and from the two higher income 
quintiles. In other words, cohabitation is most prevalent 
in the first three income quintiles, among members of low 
and middle-low income groups, and among those with only 
primary or secondary education.  
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Figure 1.5: Cohabitation by income quintile, Chile 1992-2002 (percentage of people aged 15 or 
more in a partnership at time of data collection) 
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Data source: (Herrera and Valenzuela 2006: table 11) 
 
 
 
Figure 1.6: Cohabitation by educational level, Chile 1992-2002 (percentage of people aged 15 or 
more in a partnership at time of data collection) 
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Data source: (Herrera and Valenzuela 2006: table 11) 
 
 
 
As far as living arrangements are concerned, cohabiting and 
married couples in Chile tend to live in nuclear households 
(Light and Ureta 2004; Larrañaga 2006a). However, those 
cohabiting couples who do live in extended households 
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usually live in the parental home of the male partner. By 
contrast, married couples living in extended households 
usually live in the parental home of the female partner 
(Larrañaga 2006a: Footnote 22). In addition there is 
preliminary evidence showing that young cohabiting couples 
frequently start their life together living in an extended 
household (Salinas 2011).  
It should be highlighted that extended households are 
significant in Chile, accounting for example for almost 20 
percent of all households in 2009 (Mideplan 2009e). 
Extended households are more frequent among disadvantaged 
groups (Raczynski 2006). Similarly, household size has a 
negative relation to income. In 2006, the average number of 
people per household was 4.5 in the poorest decile and 2.9 
in the richest (Larrañaga and Herrera 2008:table 13). 
Available evidence suggests that cohabiting mothers 
are less likely to be involved in paid work and education 
than are single mothers (Larrañaga 2006a: table 13) (see 
below, section on Poverty, Employment, and Education, for 
further discussion of the issue of female employment). In 
addition, cohabitation seems to present lower levels of 
homogamy than does marriage. Evidence shows that cohabiting 
partners in Chile are less similar to one another than are 
married couples as regards religion, education, and age 
(Herrera and Valenzuela 2006) 
 
 
 
On the whole, available evidence suggests that union 
formation started to change in Chile after 1990. From that 
date onwards, delayed and declining marriage was paralleled 
by increasing cohabitation.  A look at the major points of 
contrast and similarity between cohabitation and marriage 
in this period throws up the following: in comparison to 
married couples, those who cohabit are younger, less 
educated, and have lower incomes. Cohabiting partners are 
additionally more dissimilar than are married ones in 
relation to religious beliefs, age, and education. They 
typically enter into partnerships at a younger age than 
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their married counterparts. They do no have restricted 
their fertility or delayed having children. Cohabiting 
women are usually not involved in paid work, and young 
cohabiting couples frequently start their lives together in 
an extended household. By contrast, married couples have 
delayed union formation and first birth, and have also 
limited their fertility. Cohabitation is nonetheless 
similar to marriage in that both usually involve 
childbearing, albeit at different stages of life and 
partnership.   
 This evidence points to a gap between married and 
cohabiting couples. For Latin America, we moreover find an 
extensive literature highlighting how deprived families 
have favoured living in extended and complex households so 
to join forces in order to survive (see Chapter 2). Lack of 
means and family arrangements appear, therefore, to be 
related in specific ways. Consensual unions, which are more 
frequent among less privileged groups, are at the core of 
these particular family arrangements. In the next section I 
will discuss how poverty, economic growth and employment 
are related to family life, and, in particular, to 
cohabitation. 
 
 
 
Poverty, Employment, and Education 
 
 
The Western pattern of marriage, which was adopted in Latin 
America, is distinctive in implicitly requiring young 
couples to have sufficient means to set up a new household 
(Therborn 2004). Thus union formation is related to 
economic conditions. Pervasive cohabitation in the region 
has consequently been explained as a result of enduring 
poverty and income inequalities (Castro Martín 2002; 
Therborn 2004; Rodríguez Vignoli 2005). Yet the evidence 
from Chile challenges this view, as cohabitation in Chile 
has increased precisely at a time of significant economic 
 32 
growth accompanied by an absolute decrease in poverty. In 
this section I will analyse the economic context in which 
cohabitation in Chile has become more frequent. I focus 
initially on figures for economic growth, poverty, and 
income inequality. I go on to explore how the labour market 
has been negatively affected by being charged with 
providing social benefits such as childcare and severance 
pay. Finally I pay attention to issues of education; in 
particular, educational coverage and quality. 
 
 
 
At the turn of the nineteenth century, Chile experienced 
significant economic, social, and political changes (Ponce 
de León, Rengifo et al. 2006). Between 1835 and 1920 the 
population increased more than three times. This period saw 
the beginnings of massive rural-urban migration began, 
since the traditional agrarian economy could not absorb 
these levels of increase in the labour force. A mobile mass 
of impoverished men began to circulate through the country, 
seeking temporary jobs. Women and children migrated to the 
city, where they lived in conventillos, a term used to 
describe cramped, poor housing conditions. After the First 
World War and the economic crisis of 1929, the state 
promoted industrialization to deal with mounting social 
problems (Filgueira, Neil et al. 2001:8432). After the 
Second World War, industrialization was further backed by 
the economic theory of import-substitution 
industrialization (ISI).  
The ISI approach encouraged industrialization oriented 
towards the domestic market. The state was the leading 
agent of ISI, as it developed policies to encourage 
industrialization and to protect domestic industry from 
outside competition (Filgueira, Neil et al. 2001:8432). 
Industrialization and economic growth, together with 
education and urbanization, were seen as key factors in 
becoming a modern nation (Lavrin 2005:16).   
Latin America experienced significant economic growth 
between the postwar period and the economic crisis of the 
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1970s (Ffrench-Davis, Muñoz et al. 1994). Economic 
development went hand in hand with urbanization (Merrick 
1994); and to a lesser extent with industrialization 
(Ffrench-Davis, Muñoz et al. 1994), and the expansion of 
mass education (Oliveira and Roberts 1994). Chile’s urban 
population increased from 32 percent of total population in 
1930 to 58 percent in 1950, and 81 percent in 1980 (Merrick 
1994). In parallel, illiteracy declined from 20 percent in 
1950 to 9 percent in 1980 (Oliveira and Roberts 1994).  
In spite of this apparent economic bonanza, poverty 
and social inequality did not decrease as expected. Latin 
American intellectuals began to critically analyse 
modernization theory. Cardoso and Faletto (1979) posited 
that Latin American countries experience structural 
dependency on the economic centre, formed by developed 
countries. This dependency is not the same as traditional 
colonialism: in the new dependency dynamic, internal elites 
promote foreign interests because these match their own 
agendas. Local elites therefore help to produce and 
perpetuate dependency.  ISI is also believed to have 
promoted a dual labour market by focusing on 
industrialization at the expense of agriculture and rural 
labour. The resulting labour market is split between a 
reduced number of privileged formal urban workers and a 
mass of workers excluded from the formal market (Haggard 
and Kaufman 2008). Indeed, available data shows that 
industrial growth has brought only a marginal decline of 
the informal labour force (Castells and Portes 1989). In 
addition, ISI’s emphasis on the importance of technological 
inputs entailed a tapering off of domestic employment.  
The oil price crisis of the 1970s, and the resultant 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods currency system, pushed the 
region into an economic crisis. This soon deepened into the 
debt crisis of the 1980s, which in turn opened the door to 
a new economic approach: neoliberalism. International 
agencies including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank promoted neoliberal economic theories 
and, particularly in the case of the IMF, recommended or 
mandated that Latin American governments adopt neoliberal 
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market-based models in exchange for much needed loans. 
Latin America became the favoured locus for the 1980s’ most 
radical experiment in social and economic change 
(Filgueira, Neil et al. 2001). Chile was a particularly 
enthusiastic exponent of the new economic theories. 
Structural adjustment policies were applied in many 
countries. The 1980s often came to be referred to as a 
‘lost decade’ for Latin America as many major social and 
economic development indicators stagnated or regressed.3  
The neoliberal perspective introduced over the course 
of the 1980s posited the need to return to free markets and 
open economies, and to reduce state participation in the 
economy (Filgueira, Neil et al. 2001). By the 2000s, after 
well over twenty years of predominance of this neoliberal 
approach, its record in Chile is undoubtedly mixed 
(Sehnbruch 2006a). Chile has certainly been one of the best 
economic performers in the region more than doubling its 
per capita GDP between 1985 and 2003 (see figure 1.7).  
 
 
Figure 1.7: Chilean per capita GDP, 1960 -2003 (where 1960 GDP level =100) 
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Data source: Larrañaga (2006a: table 4) 
 
 
                     
3
 Whether because of or despite the neoliberal turn being, of course, a 
matter of continuing controversy.  
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Nonetheless, Chile’s macroeconomic growth has not entailed 
income equality, and has had only limited success in 
reduction of absolute poverty. Although levels of absolute 
poverty have dropped from the mid-1980s onwards, when pre-
1980s poverty indices are considered, the overall reduction 
of poverty is less evident. For example, according to UN 
figures, in 1969 poverty affected 17 percent of the Chilean 
population in 1989 and almost the same percentage in 2009 
(see figure 1.8)  
 
 
Figure 1.8: Poverty in Chile, 1969-2009 (as a percentage) 
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Note: The figure shows poverty levels based on the definition offered by UN agency ECLAC. The ECLAC definition is 
based on a poverty line reflecting the minimum value of goods and services considered essential to satisfy essential 
needs. People whose incomes place them below this poverty line are considered poor. 
Data sources: For the years 1969, 1985, 1990, 1996 and 2000: Raczynski (2006). For the years 2006 and 2009: 
Mideplan (2009f:3) 
 
 
 
 
The decline in poverty in Chile was especially pronounced 
in the 1990s, as shown in figure 1.8. This drop was due to 
economic growth, which does not automatically close the 
income gap, and in fact, inequality remained steady in this 
period (Larrañaga and Herrera 2008:149). A second fall in 
poverty took place between 2000 and 2006, from 21 to 14 
percent. In this case, declining poverty was associated 
with diminished inequality (Larrañaga and Herrera 2008:168-
69). In fact, the income ratio of the richest to the 
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poorest decile decreased from 30 to 24 times in this period 
(Mideplan 2009a). More recent figures on inequality, from 
2009, nonetheless show either a slight increase or no 
change in relation to 2006 levels (Mideplan 2009a:13). 
Consequently, although poverty and inequality are 
subject to change, in practice they have been pervasive in 
Chile. Enduring poverty is explained, in part, because 
households can easily move above or below the poverty line 
due to high levels of income instability (Raczynski 2006). 
Indeed, figures for 2006 show that 45 percent of those 
classified as poor in that year were not considered poor in 
the year 2001 (Arzola and Castro 2009). Because of the high 
numbers of households concentrated near the poverty line, 
its adequacy for the case of Chile as an indicator of 
poverty has been called into question (Larrañaga and 
Herrera 2008). Unemployment and job instability, on which I 
focus next, have been identified as the two most important 
factors in the eradication of poverty in Chile (Arzola and 
Castro 2009:21).  
 
 
Figures show that lack of employment, short-term 
employment, and informality are not equally distributed 
across Chile’s different socio economic groups. Deprived 
groups have higher rates of unemployment and informality, 
and are more likely to obtain only short-term employment or 
employment not providing a formal contract. For example, 
overall national unemployment was 10 percent in Chile in 
2009. However, it stood at 39 percent in the poorest income 
decile and 20 percent in the next poorest. By contrast, 
unemployment in the richest decile was only 4 percent (see 
figure 1.9).  
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Figure 1.9: Unemployment levels by income decile, Chile 2009 (percentage) 
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Note: Unemployment is defined here according to the International Labour Organization, ILO, definition of people who 
had actively sought work within the four weeks prior to the survey. 
Data source: Mideplan (2009g:4) 
 
 
 
 
In the same year,2009, 43 percent of wage earners in the 
poorest decile, and 29 percent in the next poorest did not 
have a work contract. By contrast, a mere 10 percent of 
wage earners in the richest decile did not have a work 
contract (Mideplan 2009g:14). Short-term work contracts are 
also inversely related to household income. Thus 60 percent 
of employees in the poorest decile have a short-term 
contract, whereas in the richest decile the relevant 
proportion is only 18 percent (Mideplan 2009g:16). 
Employment and social welfare are closely related, as 
access to social welfare in Chile is mostly dependent on 
having formal long-term employment. Therefore inequalities 
of the labour market also entail less access to social 
welfare for those involved in more precarious employment. 
Those who do not contribute to social security are usually 
those who are unemployed, work without a contract, or 
perform short-term jobs. Indeed, the proportion of 
employees who do not contribute to social security 
increases as household income diminishes, as shown in 
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figure 1.10. The last section of this chapter focuses on 
social welfare in more depth. For present purposes it is 
however instructive to note that  the existing structure of 
social welfare provision has promoted a dual labour market, 
as did ISI policies before it.  This is because in both 
cases, social entitlements are disproportionately awarded 
to long-term formal workers holding a written work 
contract.  
 
 
Figure 1.10: Employees who do not contribute to social security by income decile, Chile 2009 (as a 
percentage) 
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Note: ‘Employees’ is defined here according to the ILO definition of any individual who worked in remunerated 
employment, even if only for one hour, in the week prior to the survey. 
Data source: Mideplan (2009g:23)  
 
 
 
The labour market in Chile has been negatively affected by 
being made responsible for the delivery of some social 
benefits. Female employment is particularly negatively 
affected. Chilean employers are legally obliged to provide 
severance pay for their employees, and, if they have 20 or 
more female employees, to provide crèche facilities for 
working mothers. From the employer’s point of view, the 
requirement to provide social benefits is problematic, 
since it introduces variable operating costs. Thus in 
practice, employers have sought to reduce or avoid their 
severance pay and childcare obligations. Therefore, only a 
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small proportion of workers have received these benefits 
and the labour market has been distorted (Valenzuela 
2006b). Short-term employment and barriers to female 
employment are persistent problems in the Chilean labour 
market (Valenzuela 2006b).  
Short-term employment is particularly characteristic 
among salaried workers. A survey of businesses, conducted 
in 2000, showed that in that year 48 percent of the total 
workforce employed at some point over the year had 
subsequently been made redundant, while 54 percent were new 
hires (Valenzuela 2006b). Unemployment insurance was not 
introduced in Chile until 2002, so in practice severance 
pay has been used as a kind of unemployment insurance. 
Severance pay was introduced in 1925, and has experienced 
many modifications. Today, severance pay means that wage-
earners with a formal work contract receive one month’s 
salary for each year of work, up to eleven months’ worth, 
when they are fired. Hence it becomes a liability for 
employers to retain the same workers on long-term contracts 
and so they instead hire their workforce on a short-term 
basis (Valenzuela 2006b).  
The introduction of unemployment insurance has not 
modified these high levels of short-term employment, as the 
obligation to pay severance continues. In addition, the 
amount received as unemployment insurance depends, like 
severance pay, on being a formal wage-earner and is 
calculated according to the number of years the worker has 
been employed. Independent and informal workers are thereby 
excluded from unemployment insurance, as are short-term 
workers (Sehnbruch 2006b). In 2009 the qualifying requisite 
of the workers having made twelve continuous monthly 
contributions from wages was modified to twelve 
contributions over two years, yet given high levels of 
short-term employment many workers will still not be 
covered by this insurance. 
Short-term employment has negative effects not only in 
the economy, but also in society overall. Short-term 
employment promotes distrust between employers and 
employees, and increases the prevalence of economic 
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activities that do not require formal labour qualifications 
(Valenzuela 2006b). Short-term employment also affects 
social security protection, as the amount finally received 
varies according to pension and unemployment insurance 
contributions made, and depends therefore on the overall 
length of time spent in employment over a person’s working 
life (Sehnbruch 2006a). Short-term employment can introduce 
devastating uncertainty to family life (Sehnbruch 2006a). 
 
 
 
Company childcare provision became compulsory in Chile 
in 1917, taking its current form in 1925 (Valenzuela 
2006b). From then on, employers of twenty or more women 
have been required to provide childcare facilities, which 
is a considerable hurdle to female employment (Valenzuela 
2006b). Between 1907 and 1930, as social welfare was 
introduced, the proportion of women in paid work dropped 
from 22 to 13 percent (Valenzuela 2006b:394). More recent 
figures show that in 1999 small and medium businesses, 
which provide most of the employment in Chile, tended to 
hire no more than 19 women (Valenzuela 2006b). 
The fact that companies, rather than the state, were 
made responsible for providing childcare has introduced 
significant inequalities. It contributes to household 
inequalities, as poorer households are deprived of women’s 
incomes. Gender inequality has been increased as well, not 
simply because of barriers to female employment, but also 
because the related difficulty of accessing social 
security. So deprived women, and particularly single 
mothers, are the most affected and segregated by this 
legislation that sets motherhood against, and in conflict 
with, paid female work (Valenzuela 2006b:399). Maternity 
leave entailed similar problems up to the 1950s, at which 
point it began to be financed by the social security 
contributions of working women. 
Unsurprisingly, female employment in Chile is 
relatively low by Latin American standards (García and 
Oliveira 2011:table 1). Nevertheless female employment in 
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Chile began to increase from 1985. Figures for the capital, 
Santiago, show that 37 percent of women were involved in 
paid work at the beginning of the 1980s, compared to 50 
percent at the beginning of the twenty-first century (see 
figure 1.11). Figures for the whole country show a similar 
trend (Larrañaga 2006b:table 2). This increase in female 
employment is related to good overall economic performance, 
but also to higher levels of female education and declining 
fertility rates (Larrañaga 2006b:211). 
 
 
Figure 1.11: Women’s participation in the labour force, Santiago de Chile 1958-2003 (women aged 
15-65, as a percentage ) 
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Data source:  Larrañaga  (2006b:table 1) 
 
 
 
Women’s participation in the labour force also varies 
according to education, fertility, and marital status 
(Larrañaga 2006b). Women with higher education show 
relatively higher levels of paid employment. From 1968 to 
2003, employment reached around 70 percent for women with 
higher education (Larrañaga 2006b: table 3). Women with 
only primary education are falling behind. At the beginning 
of the 1970s, women with primary and secondary education 
showed similar rates of employment, around 37 percent. Yet 
at the end of the 1990s, employment among women with 
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secondary education stood at 55 percent, compared to 45 
percent for women with primary education. 
Childless women consistently show higher rates of 
employment. In 1958-1962 60 percent of women without 
children participated in the labour force, reaching 80 
percent in 1998-2003 (Larrañaga 2006b: table 5). Women with 
children show a similar increase of around 20 points, 
having begun from a lower figure. At the beginning of the 
1960s, employment reached 32 percent among women with one 
or two children and 19 percent for women with three or four 
children. At the beginning of the twenty-first century the 
rates were 54 and 45 percent, respectively.  
However, the participation of women with children in 
the labour force is additionally affected by their marital 
status. Having children does not, by contrast, 
significantly affect participation in the labour force for 
single or separated women: employment of single or 
separated women stood at 77 percent in 2003 for those with 
children, and 76 percent for those with no children 
(Larrañaga 2006b: table 7). Yet in the same year, among 
women who were in a partnership (marriage or cohabitation), 
only 45 percent of those with children were employed. 
Therefore, children only become an obstacle to joining the 
labour force for women with a male partner, formal or 
informal. The negative effect of having a partner on 
women’s employment holds even after controlling by 
household income and number of children (Larrañaga 
2006b:191&table A-6).  
That married or cohabiting mothers show lower levels 
of employment is a manifestation of a cultural context in 
which female employment is seen as a threat to family life, 
and in particular to motherhood (Raczynski 2006). Rejection 
of the principle of female employment is stronger among 
groups with lower levels of educational attainment 
(Larrañaga 2006b:193). A public opinion survey conducted in 
2008 shows that 31 percent of Chileans agree with the 
statement ‘a woman should only work if her partner does not 
earn enough’, and that higher levels of agreement with this 
statement were positively related to lower levels of 
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educational attainment (Latinobarómetro 2011). Agreement 
reached 40 percent among people with low educational 
attainment, compared with 23 percent among people with high 
educational attainment. 
 
 
In relation to education, Chile is advancing towards 
universal access to primary and secondary education. In 
2009, 93 percent of the population aged 6 to 13 were in 
primary education, and 71 percent of people aged 14 to 17 
were in secondary education (Mideplan 2009c). Higher 
education shows lower levels of coverage (29 percent of the 
people aged 18 to 24 group in 2009), and it is unequally 
distributed across socioeconomic groups. Seventeen percent 
of the people aged 18 to 24 of poorest quintile was in 
higher education in 2009 compared to 54 percent of the 
richest quintile (Mideplan 2009c).  
Even though access to public education is improving, 
its quality is highly uneven, and poor students tend to be 
relegated to low quality schools (Eyzaguirre and Le Foulon 
2001). In addition, school drop-out is concentrated among 
the disadvantaged. For example, 61 percent of young people 
aged 20 to 24 from the poorest decile completed secondary 
education in 2009, by contrast with 98 percent of those 
from the richest decile (Mideplan 2009b). Deprived groups 
have fewer total years of schooling: on average, 11 years 
for the two poorest deciles, and 14 years for the two 
richest. (Mideplan 2009b). A significant student campaign 
movement emerged in 2011, demanding improvements in the 
quality and equality of Chilean higher education, but it is 
too soon to see any measurable effects of this campaign on 
educational provision. 
 
 
All in all, Chile has experienced significant recent 
economic growth, yet efforts to overcome poverty and 
inequality have met only partial success. Although poverty 
has declined, a significant part of the population still 
lives below the poverty line. In addition, income 
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inequality has proven difficult to narrow. Unemployment, 
short-term employment, and informality remain problematic 
and unequally distributed. Female employment has increased, 
yet faces ongoing barriers. 
This situation is puzzling, as the combination of 
recent economic growth and declining poverty could be 
expected to have promoted marriage in Chile. Instead, 
cohabitation became more frequent. The analysis presented 
here has however shown the significance of the low quality 
of the labour market, which is moreover being used as a 
provider of childcare and severance pay. This should lead 
us to ask what role the state may have played in rising 
rates of cohabitation. In the next section I will analyse 
the normative legal framework the state provides for family 
life. 
 
 
 
Family Law and the State 
 
 
Marriage in colonial Hispanic America followed Catholic 
norms promulgated by the Council of Trent, 1545-1563 
(Candina Polomer 2005); a council at which the Church laid 
down a series of stipulations about doctrinal matters in an 
effort to counter the spread of Protestant ideas.  The 
Council is accordingly usually regarded as the maximum 
expression of the ideas of the Counter-Reformation. In 
regard to the sacrament of marriage, the Council laid down 
that marriage was to be regarded as a sacred, monogamous, 
lifetime commitment. Marriage set the limits for sexual 
activity, whose aim was procreation, and also established 
lines for the transmission of property. Marriage was to be 
patriarchal, with women and children under the authority of 
the husband and father. In Chile, as in the rest of 
Hispanic America, the Spanish crown and the Catholic Church 
encouraged marriage in order to stop interracial coupling 
(Cavieres and Salinas 1991).  
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The wars of Latin American independence that took 
place around the region in the early nineteenth century 
were driven by local elites, and tended to be political 
rather than social revolutions. By 1830 the Chilean elite, 
newly independent from Spain, had imposed an authoritarian, 
centralized, and reformist state. The Civil Code, enacted 
in 1857, signalled the aspiration of the ruling elite to 
build a modern state. Chile’s legal framework shows strong 
Napoleonic influence yet in respect of family law, Catholic 
Canon Law prevailed (Ponce de León, Rengifo et al. 2006). 
By the end of the nineteenth century, secularization of the 
state had however reached a high point, and the ruling 
elite was actively seeking to assimilate European migrants 
(Ponce de León, Rengifo et al. 2006:52). Accordingly, a 
Civil Registry and Civil Marriage Law were introduced, in 
1884, to recognize non-Catholics. Soon after the Civil 
Marriage Law was promulgated, the marriage rate declined. 
Evidence suggests that deprived groups did not value the 
idea of a civil wedding, and so did not attend the registry 
office to get married (Ponce de León, Rengifo et al. 
2006:66).  
Civil marriage was an indissoluble contract, and it 
gave inheritance rights to the legitimate wife and 
children. Women were under the authority of the husband, 
and he was responsible for managing the marital property. 
Children were subjected to the exclusive control of the 
father, a precept known as patria potestad (Milanich 
2002:85). The legislation created three classifications for 
children: legitimate, natural, and illegitimate (Candina 
Polomer 2005). Legitimate children were those born within 
marriage. Natural and illegitimate children were both born 
out of wedlock, with the term ‘natural’ reserved for those 
children who were subsequently voluntarily recognized by 
the father. Natural children had some inheritance rights 
and came under the father’s patria potestad in the same way 
as their legitimate siblings. Illegitimate children, those 
born outside marriage and not recognized by the father, 
were given no inheritance rights. Crucially, the mother’s 
authority was not recognized by law either. As maternal 
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authority for illegitimate children was not sanctioned, 
these children were vulnerable to removal from their 
mother’s control and to exploitation (Milanich 2002:85). 
Furthermore, the investigation of paternity was banned and 
it was left to male discretion whether or not to recognize 
offspring born of informal relationships. (Ponce de León, 
Rengifo et al. 2006). 
By the end of the nineteenth century, social change in 
Chile fuelled deep social problems. The Popular Front, a 
left-wing coalition formed by radicals, socialists and 
communists, took office from 1930 to 1950 (Rosemblatt 
2000). The coalition promoted democracy and economic 
modernization; developing public health and education 
policies, seeking to overcome widespread illiteracy, and 
battling unhygienic living conditions. The Popular Front 
had a traditional understanding of the family, but based on 
a scientific approach. In the 1930s, legislation protecting 
pregnant working women was approved and child labour was 
limited. This was the effective beginning of the welfare 
state in Chile (see previous section).  
As of 1950 family law remained virtually unchanged, 
except that married women were allowed to work and to 
manage their own wages (Lavrin 2005). The end of the Second 
World War brought new global perspectives on rights, and in 
1948 the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. In Chile women gained the right to vote in 
1949, and so they were allowed to formally enter the public 
sphere (Veloso 1998). 
The Cuban Revolution of 1959 marked a new phase in 
Latin American politics. In 1964 Eduardo Frei, of the 
Christian Democratic Party, won Chile’s presidential 
election. His government launched an agrarian reform 
programme, improved education and health, and promoted 
social mobilization (Tinsman 2002). In 1965 family planning 
programmes were introduced. These includedg pre and post 
natal health care, instruction on parenting and 
reproduction, and provision of birth control (Tinsman 
2002:156). The US, concerned about population growth, 
strongly supported the provision of birth control. Chilean 
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authorities embraced birth control as a response to high 
rates of maternal and infant death. Maternal death rates 
were high because of badly performed illegal abortions, as 
only therapeutic abortion was allowed since the 1930s 
(Tinsman 2002:157). 
Family planning programmes were framed by the 
government as family welfare, and so were aimed at married 
couples. Wives needed their husband’s consent to be given 
contraception. Likewise, unmarried women under the age of 
21 could only be given contraception if both parents gave 
their written consent (Tinsman 2002:163). Although the 
Catholic Church condemned birth control at the time, it was 
split over the issue (Tinsman 2002:160-61). 
Salvador Allende’s Popular Unity (UP) government of 
1970 to 1973 continued family planning programmes, but 
approached them in terms of women’s sexual and reproductive 
rights (Tinsman 2002). Gynaecological and contraceptive 
services were made available to adolescent girls as well as 
single young women. However, in practice, the married 
couple was still the main target. Husbands’ and parental 
consent continued to be needed for wives and adolescent 
girls, respectively, to access contraception. During this 
period legal abortion, which was allowed only in limited 
circumstances, also began to be practised more widely 
(Tinsman 2002). Legislation abolishing legal distinctions 
between illegitimate and legitimate births was proposed in 
1972, but Allende was overthrown before it was passed 
(Tinsman 2002:227). 
The 1973 to 1989 dictatorship presided over by General 
Augusto Pinochet entailed a reassertion of patriarchal 
values (Veloso 1999). Demographic growth was considered 
socially desirable and access to family planning was 
restricted (Raczynski and Serrano 1985:57-58). In 1989 
abortion was completely banned, even in cases when the life 
of the mother was at risk (previously the only circumstance 
in which abortion was legally permitted). A new 
Constitution was promulgated in 1980 (and is still in 
force). The 1980 text of the Constitution recognized equal 
status for men and women, except in the realm of the 
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family. A 1999 constitutional reform abolished this 
exception, and women and men were given formally equal 
status. In 1989, the military dictatorship ratified the UN 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) (Veloso 1998), showing 
that even Pinochet’s dictatorship was not immune to 
international pressure to improve women’s rights. 
The return of democracy from 1990 has involved an 
enhancement of women and children’s rights. At the 
international level, the 1990s were particularly relevant 
for the development of human rights (Cornwall and Molyneux 
2008:8). Similarly to many other post dictatorial 
governments in the region, the centre-left Concertación 
coalition, which held the Chilean presidency from 1990 to 
2010, endorsed international human rights agreements so as 
to signal Chile’s re-incorporation into the international 
community, (Molyneux and Craske 2002). In 1990, Chile 
ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child. In 
1991, the Chilean National Women’s Service (SERNAM, in 
Spanish) was created. Since SERNAM reports directly to the 
office of the presidency, and since Chile’s political 
system is strongly presidentialist, SERNAM has been able to 
be particularly effective in changing family legislation 
(Haas 2010). Democratic governments have however continued 
to focus on improving family welfare, rather than pursuing 
a feminist agenda (Haas 2010). In 2006, President Michelle 
Bachelet (2006-2010) took office. Her government decisively 
contributed to advancing legislation related to women and 
children. 
In 1990, immediately after the end of the military 
regime, new family legislation focused on tackling domestic 
violence. The Chilean women’s movement pointed out the 
connection between domestic and state violence, and framed 
domestic violence as a violation of human rights (Matear 
1999; Haas 2010). Nonetheless Chile, like the rest of the 
region, has been susceptible to violence and 
authoritarianism for much of its history. Authoritarianism 
and violence are neither confined to the political realm, 
nor exclusive to the armed forces or the police (Matear 
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1999). Rather, an authoritarian culture permeates power 
relations between social classes, men and women, adults and 
children, bosses and workers. Violence and authoritarian 
relations are embedded in social and economic inequalities, 
and also in exclusionary practices based on gender, race, 
and social class (Matear 1999). The first domestic violence 
bill was passed in 1994, and modified (reformed) in 2005. 
This most recent version of the legislation criminalized 
domestic violence for the first time, and increased 
protection for victims. Addressing violence continues to be 
a recognised policy priority, with recent legislative 
proposals for bills on femicide and sexual violence. (Haas 
2010). 
There is evidence which suggests a decline in the 
incidence of serious physical abuse against children 
(Larraín and Bascuñan 2008). This report (Larraín, op. 
cit.) claims a decrease from 34 to 26 percent between 1994 
and 2006. The same study shows that although serious 
physical abuse is more frequent among children from low 
income groups, it also occurs among high income groups. For 
example, the report’s 2006 data showed serious physical 
abuse standing at 29 percent in the lower socioeconomic 
group, and 19 percent in the upper socioeconomic group. 
Both parents are reported to practise violence against 
children, though mothers are described as principally 
responsible for it. Disobeying parental authority is given 
as the main reason why children are beaten by their 
parents. These figures should however be approached with 
caution, as measuring domestic violence is a complex 
matter. 
As regards cohabitation, the most significant recent 
change is the new paternity law of 1999. The Ley de 
Filiación eliminated legal discrimination against children 
born out of wedlock, and introduced paternity 
investigation. Thus, for the first time, children born out 
of wedlock were given similar rights to children of formal 
marriages (Candina Polomer 2005). Available data shows that 
the new paternity law did not have a direct impact in 
increasing out of wedlock births (Cox 2011:135). Currently, 
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there is an ongoing debate about legalizing consensual 
unions as civil partnerships, but it is not clear whether 
this is likely to become law any time soon. 
A new marriage law, approved in 2004, signalled a 
turning point in relation to the civil marriage law of 
1884. For one thing, legal divorce was finally introduced 
where before, it had not existed. The only option for legal 
separation was for married couples to seek a civil 
annulment through claiming incompetence on the part of the 
civil registrar. Civil annulment had however required both 
partners’ agreement and the hiring of a solicitor (Cox 
2011). Under the new legislation, one partner can file for 
divorce at any time alleging fault on the part of the 
other; or after three years of separation if a no-fault 
settlement is sought. If both partners agree to the filing 
they must wait one more year before applying for the 
finalisation of the divorce (Cox 2011). People on low 
incomes can get free legal assistance for divorce. 
The new legislation also almost completely eliminated 
the husband’s and father’s authority within marriage and 
family life. Both parents are now equally responsible for 
looking after children, and on separation, the children 
usually stay with the mother. In addition, the notion of 
the child’s best interests has replaced patria potestad as 
the overarching principle that is supposed to guide 
resolution of any dispute (BCN 2012). In 1989, the notion 
of a husband’s authority over his wife was abandoned 
(Veloso 1998). As regards financial matters, the regime of 
community property continues to predominate. According to 
this arrangement, the husband is responsible for managing 
the marital property. However, his authority has now been 
limited and the wife’s approval is needed for any 
transaction (BCN No date).  
Preliminary evidence (Cox 2011) shows that the 
introduction of a divorce law had a positive effect on the 
marriage rate, which has increased. No impact was detected 
on either fertility, or out of wedlock births. By 
comparison with civil annulment, divorce has reduced 
inequality since costs have been eliminated for deprived 
 51 
groups. In addition, divorce has improved the formal 
situation of women and children after separation in terms 
of maintenance received from the ex partner. Yet filing for 
divorce is not a simple procedure, and divorce on the 
grounds of attribution of fault to one party could be 
damaging for both partners and children. In addition, 
although the new legislation affords better protection to 
women and children after separation, it is still 
ineffective in enforcing payment of maintenance. In fact, 
less than 40 percent of divorced women who head households 
receive maintenance from their ex husband, either for 
themselves or for their children (Cox 2011). For women who 
have completed higher education, the proportion is slightly 
higher (at 45 percent). 
 In relation to sexual and reproductive rights, there 
has been little or no progress. The lack of substantive 
legal reform reflects how disruptive sexual issues are for 
the political elite. A clear example is the controversy 
created by then-president Bachelet’s decision to provide 
free emergency contraception to adolescents. Her proposal 
was predictably fiercely opposed by right-wing political 
parties and the Catholic Church, but also deepened 
divisions within the governing Concertación (Haas 
2010:179). Public opinion is also divided about controlling 
human reproduction. For example, in 2010 only slightly more 
than 50 percent of the public favoured the reintroduction 
of therapeutic abortion in cases where the life of the 
mother is at risk (ICSO 2010). Acceptance of abortion 
nonetheless varies according to socioeconomic group, with 
acceptance of abortion to save the mother’s life reaching 
66 percent in high income groups, but only 44 percent in 
low income groups (ICSO 2010). For the time being, abortion 
in Chile remains illegal under any circumstance. An 
assessment conducted in the early 2000s by experts on 
reproductive health highlighted significant deficiencies in 
the provision of birth control by the public health system 
(Schiappacasse, Vidal et al. 2003). The main problem is 
that the public health system is not giving adequate 
attention to adolescent sexual health. Local doctor’s 
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surgeries also hold only limited stocks of birth control 
resources.  
 
 
 
In general, it seems that the framework of rights developed 
by the UN has been at the core of recent transformations of 
legislation around family, sexuality, and reproduction in 
Chile. As the structure of the Chilean political system 
favours the executive, the executive women’s agency SERNAM 
has been the most effective body for advancing legal 
reform. Legal reform has accordingly been led from above, 
through the institutional order which connects 
international agencies with nation states. However, SERNAM 
is also embedded in the traditions of welfarism and 
conventional gender roles to which the Chilean state has 
adhered throughout the twentieth century. Thus SERNAM is 
far from being an advocate of women’s rights, as women’s 
groups have quickly learnt (Haas 2010).  
In any case, today’s Chilean legislation is less 
patriarchal than before. Marriage has lost most of its 
privileges. Children’s and women’s rights have begun to be 
recognised, and corresponding limits have been placed on 
men’s and parents’ authority. Domestic violence may be 
declining as well. These changes suggest that cohabitation 
and marriage are becoming more similar, and that parents 
have lost part of their power to enforce marriage. In the 
next and final section of this chapter, I will further 
analyse these changes in relation to how social welfare 
provision by the state might have affected rising 
cohabitation. 
 
 
 
Social Policies and Unmarried Mothers 
 
 
The country’s biggest increase in rates of cohabitation 
took place in the 1990s, in the first ten years of the 
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Concertación’s rule. After Pinochet’s dictatorship (1973-
1989), the first democratic government, presided over by 
president Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994), laid the foundations 
of the Concertación’s approach to social policies. From the 
onset this centre-left coalition focused on improving the 
quality and coverage of welfare, and also on targeting more 
vulnerable groups. Successive Concertación governments, 
headed by presidents Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-2000), 
Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006), and Michelle Bachelet (2006-
2010), followed this general path. Each made specific 
improvements and innovations, but none specifically 
introduced social policies aimed at favouring individuals 
in unmarried cohabiting partnerships. In this section I 
analyse how social policies might be related to unmarried 
cohabitation. I deal firstly with the origins of social 
welfare in Chile, before focusing on Pinochet-era change 
and how post-authoritarian governments dealt with that 
legacy. 
 
 
 
Social welfare emerged in Chile in the first decades of the 
twentieth century, as a direct consequence of pressure from 
diverse social movements. From the onset, governments, 
regardless of their political orientation, used welfare 
provision to gain and to maintain political support. 
Therefore we could talk of corporatist welfare, as welfare 
policies typically offered protection to organized formal 
sector workers, in particular public employees and the 
armed forces (Borzutzky 2002; Molyneux 2007; Haggard and 
Kaufman 2008). The Catholic Church’s charitable work with 
the poor, present from colonial times, has also 
characterized welfare provision as philanthropic well into 
the twentieth century (Molyneux 2000:48).  
From the outset welfare policies in Chile, as in the 
whole Latin American region, were shaped by patriarchal 
values (Rosemblatt 2000; Lavrin 2005; Molyneux 2007). They 
developed hand in hand with the family wage system, within 
which the man is expected to be the head of the family and 
the main provider or breadwinner. Women and children depend 
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on men for their survival, and marriage identifies them as 
legitimate beneficiaries of social welfare. As discussed 
above marriage increased and female employment decreased in 
Chile at the same time as social welfare was introduced, 
i.e. in the first decades of the twentieth century (see 
section on Poverty, Employment, and Education).  
Evidence shows that national welfare professionals in 
the 1930s and 1940s encouraged marriage as the best 
solution to poverty among mothers and children, and as a 
way to domesticate unruly men, in particular those from the 
lower classes (Rosemblatt 2000). As motherhood was seen as 
a woman’s first duty, Chilean authorities discouraged 
female labour. Female employment was a sign of backwardness 
rather than progress (Molyneux 2000), and paid work was 
regarded as a source of corruption that could making women 
bad mothers and sexually licentious. Employment ‘stimulated 
women’s independence and caused them to shun marriage and 
bear illegitimate children’ (Rosemblatt 2000:173).  
Even though social welfare professionals adopted a 
patriarchal and legal conception of the family, the Chilean 
state also offered protection to single mothers. Thus the 
emphasis on the importance of motherhood prevailed over the 
stigma attached to extra-marital sex (Rosemblatt 2000:176). 
Social protection of single mothers was based on the 
traditional role of women as mothers, and entailed 
marginalizing men’s responsibilities as fathers (Lavrin 
2005; Molyneux 2007). In other words, policies focused on 
the single mother reinforce the maternal role at the 
expense of the paternal one (Lavrin 1995:157). 
In the 1950s and 1960s, ideas of modernization and 
developmentalism became predominant and so welfare was 
extended. By the 1960s most Latin American countries had 
established a welfare system, even if some were rather 
fragile (Molyneux 2007). Even Chile, one of the few 
countries in Latin America to have developed a welfare 
state, did not achieve universality of entitlement or 
coverage.  
The economic and political crises of the 1970s meant 
that the neoliberal approach was extended to social 
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welfare. The neoliberal perspective reshaped the role of 
the state in providing social security (Haggard and Kaufman 
2008:184-185). The emphasis was now on targeting social 
policies to the most deprived, on the grounds that 
targeting was held to be more efficient, fairer, and more 
inclusive than universal provision. Private sector 
participation in welfare provision was encouraged, in order 
to cut public spending and to supposedly improve the 
quality of social provision through competition. 
Individuals were given responsibility for funding their own 
social security, and links between individual contributions 
and benefits were tightened. Decentralization was promoted 
to improve accountability and better matching of local 
needs. These ideas were applied by the dictatorship, and 
resulted in a decrease of both the coverage and quality of 
welfare provision (Vergara 1990). 
Neoliberal reforms did, however, mean that for the 
first time the poorest of the poor at least nominally 
gained access to social welfare. Targeting groups who had 
previously been excluded from social security due to their 
non-wage earning status meant that unmarried mothers not 
involved in formal employment started to receive social 
benefits, such as family allowance and a basic state 
retirement pension. In other words, both marriage and 
formal employment became less relevant for accessing social 
welfare. 
In the 1970s the military regime reduced the amount 
paid in family allowances and transferred this disbursement 
to the state, instead of, as previously, companies 
(Valenzuela 2006b).  At the beginning of the 1980s, the 
military regime moreover extended this benefit to include 
children whose parents were not covered by social security. 
This expanded reach family allowance, known as the Subsidio 
Único Familiar (SUF) was assigned to pregnant women and to 
every child younger than 15 years old (Vergara 1990). The 
benefit came in the form of a conditional cash transfer, 
and in order to receive it, preschool children had to 
attend health checks while school-age children had to 
attend school. The monetary transfer was payable to the 
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mother, and only in her permanent absence could it be 
transferred to the father or other person in charge of the 
child.  In an after 1985, unmarried mothers not previously 
involved in formal employment could apply to a basic state 
retirement pension, the Pensión Asistencial (PASIS). The 
PASIS was introduced in 1985 by the military regime, and 
was targeted at poor people aged 65 or over who did not 
receive any other form of pension (Vergara 1990). 
Post-dictatorship governments did not challenge the 
neoliberal approach, but rather built on it to increase 
social spending and so effectively reach previously 
excluded groups. The aim was to pay the so called ‘social 
debt’ (deuda social) left by the dictatorship. Accordingly, 
during the first democratic government of the new period, 
social spending experienced a significant increase (Meller, 
Lehmann et al. 1993). To take one example, taking 1993 
spending as a baseline, housing spending increased from 63 
percent during Pinochet’s regime to 88 percent in 1993. In 
this same period, always using spending in 1993 as a 
baseline, healthcare spending increased from 67 to 84 
percent, social security from 81 to 92 percent, and 
education from 88 to 91 percent. The biggest increase was 
in housing, as a significant public housing deficit had 
been left by the dictatorship (changes in housing policies 
will be further discussed below). Amounts for the minimum 
wage and of state retirement pension were increased during 
the Aylwin period, as was the SUF, later also extended to 
children up to 18 years of age (the age at which  
compulsory secondary education ends) (Ministerio del 
Trabajo y de Previsión Social 2013).  
In relation to healthcare the health system had 
previously differentiated between blue and white collar 
workers. This distinction was erased by dictatorship-era 
neoliberal reforms. All employed persons, with the 
exception of members of the armed forces and police, are 
now obliged to contribute 7 percent of their salary to 
cover health care. Poor people with minimal levels of 
income can be awarded free access to health care in a 
specific indigente (indigent) category by the Fondo 
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Nacional de Salud (Fonasa), a mode of access to the public 
health system. The public system has some similarities in 
principle to the British National Health Service (NHS), 
with the major difference that it is paid for not (only) 
through general taxation but also directly through the 7 
percent contributions. All except those on the lowest, 
indigent, income rung must therefore demonstrate compliance 
with the 7 percent contribution regime in order to be 
entitled to use the system. People with levels of income 
above the indigent category joined a regime of copayments 
that allow them to choose to pay their 7 percent quota into 
the public health provider (via Fonasa) or to private 
health insurance companies, known as Instituciones de Salud 
Previsional (ISAPREs), which also act as providers through 
a network of private clinics and hospitals. At point of 
access, all users (except the indigent, who are limited to 
the public system) can in principle choose to use any 
provider, although they will have to pay a larger or 
smaller specific sum depending on whether they choose to 
use the system in which they are enrolled.   
 Health policies targeting poor and extremely poor 
families, in particular mothers and children, were enhanced 
during the dictatorship period, something which allowed 
overall health indicators to continue to improve despite a 
reduction in total public spending (Vergara 1990; 
Valenzuela 2006b). 
As the dictatorship ended, democratic governments 
increased healthcare spending in an effort to improve both 
quality and coverage (Schkolnik 1995). Primary healthcare 
through local doctor’s surgeries was made free to everyone 
enrolled in the public, FONASA, system. The total number of 
healthcare employees in the public system was significantly 
increased, and the focus on improving maternal and child 
health continued. In 2005 a new health programme, known as 
AUGE (Acceso Universal con Garantías Explícitas), was 
introduced. AUGE was a decisive step towards a more 
universal health coverage, defining a core list of serious 
or major illnesses for which free, publicly-funded 
treatment was guaranteed to all users.  
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By 2009 the FONASA public system provider covered 
around 80 percent of the population, rising to around 90 
percent among the two lower income quintiles (Mideplan 
2009d: table 6). The ISAPRE private insurer system, similar 
in principle to the system of private insurers common in 
the United States, is predominantly used by high income 
groups (who can also choose to augment the minimum 7 
percent contribution in order to buy improved coverage 
and/or insurance against specific catastrophic illnesses).  
Concertación social policy reform was not limited only 
to increases in expenditure for the purposes of improving 
quality and coverage. From the outset, the Concertación 
also defined groups considered to have borne the brunt of 
the social costs of 1980s structural adjustment policies 
(Schkolnik 1995). Children, young people, the elderly, and 
women were given special attention, particularly if 
individuals in these categories were also subject to 
specific vulnerabilities such as minority ethnic identity, 
disability, or acting as a female head of household. A 
comprehensive range of social programmes was introduced to 
target these groups. I will principally focus for purposes 
of the present study on those programmes targeted at women 
and children. 
 The international context favoured an explicit focus 
on women and children, given post-authoritarian 
governments’ endorsement of international agreements on 
women’s and children’s rights (see above, section on Family 
Law and the State). Additionally, during the 1990s 
international agencies such as the World Bank and  IMF also 
encouraged social policies targeted at women and children, 
now considered an effective way of tackling poverty (Craske 
2003). Women’s issues had also gained visibility on the 
national agenda in their own right (Serrano 1992). On the 
one hand, under the dictatorship left-wing middle-class 
women had started to promote a feminist agenda as part of 
an oppositional political identity. On the other hand, also 
during the dictatorship, low-income women had played a key 
role in ensuring the survival of their families, often 
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through developing grassroots organizations and practices 
such as ollas comunes (shared community kitchens). 
  Therefore, from the initial post-authoritarian 
administration onwards promoted targeting women as a way of 
both tackling poverty and increasing gender equality. For 
example, the national Women’s Service SERNAM created a 
network of neighbourhood centres providing information on 
women’s rights, as well as specialised centres to assist 
female victims of domestic violence (Schkolnik 1995). 
SERNAM also decided to prioritise the needs of women heads 
of household from low income groups, launching a targeted 
programme for this group in 1992 (Badia 2000). The 
programme, rolled out nationally in 1994, was known as the 
Programa Mujeres Jefas de Hogar de Escasos Recursos, or 
PMJH for short. The PMJH addressed women as producers, 
rather than as mothers or wives, and aimed to increase 
their involvement in paid work through improving their 
qualifications and supporting microenterprise 
entrepreneurship. 
In addition, three charitable trusts were set up 
during the first democratic government, and are 
traditionally   chaired by the wife of the incumbent 
president. These trusts are focused on the needs of women, 
children, and families. One of them, known as PRODEMU (the 
Fundación de Promoción y Desarrollo de la Mujer),  seeks to 
improve deprived women’s productive skills so as to 
increase their involvement in paid work (PRODEMU 2013). The 
second trust, Fundación de la Familia, aims to improve 
family ties and relationships among low income families, 
since such ties are seen as providing protection against 
deprived living conditions (Fundación de la Familia 2013). 
The third trust, Fundación Integra, delivers childcare to 
preschool children of poor families (Fundación Integra 
2013).  
In spite of this focus on women, most programmes were 
not well funded, and were accordingly limited in their 
reach (Schkolnik 1995). However, the existence of this new 
institutional framework addressing women’s disadvantages 
did contribute to women themselves starting to enjoy 
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increased social recognition. For poor women, to be 
targeted by social policies probably had a particularly 
significant impact on their self-esteem given their 
previous double subordination (Serrano 1992). The figure of 
the woman head of household probably became more socially 
valued over this period, continuing to embody the 
conventional maternal role but now somehow empowered.  
 This emphasis on women was also adopted by other 
social ministries (Schkolnik 1995). For example, the 
Ministry of Education sought to eliminate gender 
differentiation from school curricula and text books. 
Pregnancy stopped being seen as a reason to drop out of 
school, and in 1993 a policy on compulsory sex education 
was introduced. Children of women heads of household were 
also given priority access to preschool education.  
Housing policies were also modified, to give non 
married mothers equal rights to married couples in 
applications for housing subsidy (Schkolnik 1995). Housing 
policies have moreover proved particularly relevant for 
family life, not least because social spending on public 
housing significantly increased in the 1990s. Indeed, the 
number of new families who did not have access to a new 
dwelling dropped from 44 percent during the dictatorship to 
6 percent over the course of the first democratic 
government (Meller, Lehmann et al. 1993). Moreover, in 
Aylwin’s last year in office (1994), the amount of public 
housing stock built actually outnumbered the number of new 
families, in an effort to finally reduce the housing 
deficit left by the authoritarian regime. 
Over the course of the 1980s, the Pinochet 
dictatorship had modified housing policies by introducing a 
system of housing subsidies. These subsidies were awarded 
on a needs assessment, using a points system (Simian 2010). 
Vivienda Básica, the  main social housing programme 
launched in 1984 (and carried through into the 1990s)  
awarded points to individuals who held a savings account; 
had specific savings set aside for housing, were classified 
as from low income groups, and had numerous family members.  
A high points total pushed the family up the priority list 
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for housing (see Simian, op. cit., table 6; and also (MINVU 
1984)).  
The Concertación modified the points criteria during 
their first year in office. Points also began to be awarded 
for acuteness of housing need, length of time on the 
waiting list, and collective (multi-person) applications. 
Holding a savings account no longer attracted points, and 
lone (single or widowed) parents were given additional  
points (MINVU 1990). Lone parents were thereby given parity 
of points with married couples. Particular attention 
(priority) was given to the reduction of the practice of 
two or more families living in the same dwelling, known in 
Chile as allegamiento (MINVU 1990) and usually comprising 
adult children staying on with their own newly-formed 
family unit in the parental home. It should be noted that 
Chilean housing policy has been successful in providing 
housing for poor families: home ownership reached almost 70 
percent of households in 2006, and in comparison to other 
social indicators, is less related to income (Mideplan 
2006b:10). There are, however, persistent problems of urban 
segregation, and poor design and construction of public 
housing(Ducci 2000). 
The content of screening questionnaries introduced by 
the military regime, and whose use was continued in the 
post-authoritarian period, provides additional specific 
evidence that solo mothers have been favoured by the logic 
of targeting. In 1979, the regime developed a questionnaire 
to classify poor families according to their socioeconomic 
needs. Although the specific content of the questionnaire 
has been modified, many social benefits continue to be 
allocated according to its outcome. Monetary subsidies such 
as SUF and PASIS (see above) are given only to those who 
are classified as ‘deprived’ (indigentes) according to this 
screening questionnaire. Housing subsidies and preschool 
education also consider the outcome of this questionnaire, 
alongside other selecting criteria. In these cases, the 
questionnaire is used to assess how many poor families 
qualify in the first instance for housing subsidies or 
preschool education due to their deprived status. Other 
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factors are however then considered in order to filter and 
prioritise beneficiaries. For instance, children are given 
priority for preschool education if their mother is 
involved in paid work, is a teenage mother, or is a head of 
household. Housing policies also take into account factors 
such as allegamiento (two or more families sharing one 
dwelling); overcrowding (numbers of people sharing one 
bedroom); housing’ precariousness, potable water supply, 
and adequacy of sewage system (MINVU No date). 
The first version of this questionnaire was developed 
in 1979 during the dictatorship. At the time, it was known 
as the Ficha CAS (Larrañaga 2005). In 1987, a modified 
version known as CAS 2, started to be applied. Post-
dictatorship era governments carried on using the Ficha CAS 
2, modifying it in 1999 to produce the Ficha CAS 3, and 
finally replacing it by in 2007 a new questionnaire known 
as the Ficha de Protección Social (FPS) (Mideplan 2010).  
The various iterations of the Ficha CAS assessed 
families’ deprivation defined as socioeconomic needs. These 
needs were assessed mainly on the basis of a combination of 
housing conditions with educational attainment and 
occupation of the household head (Larrañaga 2005). 
Criticisms of the instrument included the fact that, for 
example, possession of certain basic household appliances 
such as a water heater or fridge resulted in the family 
being classified as having a superior socioeconomic 
situation. It accordingly became common practice to hide 
such appliances during the carrying out of the survey 
(Mideplan 2010). The FPS, by contrast, focuses more on 
family vulnerabilities than on direct socioeconomic needs. 
The FPS assesses poor families’ needs and risks in relation 
to their capabilities to generate income. This capacity is, 
again, mainly measured in terms of educational attainment 
and occupation of the household head. Needs are assessed by 
consideration of which and how many family members can be 
classed as dependant (children, the elderly, and those with 
disabilities). Risks are assessed by consideration of any 
situation that threaten families’ chances to overcome 
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poverty, such as ill-health, or living in particularly 
deprived neighbourhoods.  
As both the Ficha CAS and the FPS classify families 
according to the educational attainment and occupation of 
the head of household, the absence of a head of household 
automatically leads to families being regarded as more 
deprived or more vulnerable. In the FPS, as in the Ficha 
CAS, a lower score represents a higher level of deprivation 
or vulnerability. Social benefits awarded on the basis of 
the FPS usually target families from either the lowest two 
or the lowest four deciles in the social protection record 
(Mideplan No Date). Some benefits are exclusively available 
to the lowest two deciles (classified as ‘indigent’). In 
practice, this means benefits are targeted to those 
families whose screening questionnaires produce a total of 
no more than 8,500 points (lowest two deciles) or 11,734 
points (next two deciles).  
A recent assessment of the FPS by a committee of 
experts shows that a family consisting of a lone parent, 
who declares an absent head of household (typically through 
stating abandonment by the father), and with two children 
will be given 4,972 points in relation to the assessed 
capacity to generate income. By contrast, with an 
additional adult present in the role of head of household, 
the same family will get 11,645 points reducing their 
overall benefit entitlement (Mideplan 2010: table 4.2.4). 
This example illustrates how a family is likely to have 
more access to social benefit if it is formed by a solo 
parent with dependent children, rather than by a couple and 
their children. As lone mothers are in practice more common 
than lone fathers, they are the ones who have been most 
commonly reached through this modality. 
It seems clear from empirical evidence that  people 
give misleading information about their household 
composition, since the social protection record shows 
overrepresentation of single parent, one-person and female-
headed households when compared to their known prevalence 
in the general population (Mideplan 2010). The committee of 
experts referred to above pointed out that as housing 
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subsidies favour single mothers, unmarried couples report 
their families as one-parent families. The practice of 
‘hiding the husband’ (esconder al marido) has become 
common. Although in practice the actual gender of the 
declared head of the household does not affect the score 
for housing subsidy, popular belief seems to think that it 
does. This erroneous belief may itself be an outcome of the 
social recognition conferred to women by the social 
programmes targeted at women heads of household mentioned 
earlier in the chapter. 
The committee of experts concluded that mechanisms for 
verifying information given by applicants need to be 
introduced. The right-wing government presently in office 
(2011-2014) has launched a new version of the FPS, la Nueva 
Ficha de Protección Social, which seeks to introduce 
verification by, for instance, requiring applicants to 
provide a written affidavit stating the number of people 
living in the household and attesting to the exact 
relationships between them. A separate record of residents 
per household has also been created, for purposes of 
comparison (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social 2013). For 
purposes of the present study, it is nonetheless too early 
to know what consequences these changes will entail. 
Concertación governments since 1990 have also focused 
on children’s policies as a way to tackle poverty and bring 
Chile into compliance with international agreements on 
children’s rights (Rodríguez Grossi 1995). In 1992, a 
national plan for improving children’s lives was developed. 
It aimed to enhance children’s education, health, and 
living conditions; and to develop a more adequate legal 
framework for protection of their rights. Although some 
progress was made, it was not until 2006 that a genuine 
breakthrough occurred with the launch of an early-childhood 
protection plan called Chile Crece Contigo (Chile Grows 
with You). Chile Crece Contigo focuses on enhancing 
childhood through improvements in maternal health care, 
pregnancy, and childbirth (Chile Crece Contigo 2011). The 
plan also expanded access to free childcare for the poorest 
60 percent of the population, with childcare coverage for 
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children up to 5 years old increasing from 16 to 37 percent 
between 1990 and 2009. Yet the poorest quintile still lags 
behind, with 32 percent access, while the richest quintile 
scores above the national average, with 53 percent access 
(Mideplan 2009b:10). 
 
 
 
To sum up, whilst social welfare in Chile has always 
favoured marriage, it has increasingly also provided some 
social protection for unmarried mothers. Unmarried mothers 
were however historically seen as helpless victims in need 
of protection, with men in non-legal relationships often 
labelled as absent and/or irresponsible. Neoliberal ideas, 
which have become predominant in Chile since Pinochet’s 
dictatorship, have however paid more attention to un 
married mothers. Lone mothers have subsequently been 
increasingly targeted by social policy measures due to 
their vulnerability and the possibility that this could 
generate negative effects for their children. Although 
neither the Pinochet regime nor the Concertación 
governments pursued a conscious policy of positive 
discrimination in favour of lone mothers, in practice they 
did particularly benefit, particularly under the 
Concertación. The coalition lowered previous barriers faced 
by unmarried mothers to access social benefits, and also 
prioritised them as a more vulnerable group. The 
Concertación also provided social recognition to unmarried 
mothers, through positive recognition of women heads of 
household in positive terms. As democratic governments also 
significantly increased social spending, social welfare 
became more relevant for low income groups. Thus social 
welfare gained relevance as a variable that affected the 
lives of individuals in low income groups.. 
Hence non married mothers who are not formal wage 
earners are no longer marginalized by social welfare as 
they once were. Indeed, they are in a relatively favourable 
position, thanks to targeted social policies. Consequently, 
changes to welfare provision that took place during the 
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dictatorship, but especially during post-authoritarian 
administrations, might in fact be promoting cohabitation 
among deprived groups.  
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
 
From the end of the nineteenth century, Chile has 
experienced dramatic social changes. In relation to family 
life, the twentieth century featured three major trends . 
These trends were declining fertility, increasing out of 
wedlock childbearing, and decreasing marriage. Against the 
backdrop of these demographic changes unmarried 
cohabitation started to show a sharp increase in the 1990s. 
In Chile in the 1960s, a pronounced decline in the 
fertility rate took place. In 1960 the number of children 
per woman was 4.3 and in 2000 it was 2.4 (Larrañaga 2006a). 
Between the 1960s and the 1970s, declining fertility was 
brought about mainly by the introduction of birth control 
policies. A decreasing child mortality rate also helped to 
lower fertility, yet its contribution was less significant. 
Family planning policies targeted married women, so the 
birth rate among married women, in contrast to unmarried 
women, declined the most. In the 1990s female employment 
increased and began to have a negative effect on fertility 
too.  
 On the whole, fertility decline in Chile has not 
followed the pattern predicted by demographic transition 
theory. Decreasing fertility was not mainly an outcome of 
economic development or of higher levels of education, but 
of access to contraception promoted and supplied by the 
state. Family planning policies targeted married couples, 
and those couples limited their fertility the most, 
especially those from low income groups. 
 A second trend is related to changing out of wedlock 
births. Out of wedlock births were significant at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, as they accounted for 
around a third of total births. But then, from the end of 
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1930s, out of wedlock births started to decrease. Out of 
wedlock births reached their lowest rate by the mid 1960s, 
at around one sixth of total births. From then onwards they 
started to rise again, reaching around a third of total 
births in the 1990s. In the 1990s and the following decade, 
out of wedlock births showed an explosive growth reaching 
around two thirds of total births in 2010. 
 There are different factors which explain this 
changing pattern of out of wedlock births. Declining out of 
wedlock births between the 1930s and 1960s is related to 
two determinants (Valenzuela 2006a). First, in that period 
married women increased their number of children, while 
fertility among unmarried women remained steady. As a 
consequence out of wedlock births, as a proportion of total 
births, decreased. A second factor which helped was a 
decline in the proportion of unmarried mothers, which 
further helped to decrease out of wedlock births. By 
contrast, between the 1960s and 1990s out of wedlock births 
began to rise. Again unmarried women’s fertility remained 
steady, but now married women began to limit their number 
of children (as said above). Married women’s lower 
fertility account for most of the rise of out of wedlock 
childbearing in this period.  
Yet in the 1990s out of wedlock births began to 
increase even more. This further increase of out of wedlock 
births cannot be accounted only by a decline in married 
women’s fertility. At this time an increase in the 
proportion of unmarried women also began to fuel out of 
wedlock births (Larrañaga 2006a). Unmarried women increased 
as an outcome of delayed and declining marriage, which was 
paralleled by single and cohabiting mothers becoming more 
frequent. Unmarried mothers’ fertility also show a slight 
increase in the 1990s (Larrañaga 2006a). 
 A third trend refers to marriage. For most of the 
twentieth century the marriage rate was steady, yet there 
were changes at the beginning and at the end of it. At the 
beginning of the twentieth century the marriage rate 
increased, then remained stable, and finally decreased at 
the turn of the century. The biggest increase in marriage 
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happened in the 1930s, and it was probably related to the 
introduction of social policies which favoured married 
couples (Rosemblatt 2000). By contrast, in the 1990s 
marriage experienced a sharp decline. In this period, 
declining marriage is mainly related to an increase in the 
proportion of single, and to a lesser extent, to cohabiting 
people (Herrera and Valenzuela 2006). That people are 
marrying later might also add to decreasing marriage. 
As said above, unmarried cohabitation started to climb 
up in the 1990s. Unmarried cohabitation increased most 
among young people, low-income groups, and those with low 
educational attainment. In contrast to married couples, 
cohabiting ones show early partnering and childbearing. 
Thus in relation to cohabitation, Chile is similar to the 
rest of the Latin American region: cohabitation is more 
prevalent among less privileged groups and involves 
acquiring a partner and having children at a relatively 
young age.   
Some changes that took place in Chile in the last 
decade of the twentieth century and/or at the beginning of 
the present one could be linked to rising cohabitation. 
Firstly, reform of family law involving new legislation on 
marriage, paternity, and domestic violence. Patriarchy, 
understood as the authority of men and parents, has been 
restricted. Women and children have gained new legal 
status, and children born out of wedlock are no longer 
subject to discrimination by the law. Expansion of the 
social welfare system, and targeting of social policies at 
particularly vulnerable groups, have caused marriage to 
lose its previous significance as the exclusive or major 
means of access to welfare for women not involved in formal 
employment, (especially unmarried mothers). Therefore, 
reforms to family law and social welfare could be seen as 
factors that, if not promoting, may at least have 
facilitated cohabitation. Increased participation of women 
in the labour force is another relevant issue, since it 
could be argued that as women gain economic independence, 
they might become more reluctant to marry.  
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Other changes are however less clearly related to 
rising cohabitation rates. Economic growth and declining 
poverty are examples. As cohabitation is associated with 
deprived living conditions, if the link were causal, 
economic growth should have meant fewer informal unions. 
Yet the opposite has happened. It may be that economic 
improvement does not reach all social groups equally, as 
income inequalities have remained practically unchanged. 
But even considering income inequality, the fact is that 
absolute poverty has fallen. Therefore, there seems to be 
no direct link between economic growth and union formation.  
 In other areas, it is difficult to identify a 
distinctive process or direction of change. Unemployment 
and job instability continue to be widespread in spite of 
economic growth. Extended households also seem to be an 
enduring feature of family life. The continued prevalence 
of conventional gender roles is manifest in the pervasive 
rejection of maternal involvement in paid work. 
 On the whole, it seems that transformations linked to 
the state, family law and social welfare, and female 
employment could be associated with rising cohabitation in 
Chile. But the analysis of the Chilean context also 
cautions scholars to be wary of positing direct 
relationships between macro and micro change. It is too 
simplistic to try to explain increased cohabitation on the 
basis of such broad transformations. We need instead to 
find out how these changing structures could affect why 
people might choose to live together instead of marrying. 
In the next chapter I will analyse the literature on 
cohabitation in the region, as a way of evaluating whether 
this literature offers more comprehensive ways of 
approaching the issue of informal unions.  
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Chapter 2 - CULTURE AND DISADVANTAGE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From early on, scholars have highlighted the prevalence of 
consensual unions as a distinctive feature of family life 
in Latin America. Unmarried cohabitation was seen as a 
hurdle to development, and developing states expected it to 
disappear as urbanization advanced. Yet cohabitation proved 
resilient to modernization: although rates of cohabitation 
finally dropped somewhat, the practice refused to 
disappear. Scholars therefore turned their attention to the 
question of culture, in the search for explanations as to 
why improved living conditions had failed to create a 
stable preference for formal marriage over cohabitation. It 
was suggested that consensual unions might represent the 
expression of a particular Latin American cultural trait. 
Race, sexuality, gender roles, kinship, and the mores of 
the poor were all pointed to as probable explanations. 
Cohabitation accordingly tended to be understood as an 
outcome of disadvantage and of specific customs of the 
lower socioeconomic strata.  
This view however needs to be reassessed in the light 
of current debates on modernity in developed countries. 
Today scholars assert that, in high income countries, 
increased cohabitation is an expression of advanced 
modernity. Most studies have rejected the idea that 
cohabitation in Latin America could be an expression of 
advanced modernity. Current debates on modernity 
nevertheless offer the opportunity to reflect further on 
cohabitation in the region, especially as recent changes 
are not easily accounted for by available perspectives. 
This chapter will firstly explore how cohabitation has 
been analysed in discussions of modernity since the 1960s, 
when modernization theory was influential in the region. 
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The debate around modernity is relevant not only because of 
its theoretical importance, but also because the UN and its 
various regional agencies4 are both framed by and 
disseminate the notion of modernity. In a region in which 
universities are rather weak, the influence of such 
agencies is particularly significant.  
The chapter goes on to discuss perspectives that have 
related cohabitation to a racial-sexual order imposed in 
colonial times, one which is somehow believed to be 
maintained through ongoing inequalities. In a third 
section, the chapter provides a review of 
conceptualizations of consensual unions as a consequence of 
deprived living conditions and/or a system of kinship based 
on blood ties. Finally, the chapter turns to gender roles, 
and to the notion of machismo in particular, in order to 
ask the question of what kind of relation between the sexes 
is entailed by cohabitation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Modernization  
 
 
 
For most of the twentieth century, sociologists in Latin 
America have studied family transformations in relation to 
the process of modernization. Modernization theory asserted 
that less developed countries would eventually catch up 
with Western industrialized countries, through emulation of 
Western economic and social order (Scott and Marshall 
2009). In the 1960s the debate was framed by modernization 
theory and its demographic equivalent, the concept of the 
first demographic transition. Likewise, in present-day 
thinking, family changes are linked to current reflections 
about modernity and to the notion of the second demographic 
                     
4
 Such as the Economic Council for Latin American, ECLAC (known as 
CEPAL for its Spanish acronym). 
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transition (discussed below). The phenomenon of consensual 
unions has been central to both the demographic transition 
(DT) and the second demographic transition (STD) analyses, 
although the interpretation of it has been radically 
different in each case. The section which follows reviews 
studies of modernity which have investigated family change 
and cohabitation. The aim is to assess how adequate these 
approaches are for the study of current cohabitation among 
deprived groups in Chile. 
 
 
 
 
In relation to the family, modernization theory articulates 
a transition from the extended to the nuclear family (Das 
1980). The extended family is taken to comprise two or more 
nuclear families under the same paternal authority. The 
extended family is generally related to traditional, 
religious, and hierarchical or caste-like societies. In 
those societies, kinship takes precedence over the 
individual. The family is the main source of sociability, 
and provides for every health-related, educational, and 
occupational need. The extended family is generally rural, 
with family members working together in activities such as 
agriculture, fishing, and mining. It is strongly 
patriarchal: women are under the authority of males, sexual 
double standards are a hallmark, descent is patrilineal, 
and residence is patrilocal. Marriage is arranged by 
parents. Dating is chaperoned, and matrimony is endogamous 
and early. Fertility and mortality are high, and there is 
little family planning.  
The nuclear family is defined in opposition to the 
extended family (Das 1980). The nuclear family is formed by 
parents and their offspring. The nuclear family is urban, 
and family members work individually in manufacturing and 
services. The nuclear family is held to entail increased 
gender equality, with authority and decision making being 
shared between spouses. Sexual double standards are 
weakened, descent is bilineal, and residence is neolocal. 
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Romantic love is the main reason for marriage, and people 
marry late. Parents do not intervene in mating selection. 
Dating and informal interaction between sexes is common; 
and individualism and independence are promoted. Social 
institutions, rather than the family, provide for economic, 
educational, and health needs. Recreational activities are 
peergroup oriented. Family planning is significant and 
fertility and mortality are low. The nuclear family is held 
to be characteristic of modern or developed societies, 
which tend to be secular and feature some social mobility. 
The Marxist approach also links modernization and 
family life (Solari and Franco 1980; Stolcke 1984). 
According to this view, urbanization threatens the 
traditional extended family as urban life transforms 
families from units of production into units of 
consumption. Patriarchal and traditional family life are 
held to be favoured by the rural setting, in particular by 
small-scale farming activities whose labour requirements 
encourage family cohesion and solidarity. Family members 
work closely under the direction of the head of the family.  
In urban settings, by contrast, labour is structured in 
terms of individual wage labour. As Stolcke asserts, ‘the 
household has lost one of the central attributes that gave 
it cohesion, joint labour’ (1984:280). Hence individual 
wage labour undermines the material conditions of the 
traditional extended family. 
Italian-Argentinian sociologist Gino Germani developed 
a comprehensive body of work on modernization in Latin 
America. He asserts that modernization in the region is not 
linear but asynchronous, or dual, as modern and traditional 
arrangements cohabit (Germani 1971; Germani 1972). He 
states that lack of synchronization is particularly 
relevant in the case of values and lifestyles internalized 
early in life. In Latin America, modern attitudes to 
economics, technology, and even social and political 
ideologies can therefore coexist with traditional values 
and behaviours in relation to family, personal relations, 
and individual identity (1972). 
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In addition, Germani points out that Latin America’s 
asynchronous modernization might entail a fusion effect 
(1971). The fusion effect refers to traditional behaviours 
being reinforced rather than eliminated by modern ideology. 
Traditional behaviours accordingly gain new legitimacy as 
they are presented as modern. Ideological traditionalism is 
a particular version of the fusion effect, one which 
moreover operates in the opposite direction. Ideological 
traditionalism exists where elites appeal to traditional 
values and behaviours in order to hamper the advance of 
progressive ideologies. Family life is identified as a 
privileged realm for elites to practise ideological 
traditionalism.  
Germani sees consensual unions as a traditional family 
arrangement that should decline as modernization advances. 
He asserts that the prevalence of consensual unions in the 
countryside is the main difference between urban and rural 
families (1971:363-64). Therefore, Latin America’s 
transition from the extended to the nuclear family should 
be marked by the relative decline of consensual unions.  
By the end of the 1960s, the notion of marginality 
became relevant in analyses of Latin American social 
realities in the context of massive rural-to-urban 
migration. The term ‘marginality’ was first coined to refer 
to precarious, and usually illegal, urban settlements 
located on the periphery of cities. Shantytowns were 
defined as marginal in relation to an urban-modern core 
(Nun 1969; Germani 1980). Theories of marginality were 
intertwined with dependency theories, as marginality 
involved an asymmetrical relation between the centre and 
the periphery (Germani 1980). The coupling of dualism with 
issues of power meant that modernization could reinforce, 
rather than weaken, processes of duality and dependence 
(Germani 1972). 
The concept of marginality was later broadened to 
include diverse forms of exclusion or lack of 
participation. Marginal populations are often considered to 
have a distinctive culture, especially in relation to 
family arrangements. Consensual unions are identified as 
 75 
typical of marginal groups (Germani 1980). Marginal groups 
are seen as different from the established lower class, 
which is formed by workers who have stable jobs and 
acceptable housing. By contrast, marginal groups are 
treated as outcasts. Their behaviours and lifestyles are 
distinct from, and often opposed, to those of the 
established lower class (Germani 1980). Unmarried 
cohabitation has been linked to marginality: understood as 
a backward behaviour typical either of traditional rural 
extended families or of marginal groups created by the 
migration of rural families to the city. 
Current views on modernity in the developed world 
assert that families are being transformed by processes of 
individualization and democratization (Giddens 1992; Beck 
and Beck-Gernsheim 1995; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2001; 
Beck-Gernsheim 2002). In this regard, I will focus on the 
theory of the second demographic transition (SDT), which 
pays special attention to the phenomenon of rising 
cohabitation in Western developed countries (Lesthaeghe 
1995). The SDT asserts that rising cohabitation in these 
settings is an outcome of increased individual autonomy, 
female emancipation, and increased consumerism. The SDT is 
basically held to be an outcome of Inglehart’s ‘silent 
revolution’, by which developed societies are believed to 
be moving from materialism to post-materialism, and from 
traditional or survival values to secular/rational ones 
which privilege self-expression. According to this 
perspective, individual autonomy increases alongside rising 
demands for self-fulfilment and a growing adult-centred 
orientation in social relations. Thus the quality of a 
couple’s relationship displaces childbearing as the main 
aim of a union.  
Today, people in the West impose higher standards on 
marriage. At the same time, they are more autonomous in 
their decisions about it. Cohabitation, as a weaker 
institution than marriage, is more suited to testing the 
fitness of a relationship. Thus cohabitation can be 
considered as a trial phase before marriage, likely to be 
preferred by those who have higher expectations of 
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relationships as well as by those with problematic family 
backgrounds. As cohabitation is a manifestation of personal 
autonomy which openly rejects any institutional 
intervention, it is also more common among more secular 
groups, having emerged among left-wing voters (Lesthaeghe 
1995). 
In Chile, sociologist Ximena Valdés (2005) has 
analysed the effects on families of modern forces of 
individualization and democratization. Her research is 
based on interviews with couples of different social 
classes. Her findings suggest that families in Chile 
present modern features which coexist with traditional 
behaviours, a combination characteristic of the region as a 
whole (Arriagada 2006). Valdés asserts that family life is 
experiencing a process of democratization and becoming more 
egalitarian. Parents, in particular fathers, seek to have a 
close and affectionate relationship with their children 
(see further discussion of changes to fatherhood in the 
last section of this chapter). Both women and men express a 
desire for a more equal relationship as partners.  
Valdés also, however, identifies obstacles to the 
modernization of the family. These hurdles include the 
persistence of a notion of female identity that is linked 
exclusively to motherhood, and the prevalence of the 
extended family. As Chilean women have not expanded their 
identity beyond motherhood, it is difficult to expect any 
significant change in relation to gender equality. 
Similarly, since the extended family – in particular, 
maternal grandmothers - provide childcare, gender 
inequality remains unchallenged. In this way, increased 
female employment does not necessarily lead to greater 
gender equality. In addition, Valdés asserts that 
modernization is linked to income and levels of education, 
with those enjoying higher incomes and educational levels 
presenting more modern styles of family life.  
The 2006 report of the World Values Survey for Chile, 
focused on family and religion, arrives at similar 
conclusions (MORI 2006). Its findings suggest that Chile is 
slowly moving towards a higher adhesion to rational values 
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and values linked to self-expression. In relation to 
family, childbirth and partnership are found to be 
increasingly disconnected from marriage. For instance, 
while 92 percent of respondents in 1990 agreed that a child 
needs a home with both parents, in 2006, this decreased to 
75 percent. Yet these changes are not equally distributed 
throughout Chilean society. We can identify a spectrum of 
opinions. At one end of the spectrum, men with lower levels 
of formal education hold traditional perspectives on family 
and partnership. At the other extreme, a more liberal 
stance is adopted by women with higher levels of formal 
education and income (MORI 2006). 
In relation to religion, the report shows that the 
Chilean population is becoming more secular. While 77 
percent of respondents self-identified as religious in 
1990, only 63 percent did so in 2006. There is also 
evidence that Chile is one of the most secular countries in 
Latin America (Valenzuela, Scully c.s.c. et al. 2008). 
Secularization should however be understood as the 
maintenance of Catholic identity despite weakened religious 
practice. However, Chile also has a significant proportion 
of the irreligious and of religious plurality (Valenzuela, 
Scully c.s.c. et al. 2008). Recent years have also seen a 
string of child abuse scandals involving Catholic priests, 
together with increased levels of distrust expressed by the 
public towards the Catholic Church and its hierarchy (ICSO 
2011).   
Secularization in Chile does not, however, follow the 
predictions of modernization theories regarding its 
relationship to educational attainment or socioeconomic 
group. Indeed, in Chile Catholicism increases in the upper 
class (Valenzuela, Scully c.s.c. et al. 2008; ICSO 2011). A 
survey on liberalism and conservatism likewise shows that 
middle and upper class young people, more highly educated 
and prone to religiosity, form a stronghold of ideological 
conservatism (Palacios and Martínez 2006). A study of 
religiosity among the Chilean economic elite furthermore 
shows a prevalence of identification with or adherence to 
traditionalist Catholic movements such as Opus Dei and the 
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like (Thumala 2007). The same study also shows that this 
elite currently favours religious marriage and large 
families (numerous offspring) as a differentiation 
strategy. Empirical evidence therefore raises questions 
about the adequacy of the modernity approach, since 
improved educational and living standards clearly do not 
necessarily translate into the adoption of rational values 
and the privileging of self expression. 
 
 
 
 
 
All in all, the study of cohabitation in the light of the 
question of modernity enables us to ask how cohabitation is 
related to issues of autonomy and equality. Analysing 
cohabitation from the point of view of modernity entails 
assessing cohabitation in terms of the normative ideals 
modernity itself creates. From this perspective gender 
equality becomes a key concern in the study of 
cohabitation. Yet questions of autonomy and equality are 
not confined to cohabiting partners: they also extend to 
the social context in which cohabitation takes place. 
 The normative framework which the modernization thesis 
entails can also colour the empirical study of cohabitation 
in unhelpful ways. Since the modernity thesis implies 
evolution towards the realization of modern ideals, it 
introduces an artificial opposition between modernity and 
tradition. ‘Tradition’ is defined as anything that is non-
modern, and so tradition becomes viewed as an obstacle to 
development (Bernstein 1979). The label ‘traditional’ is 
appended to specific family arrangements, religious 
beliefs, lack of education, poverty, rural settings, and so 
forth. Scholars then adopt these variables as a tool set 
for assessing the distance between actually-existing social 
actors and the modern ideal. 
The study of cohabitation in Latin America illustrates 
the artificiality involved in the modernity approach. 
Modernization theory defined cohabitation as a traditional 
arrangement. Nowadays, the SDT frames it as a modern 
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arrangement. Cohabitation itself is not problematized in 
either approach. Cohabitation is treated as an indicator of 
either underdevelopment or development, but it is not 
studied as such. To study cohabitation we first need to 
understand its historical trajectory. Cohabitation, as with 
modernity itself, did not emerge from nowhere (Wallerstein 
1979). Thus we need to study the historical origins and 
transformations of cohabitation, so as to clearly establish 
our frame of reference. In the next section we will see how 
race is at the core of socio historical accounts of 
cohabitation in Latin America. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Race and Sex 
 
 
 
Race is at the core of the question of consensual unions in 
Latin America. The Spanish term mestizaje is used to refer 
to the racial mixing that is distinctive to Latin America. 
A ‘mestizo’ (masculine form) or ‘mestiza’ (feminine form) 
is a person born as a product of such mixing, and in early 
colonial times was usually born from an informal 
relationship between a European white man and a coloured 
indigenous woman. Cohabitation, as a form of informal 
coupling, has accordingly been a prevalent form of racial 
mixing since colonial times. On the other hand, in Latin 
America sex and sexual desirability have been expressed in 
the idiom of race - white or coloured - rather than through 
gender (Wade 2009). Latina women are seen as sexy, and tend 
to believe in this racialized sexual image of themselves 
(Wade 2009:230). Hence, it is asserted, race and sex play a 
key role in explaining cohabitation in the region from 
colonial times. 
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Population scholar Robert McCaa (1983) has claimed that 
Chile has a ‘mestizo marriage pattern’, defined as the 
outcome of the mixing of three ‘biocultures’, Indian, 
European, and, to a much lesser extent, African.  Based on 
his study of marriage and fertility in Chile’s Petorca 
Valley for the period 1840 to 1976, McCaa describes the 
mestizo marriage pattern as featuring early and relatively 
free sexual intercourse, and as being characterised by 
‘[an]early age at coupling and considerable pre and 
extramarital fertility (1983:58).  
Stølen (1996) also links race with informal coupling, 
relating race, sex, social class, and religion to each 
other. Based on anthropological research conducted in 1973-
1974 and in 1988 in the rural community of Santa Cecilia, 
in northern Argentina, Stølen identified two distinct 
social groups. The first one, defined as subordinate, was 
composed of seasonal labourers of indigenous descent. The 
other, dominant, group was formed by gringos, and consisted 
in this case of white middle class farmers, of Italian 
descent. She asserts that informal unions were more common 
among the subordinate group, whose members’ preoccupations 
were focused on the present and on their feelings, rather 
than on the future and on formalities (1996:173). 
According to Stølen, at the core of mestizos’ identity 
is the belief that they are driven by their sangre caliente 
(hot blood), while gringos and/or those of European descent 
are described as having sangre fría (cold blood). Mestizo 
women report being proud of their sangre caliente, and they 
despise the sangre fría of the gringas as sexually inferior 
(1996:172). This same ‘hot blood’ idiom is adduced by 
mestizos to explain or describe a relative lack of concern 
with the formalizing of relationships and a readiness to 
live together without marrying (referred to as living 
‘juntados’). 
Stølen also highlights the centrality of popular 
(Catholic) religiosity to mestizo identity. In Latin 
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America, the meaning of the Spanish term‘ popular’ bears no 
relation to its English homograph. Accordingly, it does not 
denote popularity in the sense of appreciation or wide 
acclaim. Derived rather from the Latin populus, ‘lo 
popular’ in Latin America refers rather to characteristics 
considered to be‘the central defining traits of the 
population’ (Levine 1992:6). When used to denote a specific 
segment of the population lo popular refers to the poor as 
a group or class seen as having a sense of collective 
identity (Levine 1992: 6). Popular religiosity 
(religiosidad popular) accordingly denotes religious 
practices and beliefs which are considered to be 
characteristic of the poor and to form part of their 
identity (Lehmann 1990:139). Popular religiosity emerges 
from the constant tension between official and informal 
religious practices. Formal religious institutions try to 
restrain or co-opt expressions of popular religiosity, yet 
they are never successful. Popular religiosity - not 
exclusive to Catholicism - is moreover in constant flux, 
tolerating frequent migration between different 
denominations, faiths or belief systems. 
 
 
 
The (separate) scholarship of Raymond T. Smith (1996a) and 
Göran Therborn (2004), can be combined to create a 
comprehensive model, centred on race and sex, that may be 
used to understand formal and informal coupling in Latin 
America and the West Indies. Based on historical and 
anthropological research, both Smith and Therborn show how, 
in colonial times, race articulated with social class, 
sexuality, and gender to produce a distinctive system of 
union formation. Although their research is not focused on 
Chile, their explanatory model might be useful for the 
Chilean case. Smith’s work is based on extensive 
anthropological fieldwork conducted in British Guyana and 
Jamaica between the 1950s and the 1970s. He also carried 
out historical research on colonial family life and 
legislation in the West Indies. Smith’s model of union 
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formation is presented in his 1987 article, ‘Hierarchy and 
the Dual Marriage System in West Indian Society’ (1996a).  
Smith posits the dual-marriage system as a cultural 
system resulting primarily from the racial hierarchy 
predominant in Caribbean society. This particular system of 
marriage emerged, he claims, during colonial times, when 
West Indian society was a slave-based economy. The dual-
marriage system, introduced by white British men, held that 
white men who wished to marry could only do so with white 
women. Non-legal unions with coloured women were, however, 
tolerated. Non-legal unions were also common among slaves, 
since they were forbidden to marry. The dualmarriage system 
encompassed the whole society - women and men of every 
race. It accordingly produced significant social cohesion 
in a highly unequal society.  
Ideology and culture, not economic conditions or 
personal preferences, are at the core of Smith’s 
explanation. He states that economic conditions, meaning 
the plantation economy based on slave labour, are 
insufficient to explain the emergence and reproduction of 
this model. Similarly, since, individual choices are 
conditioned or framed by the dual-marriage system, they are 
not useful for studying its origins. According to Smith, 
essentialist views of gender and sexuality are an outcome, 
not a cause, of the dual-marriage system. Consequently, 
until today West Indian women and men tend to describe male 
sexuality as an intense natural appetite, needing more than 
one sexual partner.  
The dual-marriage system did not end with the 
abolition of slavery and related economic transformations 
in the nineteenth century. As the planter class managed to 
maintain its position of power, race continued to be the 
basic structuring principle of society. Once slaves were 
freed, concubinage became a kind of marriage for them, as 
they were at the bottom of the racial hierarchy. In other 
words, among the lower class consensual unions are 
assimilated to marriage, yet formal marriage keeps a 
superior status in comparison to unmarried cohabitation. In 
a gender unequal society, these perceptions led lower class 
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men to favour consensual unions as a way of having multiple 
sexual partners. The higher status of marriage may also 
explain why, after many years of living together, some 
lower class couples decide to tie the knot. 
Therborn’s (2004) analysis is based on secondary 
sources, mainly historical and anthropological. He makes 
reference to literature on master-slave societies and 
scholarship about the Spanish conquest and colonial 
society, in settings ranging from what are now the southern 
states of the US to South America, including the Caribbean. 
Like Smith, he asserts that racial segregation, by 
forbidding interracial marriage, produced a dual-marriage 
system in this region. However, since Therborn’s model also 
considers patriarchy, he prefers to talk about a dual 
family system rather than a dual-marriage system.  
In Therborn’s view Latin America and the West Indies 
constituted a Creole society in which the ruling white 
elite preserved a Western European pattern of marriage. A 
concern with notions of pure bloodlines resulted in strict 
patriarchy. Authoritarian parents exerted intense control 
over daughters, and white women were secluded and excluded 
from work and from undesirable suitors. Where white women 
were scarce and unapproachable, coloured women were by 
contrast abundant. They were also perceived as available 
and even willing to mingle with white men. Indeed, for a 
coloured woman to be mistress to a white man was seen as a 
sensible alternative to marriage to a dispossessed coloured 
man. 
The dual family system proposed by Therborn suggests 
two opposite family types, one for the white dominant 
class, and one for the coloured masses. Family life for the 
white elite was based on strong patriarchy and formal 
marriage. Coloured families were characterised by 
phallocracy rather than patriarchy. Sexual partnering was 
usually an informal and lax arrangement, and male 
absenteeism, matrifocality, and female-headed families were 
common. 
In addition, Therborn identifies two types of family 
systems in Creole society, the Indo-Creole and the Afro-
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Creole. Informal coupling was held to be more pronounced in 
the latter. The Indo-Creole family pattern is characterised 
as ‘mainly an outcome of the Spanish conquest and 
colonization’ (2004:34), and described as  predominating 
where there is a large mestizo or mixed blood population 
(i.e. Mexico, Central America except Costa Rica, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Paraguay). The Afro-Creole 
family type, arising from plantation slavery, is particular 
to the Caribbean but is also found in parts of Venezuela, 
Colombia, and Brazil. 
Like Smith, Therborn asserts that white men promoted 
sexual predation of coloured women. In Therborn’s view this 
predation is however characterized by sexual violence and 
exploitation, while for Smith this was not necessarily the 
case. Therborn describes the model of masculinity 
constructed by white men as that of ‘a virile, macho 
figure, sexually rapacious, and domineering in relations 
with women’ (2004:159). Violent sexual exploitation was the 
legacy of this kind of masculinity, as ‘popular sexual 
experience had seldom been far from rape and the whip’ 
(2004:159). 
 Therborn shares with Smith the view that the dual 
marriage system created during colonial times was mainly an 
outcome of racial segregation, enforced by the white elite. 
At the cultural or ideological level, the Spanish crown and 
the Catholic Church tried to ensure racial segregation, at 
least within the white elite. To this end they actively 
promoted marriage and condemned consensual unions. Racial 
hierarchy was also present in the economy: the white elite 
concentrated economic power through its ownership of 
plantations, haciendas, and mines. Black slaves or 
indigenous people, living in conditions of serfdom, could 
not afford the expense of marriage nor of setting up a 
home. Therefore, in colonial times, marriage was only 
possible between individuals who had equal status in the 
racial and social hierarchy and moreover possessed 
sufficient means. 
 Religious marriage imposed various additional 
restrictions - such as a prohibition on marrying close kin 
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- which limited access to it even more. Informal coupling 
was also favoured by the specific characteristics of native 
forms of marriage and by the relatively loose sexual mores 
of the first Iberian colonists 
Therbon, like Smith, asserts that changes taking place 
in the nineteenth century did not challenge the Creole dual 
family system. At that time the colonies became 
independent, slavery was abolished, Europeans migrated en 
masse - especially to South America - and civil marriage 
was introduced. Marriage became more frequent over the 
course of the twentieth century, reaching its peak in the 
1960s. Increased marriage was prompted by economic 
development, and by pressure from the state and the 
Catholic Church to legalize consensual unions. Economic and 
political crises in the 1970s promoted a partial return to 
informal coupling, and marriage decreased. Thus, in the 
twentieth century, marriage patterns in Latin America 
followed economic trends. 
Therborn asserts that late twentieth century Latin 
America is witnessing a resurgence of a familiar historical 
pattern, in which  informal coupling has become more 
frequent in particular where it was always been more 
prevalent (i.e. in the West Indies.  Given that Latin 
America remains, in economic terms, the most unequal region 
in the world, the rise of informal coupling over marriage 
may not be unexpected. In Therborn’s view ongoing economic 
inequalities and Catholic conservatism reproduce the dual 
and unequal sexual order of the Creole family system 
(2004:218). 
Therborn however stipulates qualifications in the case 
of Chile. He asserts that nineteenth century mass migration 
from Europe reinforced the Western European marriage 
pattern in Chile. Moreover, he states that at the end of 
the twentieth century Chile left the Creole family system 
and became more similar in this regard to Latin, i.e. 
Southern, Europe. Here, the main relevant feature of the 
socio-sexual order of Southern Europe is the significance 
of the parental household: young people stay with their 
parents until they marry. In this sexual order, young 
 86 
people have their first experience of sexual intercourse, 
and get married, relatively late in life. Households of two 
generations are common, single parenting is not 
particularly unusual, and unmarried cohabitation and 
divorce are marginal (2004:221).  
 
 
 
 
 
In sum, the dual marriage system proposed by Smith and 
Therborn goes back to colonial times, and racial and sexual 
hierarchy are characteristic of consensual unions in the 
region. By contrast, formal marriage is a form of 
partnership restricted for those who are status equal. This 
scholarship is relevant for the study of cohabitation today 
because it shows cohabitation to be   a specific historical 
development. The historical perspective shows how 
cohabitation was originally related to racial mixing, 
shaped by Western hegemonic ideologies and supported by 
social, economic, and political structures.  
Despite its usefulness, this work also throws up 
difficulties, in particular in relation to explanations of 
current patterns of cohabitation. For Smith, the lower 
class reproduces a modified version of a pattern generated 
in colonial times. For Therborn, marriage and consensual 
unions have been almost exclusively related to economic 
development since colonial times. In this interpretation, 
cohabitation is reduced to a simple manifestation of the 
past in the present, or to an externality of economic 
growth. Therborn’s thesis is also contradicted by available 
evidence, which shows cohabitation levels rising at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century precisely in those 
areas where it has not been historically pervasive (see 
Introduction, above).  
Therborn’s qualifications for the Chilean case are 
also problematic. Contrary to his assertion, cohabitation 
in Chile is not marginal. Indeed, it is currently 
experiencing a sharp increase. It is also highly 
controversial to assert that the prevalence of parental 
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households or extended household more generally means that 
Chile is adopting a Latin European socio-sexual order, 
since it is already well documented that these phenomena 
characterise family life not only in Chile, but in Latin 
America more generally (see Introduction, above). Available 
evidence also suggests a positive association in the region 
between extended households and cohabitation. 
Another problematic issue is the link between race and 
sex underscored by both Smith and Therborn. With more or 
less emphasis, each suggests a pattern of early, 
promiscuous, and informal sexuality as typical of the 
mestizo population. These claims are qualified, with Afro-
descendant populations more closely linked to frequently 
related to active sexuality than are those of indigenous 
descent. On the whole, however, coloured people are held to 
show a specific sexual identity related to prevalent 
cohabitation. The question is, to what extent do these 
sexual practices constitute a sexual identity which is 
rooted in racial difference? The issue is complex, since 
race in unequal societies is inextricably intertwined with 
social class. It could accordingly be argued that there are 
no racial or ethnic particularities, just concrete 
strategies to cope with deprivation. This is the focus of 
the next section of this chapter, which explores approaches 
that have explained cohabitation in relation to poverty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation and Kinship 
 
 
 
The literature has shown that deprivation may be linked to 
unmarried cohabitation in two ways. First, low income 
groups might opt to cohabit rather than to marry, because 
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of obstacles that they face to get married. Secondly, it is 
also possible that disadvantaged groups prefer consensual 
unions, since they are part of their mores. Cohabitation as 
constitutive of the mores of poor people is a theme which 
has been analysed from two perspectives. One approach 
relates cohabitation to a distinctive culture of the poor, 
and the other relates it to the particularities of the 
Latin American kinship system. Scholars in Chile have not 
developed a specific approach linking poverty with 
cohabitation, yet they have been influenced by the 
approaches reviewed here. 
 
 
 
 
Research on family life in poor communities has highlighted 
the various obstacles to marriage that poor people face.. 
Here I draw in particular on the work of three authors who 
have conducted extended ethnographical research on poor 
families. Angelina Pollak-Eltz (1980) studied four rural 
areas of Venezuela in the 1970s. In the early 1980s, 
Claudia Fonseca (1991), investigated families living in a 
slum adjacent to the city of Porto Alegre in Brazil. In the 
1980s and 1990s, Sylvia Chant (2003) focused her research 
on poor urban female heads of household in Mexico, Costa 
Rica, and the Philippines. 
These authors have pointed out that marriage is an 
expensive enterprise. Getting married involves, at a 
minimum, paying fees for the civil and/or religious 
ceremony and covering the costs of a wedding party. 
Marriage is moreover a formal procedure, requiring the 
presentation of certain documents and the meeting of 
certain preconditions. For impoverished groups these 
hurdles may be difficult to overcome. For example, as young 
people from low income groups tend to have an early sexual 
start, they might not meet the legal age of marriage 
(Fonseca 1991:149).  
Unmarried cohabitation is, relatively speaking, 
informal and inexpensive. Living together does not require 
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following any institutional procedure. Although 
cohabitation is more affordable and easier to achieve, the 
nature of the relationship resembles marriage. Therefore, 
consensual unions are experienced by the poor as a 
surrogate marriage. The fact that a couple starts living 
together signals the beginning of married life without any 
need for formal ceremony. As Fonseca points out, in 
practice, ’marriage, or official recognition of liaison, 
[is] coterminous with co-residence’ (1991:148). In this 
view, consensual unions involve co-residence, the bearing 
of children, the playing out of traditional gender roles, 
and, significantly, couples referring to each other as 
‘husband’ and ‘wife’. Thus, as Chant concludes, 
‘cohabitation is regarded as the next best thing to 
marriage’ (1997:252). Raczynski and Serrano (1985) arrive 
at a similar conclusion in their study of poor families in 
Chile. They also assert that most consensual unions are 
eventually legalized through marriage. 
There is a second approach which, without denying the 
difficulties faced by disadvantaged groups in tying the 
knot, asserts that cohabitation is primarily a cultural 
trait of these groups. In the 1960s, American 
anthropologist Oscar Lewis (1968) coined the concept of the 
culture of poverty. He asserts that impoverished groups 
have a distinctive culture: the culture of poverty. 
Although produced by structural conditions, this culture, 
once created, helps to reproduce poverty. Lewis indicates 
many traits as constitutive of the culture of poverty. In 
relation to family life, he asserts that consensual unions, 
alongside family arrangements which are unstable and 
disorganized, are typical of the culture of poverty. Family 
life is hard: men frequently desert women and children, 
family members compete for scarce affection and goods, and 
family relations are described as authoritarian (Lewis 
1968:53). 
In addition, Lewis claims that people immersed in the 
culture of poverty have a present-time orientation which 
promotes early sexual intercourse and formation of 
consensual unions. He says that individuals in this culture 
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have ‘relatively little ability to defer gratification and 
to plan for the future’ (1968:53). Emphasis on the present 
moment can also be seen as a positive trait since it 
encourages spontaneity, sensual enjoyment, and the 
indulgence of impulses, in contrast to the unfeeling and 
future-oriented culture of the middle class (Lewis 
1968:57). Whether viewed as a positive or a negative trait, 
emphasis on the present is held up as an explanation of 
pronounced cohabitation among disadvantaged groups. 
In the case of Chile, the research of Irarrázaval and 
Valenzuela (1993) endorses the notion of the culture of 
poverty. Their study is focused on illegitimacy in Chile 
from 1960 to 1990. They concluded that customary 
illegitimacy, i.e. the type prevailing before indices 
started to rise at the end of the twentieth century, is an 
outcome of both mestizo culture and the culture of poverty. 
They assert that recent changes in illegitimacy and 
cohabitation should be studied against this backdrop of 
poverty-culture-race.  
The notion of the culture of poverty should be 
understood in relation to a debate around the capacity of 
the lower class to postpone gratification. In 1953 
Schneider and Lysgaard (1953) suggested that the lower 
class, when compared to the middle, shows a pattern of non-
deferment. Lower class self-indulgence was associated with 
free sexual expression. Sexual indulgence manifests itself 
in frequent premarital sex, and in higher rates of 
illegitimacy (Miller, Riessman et al. 1969). However, the 
idea that the lower class, or those living in the culture 
of poverty, cannot control their impulses has been 
criticized (Valentine 1968; Miller, Riessman et al. 1969). 
To begin with, the concept of a culture of poverty fails to 
acknowledge that impoverished groups are not homogeneous. 
Secondly, it does not consider the social context in which 
people choose whether to postpone, or not, certain 
gratifications. Thirdly, evidence suggests that lower class 
parents are if anything relatively strict with their 
children in relation to sexual issues. 
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The Latin American kinship system is characterized by its 
emphasis on blood ties, visible in the importance that is 
placed on the extended family, men’s obligations as sons 
and brothers, and the reverential treatment of motherhood. 
Each of these traits in turn contributes to the promotion 
of cohabitation. In relation to the extended family, I will 
refer to the work of Lomnitz (1977; 1984) and of González 
de la Rocha (1994). I will also rely on the research of 
Chant, Fonseca, and Pollak-Eltz already discussed above. 
Lomnitz’s seminal research (1977) highlights the role of 
extended families as support networks in situations of 
deprived living conditions. From 1969 to 1971, she studied 
families living in a shanty town of 200 households in 
Mexico City. At a time of significant rural-urban 
migration, she identified the importance of relatives in 
giving assistance to new migrants. Furthermore, she 
observed that kin support did not cease after people 
migrated to the city. Thus, in the face of deprived living 
conditions, social networks are valuable resources that the 
poor can rely on to ensure their survival. 
Lomnitz asserts that networks of reciprocal exchange 
are typically based on kinship, which gives stability and 
intensity to these networks. The extended family is 
accordingly then the most efficient support network, in 
particular when family members share expenses and live in 
the same household or plot. Mothers or elder sisters are 
commonly the ones who articulate and promote these networks 
of reciprocal exchange. In subsequent research (1984) she 
asserts kinship as the key vehicle of reciprocal exchange, 
not only for the lower class, but also for the middle and 
upper classes. In particular she asserts that three 
generations - parents, children, and grandchildren - form, 
what she calls the ‘grand-family’, which is ‘the basic unit 
of solidarity in all social classes’ (1984:193). 
González de la Rocha (1994) also pays attention to 
support networks among poor groups, particularly in 
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relation to young couples who are starting a family. In the 
1980s she studied 100 poor households in Guadalajara, 
Mexico. She concluded that extended families have more 
capacity to cope with economic hardship than nuclear ones. 
Nuclear families, especially if they are young, have a 
better chance of coping with poverty if they can rely on 
the support of relatives. An example of support provided by 
the extended family to young couples is that such couples 
usually begin their life together living in the parental 
home of either partner (Lomnitz 1977; González de la Rocha 
1994). Evidence from Chile also supports this pattern of 
new families living in the parental household (Raczynski 
and Serrano 1985). 
Starting a new family is expensive, especially if 
young children are involved. Young couples living with 
their parents do not pay rent or need household appliances 
or furniture, and receive help with childcare. This allows 
for a better standard of living and the opportunity to save 
towards their own future accommodation (González de la 
Rocha 1994:217-20). 
In addition, Lomnitz claims that conjugal roles should 
be studied in the light of the significance of the extended 
family. She asserts that conjugal life is in practice 
restricted to sexuality, as every other need is provided by 
the extended family. As she puts it, ‘with the sole 
exception of the sexual functions, all other marital 
functions may be discharged indifferently or alternately by 
close relatives’ (1977:96).  
The importance attached to blood ties can also be seen 
in men’s family obligations (Lomnitz 1977; Pollak-Eltz 
1980; Fonseca 1991). Emphasis on blood ties means that men 
are close to their mothers and sisters. Sons and brothers 
provide economic support, and limit the male authority and/ 
or violence of fathers, husbands, or male partners. Men’s 
strong attachment to their mothers and sisters makes them 
proportionately less close to their sexual partner, whether 
formal or informal. Hence this system of kinship promotes 
absent or distant husbands and fathers. Furthermore, men’s 
family obligations make it difficult for men to start their 
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own family and set up an independent home. In the case of 
Chile, the accounts of the women interviewed by Raczynski 
and Serrano show a similar situation. Some women reported 
how difficult it was for them to persuade their partner to 
leave the maternal home in order to set up an independent 
household (1985:86). 
Likewise, Latin America’s kinship system entails 
matrifocality, a focus on the mother-child bond, which is 
detrimental for sexual ties (Smith 1996b). The prevalence 
of consensual unions in the lower class goes hand in hand 
with matrifocality. Matrifocality is also relevant to 
support networks, as it produces female intergenerational 
cooperation without challenging male dominance.  
Parental authority is also relevant to kinship. 
Evidence shows that although parents do not produce 
arranged marriages, they do pressure young couples to marry 
- or at least to live together - once they have had sexual 
intercourse and/ or the female partner is pregnant (Chant 
1997). Chant reports that parents are more open in some 
places than others to accepting consensual unions if young 
partners are reluctant to get married. The point is that 
parents seek to restrict their daughters’ sexuality to one 
male partner. Once a daughter is discovered having sex or 
is found to be pregnant, her parents will accordingly urge 
her to move in with her partner, formally or not, since 
women ‘are expected to go from the house of their parents 
to the house of their husbands’ (1997:135). McCaa (1983:54) 
reports that in Chile, at least in the nineteenth century, 
parents favoured marriage over cohabitation and forced 
their daughters to marry. In addition, parents severely 
punished their daughters, even throwing them out in the 
street if they had premarital sex or became pregnant. 
Montoya’s research (2002) elaborates on why parents 
urge their daughters to marry or, alternatively, to live 
together. She conducted anthropological research from 1992 
to 2000 in the rural village of El Tule, Nicaragua. She 
observes that the loss of virginity in a daughter is not 
unforgivable, if then she starts living a marital life with 
her partner (2002:75). The couple gains recognition from 
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the community by living together. Living with a man, 
formally or not, shows the community that a woman has a 
man’s backing, which entitles her to be treated with 
respect (2002:70). Raczynski and Serrano (1985:105) 
similarly report that, in Chile, women who live without a 
male partner may lose respect. Thus women report preferring 
to endure a bad relationship, rather than go through a 
separation. 
Finally some authors have explained earlier partnering 
through cohabitation in Latin America as a mode of 
formation of support networks (Fussell and Palloni 2004). 
In this view, women with low levels of education and 
limited access to the labour market seek to marry in order 
to ‘reduce economic uncertainty by creating and solidifying 
family ties’ (2004:1206). Since disadvantaged women have 
less negotiating power, they marry earlier and commonly 
form an informal union. Those with higher educational 
attainment delay the formation of a union, and usually 
marry. Cohabitation as a mode of union formation is 
accordingly more frequent among deprived women. 
 
 
 
 
Overall, research into links between cohabitation and 
poverty and kinship points to some key issues that should 
be considered in any analysis. First, it highlights the 
barriers to marriage faced by the poor, in terms of the 
costs, requirements, and bureaucracy involved. Second, it 
shows that cohabitation should be studied in relation to 
kinship, as an emphasis on blood ties might promote weak 
sexual alliances. Approaches focusing on poverty and 
kinship also, however, have their difficulties.  
Perspectives emphasising the cultural dimension of 
poverty have rightly been criticized for essentialist 
understandings of poverty. Consensual unions are certainly 
not explained by positing some psychological feature, such 
as self-indulgence, held to be exclusive to the poor. In 
addition, views which focus on the barriers to marriage 
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have assimilated cohabitation to marriage, which means 
neglecting cohabitation as a separate object of study. With 
so much good research conducted on the families of the 
poor, it becomes noticeable that little attention has been 
paid to consensual unions.  
Furthermore, the process of union formation has barely 
been analysed by this branch of research, meaning that 
parental intervention is left out of the picture. Not 
paying attention to parents in relation to union formation, 
and not tracing the process(es) involved in union 
formation, seems to be an unwise omission. There is, for 
example, robust evidence that in Latin America young 
couples from low income groups usually start their marital 
life, formal or not, living in the parental household. Some 
researchers even point this out as a cause of distress for 
young people (Raczynski and Serrano 1985), in spite of 
which they rarely go on to ask questions about how issues 
of autonomy are linked to parental power.  
Kinship-based studies have paid considerable attention 
to consensual unions. Links between cohabitation and 
kinship are also problematic. If cohabitation is one 
outcome of a system of kinship that favours blood ties -a 
system that is not restricted to the lower strata - then 
why is cohabitation more prevalent among the lower class? 
Kinship might contribute to explaining consensual unions, 
then, but these should clearly also be understood in 
relation to different and changing contexts. Nevertheless, 
the analysis of kinship has underscored how family 
obligations are different for women and men, and how this 
might affect union formation. Literature on poverty has 
also asserted that gender roles are similar in marriage and 
consensual unions. It seems appropriate, then, to further 
analyse connections between gender and cohabitation. This 
issue is the focus of the following section. 
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Machismo 
 
 
 
On the one hand, it has been asserted that cohabitation is 
an arrangement favourable to the exacerbated masculinity of 
the macho. Consensual unions suit macho men because their 
relatively weak sexual bond diminishes parental 
responsibilities (Rodríguez Vignoli 2005). On the other 
hand, it has been said that women might prefer cohabitation 
to marriage, as it is less patriarchal (Stølen 1996; Chant 
1997). This section accordingly reviews research on gender 
in the region, to provide a better understanding of how 
cohabitation is linked to gender.  
 
 
Lewis (1968) identified reasons given by poor women to 
reject marriage. These have been confirmed by later 
research (Fonseca 1991; Chant 1997). Women from deprived 
groups say that they prefer to cohabit in order not to be 
tied down to unreliable men, and so as to enjoy some of the 
freedom and flexibility granted to men. Women who cohabit 
can have an affair, or leave a partner, without the risk of 
being separated from their children. Women assert that if 
they marry, their partner might become authoritarian. In 
addition, cohabitation does not challenge women’s exclusive 
rights to any property that they might own. Chant 
interprets avoidance of marriage as an act of resistance 
towards male domination. Stølen (1996) also sees 
cohabitation as entailing a more equal relationship than 
marriage in terms of gender roles. Yet Fonseca observes 
that one should be wary of such claims, since they might be 
rationalizations rather than representing an active 
opposition to male power (1991:149). 
 Research on families of the poor also indicates that 
union formation is driven by instrumental rather than 
romantic reasons. Poor women commonly enter a partnership 
in order to escape from a difficult situation such as 
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poverty, strained relationships in the family of origin, or 
housework and childcare duties in the parental home 
(Raczynski and Serrano 1985; García and Rojas 2004). Thus 
women from deprived groups enter marriage or cohabitation 
to gain social status, to become mothers, and for company. 
It is also stated that amongst the lower class, love is 
understood almost exclusively as sexual intercourse. 
Courtship accordingly equals having sex (Fonseca 1991:148). 
It has even been suggested that love and companionship are 
almost non existent in partnerships, marriage or 
cohabitation among disadvantaged groups (Lewis 1959; 
Pollak-Eltz 1980; Fonseca 1991). 
As regards gender-focused research, three main 
approaches can be distinguished. The first explains gender 
roles in relation to Latin American  myths of origin. A 
second asserts that gender roles are constructed and 
structured around the distinction between the house (la 
casa), and the street (la calle). The third perspective is 
focused on the study of machismo from a sociohistorical 
perspective.  
The mythical explanation asserts that the Spanish 
conquest is the foundational event of Latin America’s 
identity, defining femininity and masculinity for the 
region. Octavio Paz’s essay, El Laberinto de la Soledad 
illustrates this perspective (1950), depicting the mestizo 
as born out of a traumatic sexual relationship (Fuller 
1998). The father, a white conquistador, forces an Indian 
woman to have sex, and then denies any relationship or 
responsibility towards his offspring. The man is 
characterized by his arbitrary nature, sexual violence, and 
lack of fatherly qualities. The woman is defined by her 
subjection to the man. 
 There is another version of the mythical origin of 
Latin American identity and gender roles which considers 
popular religiosity (Stevens 1979; Morandé 1984; Melhuus 
1996; Montecino 2001; Morandé 2010). This approach has been 
influential in Chile thanks to Montecino’s essay, Madres y 
Huachos (Mothers and Bastards) (2001). However, as 
Montecino herself acknowledges, her work is based on Pedro 
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Morandé’s interpretation. Morandé asserts that Catholicism 
brought by the Spanish connected with native oral 
traditions (1984; 2010). The indigenous inhabitants of the 
region assimilated the Catholic calendar based on saints 
and religious festivities. Popular religiosity came to 
focus on the cult of the Virgin and the saints, 
pilgrimages, processions, and shrines. Popular religiosity 
- oral, and institutionalized in the feast - is understood 
as a form of sociability.  
In relation to gender, popular religiosity further 
strengthens the prevalence of the mother-child relationship 
through promoting the influential icon of the Virgin and 
Child (Montecino 2001). Amongst the popular classes the 
image of the Virgin and Child has been equated with that of 
the single mother. The type of maternity inspired by the 
Virgin is one of self sacrifice and self-denial, as ‘there 
is an intrinsic link between womanhood – motherhood – and 
suffering’ (Melhuus 1996:248). This kind of femininity has 
been called marianismo, based as it is on popular devotion 
to the Virgin Mary (Stevens 1979). Just as womanhood is 
identified with the Virgin, manhood comes to be identified 
with the Child. Men never grow up, and so ‘must be 
humoured, for after all, everyone knows that they are como 
niños (like little boys) whose intemperance, foolishness, 
and obstinacy must be forgiven’ (1979:95). 
The second main approach to gender roles in Latin 
America relates femininity and masculinity to specific 
spaces. The woman belongs to the house (la casa), and the 
man to the street (la calle). La casa and la calle define 
actual and symbolic spaces for women and men (Hurtig, 
Montoya et al. 2002). This perspective is based on 
anthropological research, including the works of Pollak-
Eltz (1980), Fonseca (1991), Chant (1997), and Montoya 
(2002) already cited. In addition I also consider the 
literature on gender and families and households by Chant 
(2003), and on gender and sexuality by Chant and Craske 
(Chant and Craske 2003).  
The division between the house and the street mirrors 
an asymmetrical sexual order. The street is a sexualized 
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place, where only men and ‘bad women’ venture (Montoya 
2002:70). The street is the locus of men’s social life. It 
is where they meet and party with male peers, and where 
they flirt with loose women. Men are expected to have extra 
marital sex. Women, by contrast, should be faithful, and 
should be confined to the home. Women’s social life is 
expected to be limited to visiting relatives and female 
friends. 
The asymmetric sexual order involved in these notions 
of la casa and la calle relates gender to sexuality in 
specific ways. Women need men in order to have children, to 
become mothers, and, to have someone who would provide for 
them and their children. Hence female sexuality is 
primarily linked to reproduction, and ‘is not so much an 
expression of sexual desires as an expression of women’s 
“nature”’ (Chant and Craske 2003:144). Female sexuality is 
also restricted to marriage or to cohabitation, since a 
woman who sleeps with many partners before marriage will 
negatively affect her own reputation and conjugal prospects 
(Chant and Craske 2003:145).  
Women are supervised from childhood: ‘long before 
puberty, girls in many parts of the region are controlled, 
kept within or close to the home in their play, encouraged 
to be demure and deferential, and to build up a solid 
repertoire of domestic skills’ (Chant and Craske 2003:144). 
By contrast, young men are encouraged to gain premarital 
sexual experience (Chant and Craske 2003:145). Male 
sexuality is believed to be active, dominant, and driven by 
uncontrollable biological impulses (Chant and Craske 
2003:141). 
The house and the street also define women’s and men’s 
labour. Women are expected to be diligent and attentive 
housewives, looking after the house and children. Women 
should manage the home and rear children single-handed. Men 
are not expected to spend too much time at home. Men should 
go out into the streets and get a job so as to provide for 
their family. Only men are expected to be breadwinners. 
Women who work away from their home or from their male 
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partner’s supervision are seen as loose women, who are just 
looking to go out and flirt with other men. 
These two approaches to the study of gender - the 
mythical approach and the ideology of la casa and la calle 
- are both problematic. Each perspective portrays gender 
roles as stereotypes, and neither is sensitive to 
historical and social change. In addition, mythical 
accounts of gender are not grounded in empirical data. It 
seems unreasonable to assert that one event, that moreover 
took place five hundred years ago, has shaped gender roles 
through to the present day (Fuller 1998; Navarro 2002).  
The sociohistorical approach, by contrast, illustrates 
a more complex and changing evolution of gender roles. We 
have seen how gender roles were structured around racial 
hierarchy in colonial times. Social class was determined by 
race. As white men were in the dominant position, they 
imposed a model of masculinity consisting of sexual 
predation or machismo. One alternative explanation asserts 
that the image of the macho was created after the 1917 
Mexican Revolution, so as to promote national identity 
(Gutmann 2007). The macho figure, embodying the young male 
revolutionary fighter, was spread through the region during 
the golden age of Mexican cinema in the 1940s and 1950s. 
Current research shows that machismo is used by men to 
refer to what they are not (Fuller 1998; Gutmann 2007). 
Today men and women say that machismo is a thing of the 
past, and depict exacerbated virility and violent control 
of women as old-fashioned. Yet, although men in Latin 
America may no longer aspire to be macho, they continue to 
express contempt for men who are dominated by a woman. In 
Mexico, for example, men tend to quote the saying ‘neither 
a macho nor a mandilón’ (Gutmann 1998).  
Consequently, the sociohistorical approach suggests 
that there is no single masculinity. There are only 
masculinities, which vary according to specific living 
conditions and diverse local and global cultural influences 
(Gutmann 2007). Although the socio historical approach 
moves us on from stereotypical images of masculinity, it 
does not refer to femininity, which remains 
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unproblematized, and defined in negative terms, in 
contradistinction from masculinity.  
Evidence from Chile shows a continuing prevalence of 
conventional gender roles. A survey conducted in 2009 
indicates that women are characterized by motherhood, by 
self sacrifice, and as a source of affection (PNUD 2010:56-
57). Women are predominantly defined in positive terms, by 
both women and men. Women define themselves especially in 
relation to their endurance, and men value women as a 
source of affection. 
By contrast, men are described in negative terms, in 
particular by women of low income groups. Men are primarily 
seen as machistas, and are portrayed as irresponsible, 
lazy, and deceitful. Less frequently, men are associated 
with their familial roles as fathers, sons, or siblings. In 
third place, men are defined as providers or breadwinners. 
The report also shows that almost a fifth of the Chilean 
population can be described as having traditional views on 
gender, with a similar proportion described as machista. 
Both of these viewpoints are more pronounced among low 
income groups, with the machista profile particularly 
relevant among men (PNUD 2010:60-68). The same survey shows 
that women are almost exclusively in charge of looking 
after household and children, even if they are involved in 
paid work,. 
 In spite of the prevalence of traditional gender 
roles, qualitative research shows that gender, and in 
particular masculinity, is somehow changing (Olavarría 
2001; Valdés 2008). This research uncovers an emergent 
discourse on masculinity which incorporates affectionate 
fatherhood. Young Chilean men aim to develop a close and 
affectionate relationship with their children, in 
opposition to the authoritarian and distant fathers of 
previous generations. This view of a more expressive 
fatherhood is present across different social classes, yet 
it does not need to entail actual changes in fathering, or 
increased gender equality. Likewise, it is not clear that 
increased female employment and education are displacing 
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motherhood as the cornerstone of female identity (Valdés 
2005; Valdés, Caro et al. 2006). 
 
 
 
On the whole, research into gender in Latin America can 
suffer at times from a dualistic and simplistic 
characterization of femininity and masculinity. Such 
monolithic views of gender lead to union formation being 
seen as fulfilling stereotypical gender needs - basically, 
procreation - without due consideration of other possible 
interpretations. Furthermore, gender segregation is assumed 
to be predominant in both formal and informal partnerships. 
No room is left for more complex accounts of gender 
relations. Research focused only on one gender also remains 
frequent. This is especially problematic for discussions of 
identity construction, since identities are developed in 
relation and opposition to other identities. However, some 
progress has been made in conducting research that situates 
gender in relation to social and historical change. Thus, 
although it is acknowledged that conventional gender roles 
remain predominant, room is left for diversity and change. 
Attention to gender has moreover highlighted the 
possibility that cohabitation may entail a quite 
distinctive arrangement from marriage in terms of gender 
relations, although it is as yet  unclear whether 
cohabitation is associated with high levels of female 
autonomy. In the summary that follows, I will show how this 
research on cohabitation is related to previous research, 
reviewed here, on the family in Latin America, specifically 
in Chile. 
 
 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
 
The literature on unmarried cohabitation in Chile and Latin 
America offers diverse explanations for the pervasiveness 
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of cohabitation. Cohabitation has been linked to 
modernization in positive and negative terms; to a 
racialized sexual order developed in colonial times; to 
enduring traditional gender roles; to a kinship system 
based on blood ties, and to ongoing poverty and inequality. 
Each of these factors constitutes, when taken by itself, an 
incomplete account of the phenomenon of cohabitation. Since 
I have already pointed the main deficiencies of each of 
these approaches, here I will principally highlight how 
existing literature frames the research on consensual 
unions presented in this study. 
 Even though interracial sex might not today be at the 
core of cohabitation, the question remains relevant if 
there is a sexual order related to cohabitation. Thus I 
seek to study what sexual arrangements are entailed by 
cohabitation. According to the literature, we should expect 
living together to be a looser sexual arrangement than 
marriage. It may therefore be the case that those in a 
cohabiting relationship prove more tolerant of sexual 
affairs. In addition, this literature relates cohabitation 
with social segregation, which is pertinent in the face of 
ongoing social inequalities. 
 Studies of kinship have underscored the significance 
of the extended family and have depicted the 
differentiation of family obligations according to gender. 
Cohabiting couples should not, therefore, be studied in 
isolation. They should be studied in relation to their kin, 
in particular to parents and grandparents. Likewise, we 
should pay attention to how women and men relate to their 
families of origin, in order to ascertain whether differing 
obligations affect types of union formation. In other 
words, if women and men have different obligations towards 
their families of origin, they might also have different 
motivations for starting a partnership and/ or opting for 
different types of partnership: formal or informal. 
 Research on poor families correctly highlights the 
constraints faced by low income groups regarding marriage 
and the formation of a family. Costs and legal requirements 
are real, although not insurmountable, barriers to 
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marriage. Kinship networks help young couples to start out, 
often by providing housing for new families. In addition, 
as explained in the previous chapter, some social policies 
are currently being targeted to single mothers in low 
income groups. Hence attention should be paid to how a lack 
of means interacts with family ties and welfare provision 
so as to favour different forms of partnership. 
Framing research on consensual unions within the 
debate on modernity can be valuable, but scholars should 
take care not to superimpose a notion of teleological or 
linear progress onto what is, in fact, a contingent and 
open-ended sociohistorical trajectory. A modernity 
perspective enables us to link cohabitation to issues of 
autonomy and equality, asking what kind of arrangement 
cohabitation is as regards gender equality. Research on 
gender has demonstrated a close connection between gender 
and sexuality, alongside the predominance of traditional 
gender roles. We can, moreover, relate rising cohabitation 
to broader social changes, as suggested in Chapter 1. In 
short, increased cohabitation could tell us something about 
what sort of society Chile has become in the last two 
decades. 
 In spite of the valuable contributions of previous 
literature, there appears to be a significant gap. The 
views of those actually involved in a cohabiting 
relationship are almost unknown. We only know that some 
women from deprived groups say they prefer cohabitation to 
marriage. The reasons given by these women have been 
interpreted as either resistance to patriarchal marriage or 
mere rationalizations to cope with lack of opportunities. 
In either case we are left with almost no clue about why 
these women came to be living with partners rather than 
married to them.  We have similarly little insight into why 
men might enter into cohabitation instead of marriage. 
Rather, as we have seen, available research presents us 
with diverse explanations as to why people enter into 
cohabitation without adequately accounting for the views of 
those actually cohabiting. The next chapter gives a brief 
overview of the research design of the present study, 
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explaining how and why the study sample was selected and 
describing the data collection and analysis techniques that 
were applied. 
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Chapter 3 - RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the research design. 
It gives a brief description of the aims of the study, 
criteria applied to sample selection, the main 
characteristics of the participants, the format of the 
interviews, and the analysis of the data. 
 
 
Aims of the study 
 
This study has three main aims. The first objective is to 
explain the social mechanisms that prompt cohabitation 
among low income groups. I analyse union formation from a 
twofold perspective. On the one hand, I pay attention to 
how it is influenced by social conditions, and on the other 
hand, I study how individuals deal with those conditions 
when making partnering decisions. A second aim is to 
account for the experience of cohabitation from the 
perspective of those actually cohabiting. The focus is to 
find out what kind of arrangement cohabitation is, in 
particular by comparison with marriage. A third objective 
is to suggest a tentative explanation as to why 
cohabitation has recently increased in Chile.  
 
 
Sample selection and recruitment 
 
The sample selection criteria were set to collect a sample 
typical of cohabitees in Chile. The first requirement was 
that participants should have been living together with the 
same partner for at least one year, so as to include people 
with at least a minimum of stability in their relationship. 
In addition, participants should have had at least one 
child born of that relationship, as the focus of the study 
is on cohabiting people with children. Previous research 
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has suggested a negative impact of cohabitation on children 
(see the Introduction), and most cohabiting couples in 
Chile have children (Rodríguez Vignoli 2005; Herrera and 
Valenzuela 2006). 
Participants and their partner also had to be single, 
never married, and aged between 20 to 29 years old. These 
criteria aimed to select people who did not face legal 
restrictions on marriage, as the legal age to marry without 
parental consent is 18 years. In order to address the issue 
of gender, both women and men were targeted. 
Another criteria was to include people from urban low 
income groups, as cohabitation is most frequent in urban 
areas (Irarrázaval and Valenzuela 1993; Rodríguez Vignoli 
2005), and among more deprived groups (Irarrázaval and 
Valenzuela 1993; Rodríguez Vignoli 2005; Herrera and 
Valenzuela 2006; Salinas 2009). The majority of the Chilean 
population is urban, 87 percent according to the last 
census (INE 2003)). Greater Santiago was selected as the 
geographical location of the study. This is a conurbation 
formed by the most populated boroughs in and around the 
city of Santiago. It has a population of 5.4 million 
inhabitants, which represents 36 percent of the national 
population (INE 2005). Greater Santiago is formed by all 
the municipalities of the province of Santiago, plus the 
municipalities of Puente Alto and San Bernardo (see 
illustration 3.1). 
Cerro Navia and La Pintana, the two most deprived 
municipalities of Greater Santiago, were chosen to conduct 
the fieldwork. In these two boroughs around 90 percent of 
households are classified as middle-low income, low income, 
or poor (Adimark 2003). They are also similar in terms of 
the Human Development Index (PNUD and Mideplan No date). 
Recruitment of participants from the low socioeconomic 
group (D) was favoured, as it is the largest group. 
Although there are no representative figures on 
cohabitation at the level of municipalities, available data 
suggests that cohabitation is pronounced in La Pintana and 
Cerro Navia (Mideplan 2006a). In addition, the 
municipalities are situated on opposite sides of the 
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Greater Santiago. La Pintana is located in the south of the 
city, and Cerro Navia in the north-west (see illustration 
3.1). Therefore both sites are alike in variables that are 
relevant for studying cohabitation, yet they are 
geographically distant.  
 
 
Municipalities of the Greater Santiago district   
 
 
 
Methods of socioeconomic classification use the household 
as the unit of analysis, which is inadequate for cohabiting 
couples. People who cohabit usually live intermittently 
with different relatives. Therefore, instead of the 
household, the cohabiting couple was used as the unit of 
analysis for the purposes of socioeconomic classification. 
The educational attainment and occupation of the main 
N 
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provider was assessed using the World Association of Market 
Research system adapted to the Chilean situation (Adimark 
2000). The matrix used for socioeconomic classification is 
attached in Appendix 1. It should be noted that in every 
couple at least one partner, woman or man, was involved in 
paid work, and acted as the main provider. In addition, it 
was required that the main provider had no more education 
than completion of secondary education. This also ensured 
that they belonged to a low income group. Also, evidence 
shows that cohabitation is more common among people with 
primary or secondary education, in contrast to people with 
higher education (Herrera and Valenzuela 2006). Box 3.1 
presents a summary of the selection criteria. 
 
 
Box 3.1: Participants’ selection criteria 
 
                                                                                                                             
Twenty-four people were recruited, evenly distributed in 
terms of gender and municipality of residence. The majority 
(19 of the 24) were from the low socio economic group, 
group D, with the rest classified as middle-low (group C3). 
They had been cohabiting for 5 years, on average, and had 
an average of 1.4 children. Appendix 2 summarises the main 
characteristics of the interviewees. 
The recruitment of participants, men in particular, 
was problematic. I used two strategies to recruit 
participants. First, I contacted local institutions, such 
 
i. To have been living together with the same partner for at least one year 
 
ii. To have at least one child born from that partnership 
 
iii. Single (never married) 
 
iv. Aged 20 to 29 years  
 
v. Women and men 
 
vi. Classified as middle-low, low, or poor in terms of socioeconomic group 
(C3DE) 
 
vii. Living in the municipalities of Cerro Navia or La Pintana 
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as town councils, doctors’ surgeries, charitable 
organizations, and government social intervention 
programmes. Yet these institutions provided only a few 
people. A second, and more effective strategy, was to get 
in touch with possible participants through personal 
contacts (friends and relatives). I used my own my research 
assistant’s social networks to get in touch with people who 
met the selection criteria. Thereafter, people who had 
already participated in the study helped in recruiting new 
participants. These people were given a monetary incentive 
of roughly £5 for every new participant they recruited. The 
same amount was given to each interviewee in appreciation 
for having taken part in the study. 
 
 
Data collection 
 
Information was collected about the life course of each of 
the 24 participants. Participants also provided some 
limited information about their partner and parents. 
Appendix 2 summarises the data given by the interviewees 
about their partner and parents. The life histories were 
gathered in two separate interview sessions, both involving 
verbal interviewing and the use of questionnaires (see box 
3.2). The first interview was focused on interviewees’ 
family history and life history. Interviewers turned to the 
subject of cohabitation in the second session. The complete 
interviewing schedules and the questionnaire are attached 
in Appendix 3. 
 
Box 3.2: Instruments applied for collecting participants’ life histories 
Instrument Focus 
1. Semi-structured interview 
Family history (grandparents and parents)  
Life history (from birth to interview) 
2. Semi-structured interview 
Relationships, partners, & children 
Opinions about cohabitation & marriage  
3. Structured questionnaire 
Socio-economic data (interviewees, partner, and 
parents). Perceptions about cohabitation & marriage 
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The life history is a qualitative in-depth interview, which 
seeks to capture the salient experiences in a person’s life 
and that person’s definitions of those experiences (Taylor 
and Bogdan 1998:88-89). I refer to this technique as life 
history and not life story or narrative, to emphasize that 
the attention is on experiences and meanings rather than on 
narratives (Thompson 2009:39). Semi-structured interviews 
were conducted using interviewing schedules that were 
mostly descriptive and non-evaluative. The aim was to 
facilitate personal reconstructions and to avoid forced 
rationalizations. Interviewing guidelines were revised and 
changed several times to improve them: because of this, not 
all interviewees were asked exactly the same questions. 
Interviews were conducted in a flexible style, topics being 
introduced in different ways and at different times, to 
avoid disturbing the flow of the interview.  
To control for the possible negative effects of the 
interviewers’ gender and age, my male research assistant 
interviewed the men, and I interviewed the women. The 
majority of the interviews were conducted in settings that 
met the requirement of privacy, though settings varied 
according to gender. Most women’s interviews were carried 
out in the homes of the interviewees, whereas most men were 
interviewed at the field recruiters’ home. A few interviews 
were conducted in other settings, for example cafés, fast-
food restaurants, or parks. 
Participants were given an information sheet and were 
asked for their informed and voluntary consent. Translated 
versions of these documents are included in Appendix 4, 
below. Anonymity and confidentiality were assured, and 
participants were informed that the research would be 
published as a doctoral thesis, and eventually as an 
academic book or articles. They were also told what they 
would be asked to do. In particular they were told that 
interviews included sensitive issues such as their sexual 
life (Singer 2003:197). 
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All interviews were recorded digitally. On average, 
both sessions taken together lasted 2.7 hours. Women’s 
interviews were slightly longer than men’s, on average 3 
and 2.5 hours, respectively. The fieldwork lasted 5 months 
and was conducted between September 2008 and January 2009.  
 
 
Data analysis 
 
Each interviewer transcribed his or her own interviews, to 
maximise accuracy. I also checked every transcription made 
by my research assistant against the corresponding audio 
recording. Transcriptions represent the interviewee’s 
original narration: thus they include local idioms and are 
in Spanish, the language in which the interviews were 
conducted. 
NVivo and SPSS data analysis software was used. 
Initially I carried out detailed coding of six interviews, 
balanced in terms of gender and place of residence. The 
specific interviews were selected for quality and variety. 
This first coding produced more than two hundred codes. 
These codes were then grouped, merged, and some deleted so 
as to produce a coding tree with ten core codes. These core 
codes were: background, partnership, life stages, gender 
roles, parenthood, personality, people, feelings, 
sexuality, and expectations. This coding scheme was applied 
to the rest of the interviews. The data analysis also 
involved counting the frequency of relevant events or 
characteristics. Appendix 5 gives a brief description of 
the qualitative codes and of the main data included in the 
quantitative database. 
The research results are presented through a 
combination of quotations and counts. Quotations from 
interviews were translated into English. I undertook the 
translation, which aims as far as possible to preserve the 
particular voice of each interviewee. The names of the 
participants, and of their partner and parents, have been 
changed.  
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The selection of interviewees aimed to represent the 
kind of cohabitation most typical in Chile, and thus the 
sample is rather homogeneous. It presents many features in 
common with other qualitative studies of family life in the 
Chilean lower class (Raczynski and Serrano 1985; Olavarría 
2001; Valdés 2005; Valdés, Saavedra et al. 2005). Thus it 
is reasonable to say that the sample represents an adequate 
illustration of families of the lower strata. By extension, 
it seems probable that it is also a good sample of the most 
common type of cohabitation found in Chile. As cohabitation 
is an informal arrangement, recruiting participants was 
particularly difficult. Government institutions could not 
be used to reach cohabitees, especially as people may be 
afraid of losing some of their benefits if they are found 
to be cohabiting. The following chapter presents initial 
findings, focused on exploring how cohabiting people relate 
to formal institutions such as formal employment and social 
welfare. These findings clearly show how elusive 
cohabitation can be from an institutional perspective. 
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Chapter 4 - MAKING ENDS MEET 
 
 
What I want the most for my family is not to worry about not having 
enough to make ends meet. (Fernando) 
 
With this thing of living with a partner the money shrinks. One needs 
to start working out the expenses. I don’t work; I have to look after 
the children. Cash problems, those are the arguments. (Giovanna) 
 
As a couple, we are okay. We only have arguments when he has no work, 
and he starts to behave stupidly, and me too, because we don’t know 
what to do. (Paulina) 
 
He wants to have more children out of love, but I tell him we don’t 
have cash, we don’t have a house. He knows about all that, but he 
wants to forget… because money stops us getting many things that we 
want. (Frances) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Most of the couples in the study struggle to make ends 
meet. On average, they have a monthly income which 
represents 1.6 times the Chilean minimum wage.5 All have at 
least one child, so their family income needs to cover 
living expenses for at least three people. They therefore 
face difficult living condition, and are affected and 
constrained by living with scarce resources. The objectives 
of this chapter are twofold. The first aim is to show the 
actual living conditions of the young couples. The second 
aim is to describe how they deal with deprivation. I began 
by exploring how they make ends meet: given their lack of 
means, they need to develop specific arrangements to ensure 
survival. These arrangements are not just an outcome of 
deprivation, but of their views about who should work and 
how can they get support. In turn, their strategies and 
views about making ends meet will affect, and are related 
to, their decision to live together and their experience of 
doing so. Therefore, in this first results chapter  I 
present the survival arrangements that need to be 
considered when I later address issues of kinship, gender, 
                     
5
 The monthly minimum wage in 2008 was around 160,000 Chilean pesos, 
which at 2012 exchange rates was approximately equivalent to 200 
British pounds. 
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sexuality, and meanings of marriage and cohabitation. Most 
of the data analysed in this chapter in relation to 
interviewees, their partners, and their parents is 
presented in full in Appendix 2. Below, I will analyse 
issues of paid work and gender, access to social welfare, 
and support provided by relatives.  
 
 
 
The Breadwinner 
 
The meaning of life for me is to work and to give my family a good 
standard of living. (Mauricio) 
 
Whatever comes along I’m going to work, so my son has everything. 
(León) 
 
What I need is a good job so I can earn a little bit more. In my 
current work I haven’t been able to save any cash, we need many 
things, and I just don’t earn enough. (Albert) 
 
If you don’t work, you don’t eat, because nobody is going to come and 
provide for you, even if you have thousands of friends saying “we are 
with you”, at the end of the day, when you hit rock bottom, only your 
family is with you. But that’s not much, as sometimes they don’t have 
cash to help you. (Cristián) 
 
 
 
 
Employment is the key issue in these young people’s 
struggle for survival. Having a job, and a stable one, 
entails a significant improvement in their living 
conditions. However, employment is not unproblematic. 
Slightly more than half of the interviewees are involved in 
paid work. Yet there is a clear gender gap, as men are in 
paid work much more frequently than women. Indeed only a 
few women are in paid work. The partners of respondents 
show a similar pattern: the majority are employed, men in 
particular. The interviewees have poor qualifications, with 
most having only secondary vocational education. A few have 
only primary, or incomplete secondary, education. There are 
no gender differences in relation to educational 
attainment. Partners of the interviewees show similar 
levels of schooling. In addition, most interviewees are 
school dropouts. Young women and young men give different 
reasons for having left school. Men are more likely to 
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mention bad behaviour, lack of interest, and the need or 
desire to work, while women tend to report pregnancy and 
poor academic performance. A few young people also say that 
they left school because their parents separated. However, 
the young people value a complete secondary education, and 
some who dropped out of school eventually managed to 
complete their studies (e.g. through attending night 
school).  
The majority of the interviewees are employed in 
occupations which require few qualifications. Slightly less 
than half of those in paid work have unskilled manual 
occupations, around a third have skilled manual 
occupations, and one male interviewee has an administrative 
job. Two male interviewees are unemployed, and one male has 
occasional work. The partners, similarly, are mostly in 
unskilled manual occupations. Males in unskilled manual 
occupations frequently work as builders or factory workers. 
Males in skilled manual occupations are usually skilled 
construction workers or small shop owners. Men in 
administrative occupations commonly work as clerical 
assistants. The few women - either interviewees or female 
partners - who are in paid work are mainly involved in 
catering and cleaning. A few women are involved in 
occasional work, such as looking after children or selling 
home-made bread. There is one woman in an administrative 
job: she works as a call centre operator. 
Men are the main earners in all but two cases, where 
the man is unemployed. Both men and women expect men to be 
the breadwinner. They believe that a man’s ability to 
provide for his family is the most important sign of his 
worth. Unsurprisingly, men report that their main 
responsibility is to get a job so as to provide an adequate 
standard of living for their families. As one says, ‘I 
work, I earn my salary, for the bills, for the food, for 
the nappies, for everything needed in the house’ (Celio). 
Having a job is an important issue. Men commonly take on 
any job available. They mostly obtain low quality jobs, 
meaning jobs that they are temporary, have low wages, or 
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offer no formal contract. The young men in the study 
accordingly struggle to be providers. 
Job instability is a source of constant concern, as 
moving between jobs is a common experience for many men. 
For many men, job hunting is not an episodic situation, but 
a permanent state. As Pedro, who is 23, states: ‘what work 
haven’t I done? Lorry loader, filling station attendant, 
electrician’s assistant, assistant in a clinic (…) what 
else? As a driver’s mate delivering computers, stock 
keeper. I don’t know what else? Also as a building worker. 
I have worked in so many different places!’. Ernesto, who 
is 29, reports a similar experience: ‘I have been through a 
lot, and I have worked in so many things. I have worked in 
building, as a painter, joiner, plasterer, locksmith’s 
assistant (…) so many things! In factories as well. I have 
a good CV, but always doing temporary jobs’.  
Severance pay makes it expensive for employers to keep 
workers for the long term (see Chapter 1). As one woman who 
works for a cleaning firm reports, ‘I have been working in 
the same firm for 3 years, but every year, at the end of 
the year, I have to resign for the summer. Then they hire 
me again in autumn’ (Karin). Yet severance pay might also 
encourage workers to seek out redundancy. For example, a 
woman reports that she wanted to stop working after giving 
birth to her child. Instead of resigning she started to 
behave in such a way as would cause her to be made 
redundant. This would entitle her to receive severance pay. 
‘I was missing seeing my daughter growing up. I began 
refusing to follow my boss’s directions, I wanted to be 
fired, because I wanted the money. Finally they fired me’ 
(Danae). 
The men interviewed look forward to a stable job. 
Andrew, who reports difficulties in getting along with his 
bosses, dreams of ‘having a job where I can last 35 or 40 
years! I know people like that and I would have liked to be 
like them’. Indeed, in some cases men prefer a stable job 
even if it pays less. For example, Paulina says that her 
partner, who is a painter, is currently working as a 
building labourer even though he earns less, as it is more 
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secure. Likewise, some men who hold a stable job point to 
job stability as a significant advantage, ‘I think I have 
done well, I have been lucky, because not everybody has 
such a stable job as I have, and I have tried to keep it’ 
(Eugenio). 
Many men dream of working independently, typically 
meaning opening a small shop at home. To be self-employed 
means becoming an entrepreneur, and not being under 
anyone’s authority. As one unemployed man says, ‘I dream 
about having my own business. When I have a house I would 
like to open a small shop there. I would like to be my own 
boss, to put money on that, so we can get through’ (León). 
Most men report having begun work as children 
contributing to the family income. Usually their father 
took them to work. Starting work so young was a mixed 
experience. On the one hand, they acknowledge that thanks 
to this they learnt to earn a living, ‘I started to work 
with my father when I was 10 years old, he taught me how to 
work, he taught me so many things. Thanks to that today I 
am someone, even though I left school so young’ (Adrian). 
On the other hand, they regret not having a proper 
childhood. As Iván recalls, ‘I ended school at 2 pm, and I 
had to go with my father to the vegetable market. I didn’t 
like to work at that time, I was so young, I wanted to do 
other things’. 
All in all, most young men say that working has been a 
good experience. Those who are in better quality jobs 
report a more rewarding experience. As Cristián, who works 
as a skilled building worker, says: ‘it has been good, 
good, good. Full! I like my job, and it is well paid, I am 
motivated in my job. Working in building is hard, but it is 
well paid.’  
Yet for some it is difficult to meet the requirements 
of work. ‘I am just beginning to get used to work, to be 
responsible. It is hard, it’s a challenge. Sometimes I feel 
I don’t want to work anymore, I feel I want to run away. 
But I can’t, because of my daughter and of her [his 
partner]’ (Pedro). Another man recalls, ‘I worked as a 
postman, I stayed one month, then I took the pay and went 
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to the beach. I just left the work without notice. That 
experience was very difficult, because I landed in a world 
where you are told to do things. And they are not even your 
mother or dad!’ (Celio). Likewise, some report laziness, 
arguing with bosses, not getting along with colleagues, and 
being fired as common experiences. As one interviewee says, 
‘I am one of those people who don’t stay quiet if something 
annoys me. I can’t stay quiet. If I see that a boss wants 
to cheat, I tell him, and then they get upset, and they 
fire me. It’s always the same’ (Andrew). 
 
 
The participants have higher levels of educational 
attainment than their parents. Their parents have around 
nine years of schooling, which takes them only slightly 
beyond primary school, which lasts eight years. By 
comparison, participants have an average of 11 years of 
schooling, or slightly less than the 12 years required to 
complete both primary and secondary education. 
Interviewees say that their parents encouraged them to 
complete secondary education in order to have better 
qualifications. As Andrew reports, ‘I finished my studies 
thanks to my dad, I wanted to leave school when I started 
secondary education, but he said “no, you should finish 
school, and not be like me”’. Similarly, one woman says, 
‘my mother always said “you finish your studies and then 
you are allowed to date, you finish your secondary school” 
that was the aim set by my mother. And I did it, I 
finished, I met her expectations’ (Elaine). 
Yet in some cases, usually among more deprived 
families, parents did not worry too much when the young 
people left school. As a woman says, ‘I was never a swot, I 
was bad at maths, so after I finished primary school, I 
said to my parents, “no, no, no, no. I don’t want to go to 
school any more!”. And they said, “OK”’ (Leocadia). León 
makes a similar statement, ‘I finished primary school and 
then I didn’t study any more, I gave myself a sabbatical 
year!’. 
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Even though the interviewees have more schooling than 
their parents, this does not necessarily translate into 
better or more highly qualified jobs. As men are usually 
the main providers, I focus in the study on the occupations 
of interviewees’ fathers.  Fathers are mostly in skilled 
manual occupations, with a few in unskilled manual jobs. 
The fathers are builders, bricklayers, painters, drivers, 
security guards, factory workers, shopkeepers and the like. 
Most young men, as mentioned above, are in unskilled 
manual occupations that will probably lead them to 
eventually become skilled manual workers like their 
fathers. The exceptions are the few interviewees who are 
currently in administrative jobs, and have experienced some 
upward mobility. For the most part, then,  young people are 
more educated than their parents, most are not in better 
occupations. Most are probably reproducing rather than 
improving the socioeconomic conditions of their families of 
origin. 
 
 
To sum up, the young people in this study commonly have 
secondary vocational education, and most have dropped out 
of school. They typically work in unskilled manual jobs, 
and face frequent spells of unemployment owing to job 
instability. Men are typically the main and/ or exclusive 
earners, which increases the vulnerability of their 
families in relation to eventual unemployment and job 
instability. In addition it is not clear that the 
interviewees have better living conditions than those 
experienced by their parents, although they have more 
schooling. If the men carry the burden of being 
breadwinners, then what happens to the young women? Why are 
so few in paid work? In the next section I address these 
questions. 
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Women and Employment 
 
Today there is more freedom for women, now women can work and be 
independent. (Giovanna) 
 
I wanted to have my first child when I was 30 years old. I didn’t want 
to have children earlier, because I wanted to study, I wanted to do so 
many things. To study, to work, to have my own house. And then have a 
child and a partner. (Frances). 
 
I don’t like sexist men (…) the woman can do everything that the man 
does. Why not? Women do it better, women are more responsible. 
(Karin). 
 
I want to work, I want to work, but he says “no, why would you want to 
work?” He says that I will make myself look good, that I will meet 
other men, that I will have my own money. I say, yes. I want to have 
my own money. He says no, that as long as he can work, there is no 
need for me to work, that I should stay at home and look after the 
children. He is sexist! (Verónica). 
 
 
The women in the study have a more negative perception of 
their economic situation than the men. Most female 
interviewees, when asked directly, say that it is difficult 
to make ends meet or to have just enough to survive. By 
contrast, slightly more than half of male interviewees say 
that they live in some comfort. In addition, the majority 
of the women agree that women should work, even if they 
have young children. Furthermore, some women say that when 
they were younger they dreamed of studying and working, and 
only later marrying and having children. A few women 
emphasize that times have changed for the better, and that 
today women can work and be autonomous. Some female 
interviewees even assert that women are equal to, if not 
better than, men; especially when it comes to work. If 
women report such positive views of paid work, and if they 
are particularly concerned about their deprived living 
conditions, then why are so few of them in paid work?  
 
 
As most women are housewives they are in a situation of 
economic dependence, so they worry about their partner’s 
capacity to provide. Women are in charge of looking after 
the home and bringing up the children. If men are not able 
to provide enough money, women find it difficult to perform 
their expected duties. As one mother says, ‘if something 
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happens to him [her partner], what would we do? We depend 
on him for the money. If something happens to him, what I 
am going to do? And to work would be difficult for me, 
because the girl [her daughter] is too young’ (Jessica). 
The majority of the women report having worked in the 
past, usually before they got pregnant and started to 
cohabit. A few women were forced to work when they were 
children, because of their deprived living conditions. One 
woman started work when she was aged 15, after she gave 
birth to her first child: ‘I went out to work when I lived 
with my Mum, because we didn’t have anything. Neither my 
father nor the father of my daughter gave us anything’ 
(Diana). By contrast, some women report that they worked 
out of boredom, as otherwise they were at home all day. ‘I 
was bored of being at home. I didn’t need the money, but I 
started to work because I was bored’ (Danae). 
Women report having worked as maids, cleaners, 
waitresses, shop assistants, and doing catering. Others say 
they have had more flexible and informal jobs, which they 
did mainly from their homes. These included assembly and 
manufacturing, paid on a piece-rate basis; craftwork 
production; selling home-made food; and childcare. Women 
have also done jobs which did not involve going too far 
from their homes, such as door-to-door distribution of 
flyers. 
Most women who had worked at some point in the past 
say that paid work was a good experience. What women liked 
about paid work was economic independence: ‘I liked to have 
my own money. I earned good money. I bought so many 
clothes, and shoes!’ (Danae). They also valued the 
opportunity to go out, which came with work: ‘I liked 
having my own money and not being at home the whole day!’ 
(Paulina).  
By contrast, other women did not like working, 
especially when they had begun to contribute to the 
parental home very young. Some had preferred to remain 
dependent on their parents rather than working. ‘I lasted 
only one month in the job, the lady was very nice, but I 
didn’t want to work any more. I wanted to stay with my 
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girlfriends, that was my life, to help my Mum with the 
chores, have lunch, and then go out to the street to stay 
with my girlfriends. I was bored working. I asked my Mum 
could I stop?, and she said OK. I asked my dad, and he 
said, “If we don’t need for anything, what do you work 
for?”’ (Elaine). 
All in all, and despite a few bad experiences, most 
women state that they would like to work in the future. So 
why are most of them not working? First they say that they 
cannot work because they have to look after their children. 
‘I haven’t worked because I have to look after my children. 
I don’t leave them with anyone, not even with my 
relatives!’ (Giovanna).  
Women say that they will start to work when their 
children are older, which is a flexible criterion. Some say 
they will work when their children start school, others 
when their children are at school full-time, or when their 
children are big enough to be looked after by another 
person. In addition, women indicate that they need a job 
that does not interfere with their obligations as mothers 
and housewives, such as opening a small shop at home. ‘My 
dream is to have my own house, where my children can have 
their own room, and to make a shop in it, to be able to 
have my money without leaving them’ (Giovanna). 
Yet women give a second reason for not working, which 
is that their male partners do not like them to have a paid 
job. According to these women, their male partners assert 
that as they themselves work, women should stay at home and 
look after the home and children. Furthermore, some women 
say that men do not like women to work because they fear 
that women will flirt with other men and become 
economically independent.  
The participants report that men from previous 
generations, grandfathers and fathers, were very machista, 
as they did not allow women to work. As one man says, ‘my 
father never let my mother work away from home, he was 
machista’ (Iván). Or, as one woman reports, ‘my father 
never allowed my Mum to work. He is machista. For example 
he used to say that we [his daughters] would never make any 
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progress, or that women are useless. For him women are 
everything negative and men are on top’ (Danae). 
By contrast, young men’s discourse about female 
employment is more contradictory. Generally, men’s 
spontaneous reaction is to assert that they are in favour 
of female employment. But they soon qualify this. Only a 
half of the men believe that women should work when they 
have small children. Men fear that if women work they will 
be object of sexual attention from other men. ‘It depends 
on the type of work. You are not going to send your woman 
to work in a building site, that will be like throwing 
cheese to mice!’ (Mauricio).  
However, the men acknowledge that in times of economic 
difficulty women’s work could make a contribution to the 
family budget. As one man, who is reliant only on short-
term jobs states, ‘I do believe that the man should bring 
the money into the house and that the woman should not 
work. Yet in these times sometimes the woman’s money is 
needed’ (Andrew). 
 
When compared to their daughters, most of the mothers of 
interviewees are involved in paid work. These mothers are 
usually in skilled or unskilled manual occupations. They 
work as maids, cooks, seamstresses, or hairdressers, and 
also trade in informal street markets. The participants say 
that their mothers began to work mostly out of need, 
especially if their parents separated. One woman, whose 
parents separated, says ‘my mother worked when I was a 
child, and my grandmother looked after me, then, when I was 
bigger, my grandmother started to work as well’ (Frances). 
Another, whose parents are married, reports ‘my dad works, 
but then things got difficult and my mother started to 
work, so we didn’t need for anything’ (Dalila). 
 Some women say that their mothers encourage them to 
work, to be independent. Yet some of them do not want to 
work, because their mothers, as they had to work, did not 
look after them. One says  ‘I don’t want my children to go 
through the same, that’s why I don’t work. I want to be 
with them, to help them, not to come back late at night, 
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and say “no, I’m tired”’ (Jane). Another explains, ‘she 
worked since I was very young because my father didn’t give 
anything to her, she had no choice but to work […] I was 
looked after by strangers, by people who weren’t my family’ 
(Jessica). 
 
 
 
Overall, negative attitudes towards female employment are 
prevalent among the young people, in particular among men. 
The women have a positive attitude towards paid work, yet 
in practice most are not involved in paid work as long as 
they have small children. They are reluctant to get 
involved in paid work as they believe it would be 
detrimental to their roles as mothers and housewives.  
A few women report having stopped working because they 
got pregnant and were not entitled to maternity leave. As 
one recalls, ‘I worked with my uncle, without a contract, 
because he was my uncle, I was saving for my studies but I 
became pregnant so I had to quit’ (Frances). Social welfare 
provision can influence not only female employment but also 
how couples make ends meet. In the next section I will 
analyse social welfare. 
 
 
 
The Single Mother 
 
Right now it is more advantageous to be a single mother, because you 
have lots of benefits. There are people who conceal their marriage so 
as to receive these benefits. You get more benefits if you have less 
points, and having a stable partner gives you points. (Paulina) 
 
If he was working under contract it would be more advantageous to be 
married, I would have more benefits, but because he has no contract he 
has no benefits, even he does not get benefits. (Frances) 
 
Marriage for me is just a formality. Yet the law gives you some 
benefits, such as the protection that I can give to my wife if I marry 
her. (Ernesto) 
 
Today the government gives more support to married couples, they have 
more benefits than unmarried couples. Because we are not married there 
are many benefits that we can’t claim. (Adrian) 
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The couples in the study receive support from social 
welfare in their struggle to make ends meet. Yet in Chile, 
access to welfare is mostly based on formal employment and 
formal marriage (see Chapter 1). Hence, couples are in a 
difficult situation. Even though they are in need of 
support because of their deprived living conditions, they 
may be excluded from social welfare as they are not 
married, and many are only employed on a temporary or 
informal basis. However, as social policies are now 
targeted at the poorest of the poor, single mothers are 
increasingly a focus of social policies. The aim in this 
section is to explore how couples relate to social welfare. 
I will also analyse the possible implications of social 
policies on the couples’ decisions to live together rather 
than marrying. 
 
 
Housing is a key issue for the couples, as none of them are 
home owners. To be home owners is their most cherished 
dream. As one man says,  ‘what I wish the most for my 
family is to have our own house, so to have a space where 
we can stay together, where I can do whatever I want, where 
we can do whatever we want’ (Cristián). Similarly, a woman 
reports, ‘my dream is to have my own house, I have always 
wished to have my own house, so as to have my own things, 
to up bring my children, and when they come from school 
they will say, this is so beautiful, and it will be mine, I 
would’ve bought it with my own sacrifice’ (Frances) 
The majority report that they are applying for housing 
subsidy. Applications for housing subsidy are made almost 
exclusively by women. Women say that they apply as single 
mothers so that they have more chances of being given 
housing subsidy. ‘I am applying. If we were married we 
would have fewer chances. They give more points to the 
single mother’ (Jane). Or as another woman reports, ‘if I 
was married I wouldn’t be entitled to apply for housing 
subsidy, because you have to be single, with children, and 
with no husband!’ (Giovanna). 
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Women also say that if they apply as single mothers, 
their male partners are not precluded from applying 
separately for housing subsidy as well. In married couples 
only one partner can apply. As Karin highlights, ‘it is 
easier for the single mother, I can apply and he can apply. 
But if we were married and I apply, he is not allowed to 
apply ever!’ (Karin). For the couples it is important that 
both partners continue to qualify for housing subsidy, 
especially if they happen to separate in the future. 
Formally, wage-earners with a formal work contract 
make compulsory contributions to social security, a 
retirement pension, health insurance, and unemployment 
insurance. In addition, workers in formal employment are 
entitled to family allowance for every child, and the same 
benefit has been extended to indigent women without a male 
partner. The majority of the interviewees who are in paid 
work have a formal job, i.e., one with a written work 
contract. The same is true for the partners of 
interviewees, although there is a gender gap, as women are 
less likely to have formal employment. 
Most of the respondents in paid work contribute to 
their retirement pension, yet these make up only a third of 
total interviewees. Only those who are wage-earners with a 
work contract contribute to a retirement fund. There is a 
clear gender gap here. Slightly more than half of the men, 
but only one of the women, contribute to a pension fund. 
Most women do not contribute since they are housewives not 
involved in formal paid work. Moreover, as the women are 
not married, they would not be entitled to receive a 
widow’s pension. 
All the interviewees receive health provision through 
Fonasa, the public health system. Fonasa allocates people 
to different plans according to their incomes. Formally 
employed workers are automatically registered in a health 
care plan that matches their wages. Those with low wages 
are given free access to health care, but as wages 
increase, co-payments are required. Those who co-pay are 
given some choice of health care provider. In addition, 
Fonasa provides free healthcare for indigents, to those not 
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in formal work, and to those from the most deprived groups. 
These categories apply to the partners of the interviewees. 
Slightly more than half of the respondents have access 
to health care as indigents, and a quarter as wage-earners. 
The rest reported being in the Fonasa scheme, but without 
specifying in what category. There are gender differences 
in access to health care, mirroring gender differences in 
involvement in formal work. Men who access health care are 
more likely to do so in their capacity as wage-earners; 
while most women access healthcare as indigents. Children 
usually have the same kind of health plan as their mothers, 
so most children are part of the Fonasa scheme as 
indigents. 
In addition to formal work, legal marital status is 
the other element that shapes access to healthcare. 
Housewives report that, as they have young children and are 
not legally married, they are considered by Fonasa to be 
indigents. As one explains, ‘if you are married you have to 
pay for a private doctor, you can’t be indigent. To be 
indigent you have to be single, have children, and not be 
living with the father. If you are married you are a 
dependant of your husband, either in Fonasa or in an Isapre 
[private health system]’ (Giovanna). 
 Because the women are legally single, they cannot have 
access to the same health plan as their partners. Fonasa 
only allows women to participate as dependants of men if 
they are formally married. As one says, ‘I can’t be his 
dependant in Fonasa, because we are not married. I told him 
to let them know that we have been living together for 10 
years, we are married! But they said no, he needs to have a 
certificate of marriage’ (Danae). 
Some women say that they dislike not having access to 
their male partner’s health plan. Women perceive a greater 
disadvantage when their partners are involved in formal 
work, with a relatively good salary, which translates in a 
better health plan. As one says, ‘If we were married I 
would have the chance of going somewhere else, not just the 
surgery. When you pay, you get another class of service. If 
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he has had a good job, and if we were married, we could 
have better health care’ (Frances). 
Yet women believe that free doctors’ surgeries have 
improved, and that they now provide a better service. 
Frances, who acknowledged the advantages of paid healthcare 
also said, ‘but now health care is not bad, the [local] 
surgery has changed. They treat you better, there are fewer 
queues, if you ask for an appointment they give it to you. 
Before you had to fight to get an appointment, now it is 
different, is better’. 
Generally, access to healthcare is differentiated 
according to involvement in formal work and marriage. Most 
women get health provision as indigents, as they are 
formally single, those who work mostly do so at home or in 
informal work. Most men, however, access healthcare as 
wage-earners, as the majority are involved in formal 
employment. There are accordingly significant gender 
differences in access to health. 
There are two types of family allowance targeted at 
the poorest families (see preceding chapters). The first of 
these, the Subsidio Único Familiar, SUF, is a monthly child 
allowance for every child up to 18 years old. A similar 
amount goes to the child’s mother, and to pregnant women. 
The allowance is around 6,000 Chilean pesos, or roughly £7, 
per month. Women and their children who qualify to claim 
SUF are also given automatic access to free healthcare as 
indigents. The second type of family allowance, the 
Asignación Familiar, AF, involves similar benefits and is 
given to formal wage-earners, women and men, with children. 
The main practical difference between AF and SUF is that 
the amount payable under AF decreases as wages increase. 
 The overwhelming majority of the interviewees report 
claiming family allowance, with women typically the ones 
who claim it. As most are not involved in formal paid work, 
most are entitled to SUF rather than AF. As with housing 
subsidy, and access to healthcare, women report that they 
claim family allowance as single mothers. 
Unemployment insurance is another benefit that one 
might expect to be relevant to the study participants. As 
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was highlighted in the previous section, many of them 
report job instability as a frequent experience. Yet the 
two men who are unemployed do not receive unemployment 
insurance. Furthermore, no participant reports receiving 
unemployment insurance at those times when they were made 
redundant. Probably they did not meet the legal and 
contribution record requirements to be able to claim this 
benefit (see earlier chapters). 
 
 
 
To sum up, the evidence shows a complex situation in 
relation to social security and unmarried cohabitation. It 
is clear that social protection is focused on those with 
long-term formal work and who are married. As the women in 
the study are legally single, and most of them are not 
involved in formal paid work, they and their children are 
relatively disadvantaged by the social welfare system. 
However, their marginalization has been limited by the fact 
that social policies have targeted them as single mothers, 
considered a vulnerable group. Therefore, cohabiting 
mothers from deprived groups are entitled to receive 
housing benefit, health care, and family allowance because 
in legal terms they are single mothers. It may be that 
cohabiting mothers are even favoured over their married 
counterparts by housing policies.  
Access to retirement pensions however remains focused 
on formal workers. Only women who are legally married can 
inherit a partner’s pension on his death (as a widow). 
Nonetheless, since most of the interviewees in the study 
have access to temporary or informal jobs, it is doubtful 
that even the men who are currently in work will be 
entitled to retirement pensions. Thus it is probable that 
both the men and the women in the study, will receive only 
a basic state pension when they retire. If that is the 
case, it will be in the interest of the interviewees to 
remain legally single. Women would lose out by staying 
legally single only in the event that their partner became 
a long-term, formally employed worker with a good salary.  
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The evidence of the study suggests that women are better 
informed than men about social benefits. Most women know 
which social benefits they are entitled to, while men tend 
to speak about social benefits, apart from housing subsidy, 
only in general terms. Men probably are well informed about 
housing subsidy as finding accommodation for their families 
is a pressing concern for them. In the next section I 
analyse the current living arrangements of the young 
couples in the study. 
 
 
 
Living Arrangements 
 
I asked my mother and she said there was no problem, she was happy 
because she would be with her grandchildren and then my dad said he 
would pay for everything, we only pay water and gas, so we can save 
for our house. (Giovanna) 
 
 
One should live alone with your own family… even if it is very hard to 
pay rent, but you should rent a place only for you and your family… 
because to live in another house, to live as allegado (…) I don’t 
recommend that to anyone! (Adrian) 
 
I believe that you shouldn’t live with your parents, I need my own 
space… you can’t live [as a couple] in the house of your parents! Here 
everybody lives with their parents, I just couldn’t do that. (Iván) 
 
 
 
Families of origin are a source of support for young 
couples. Parents and relatives can provide accommodation, 
financial aid, and childcare, or they may even help to find 
jobs. At the time when the young couples in the study began 
to live together, none had a place of their own. Thus, they 
typically moved in with one of their families of origin. In 
Chile, people who do not have their own house, but who live 
in the house of another family, usually the parental home, 
are called allegados. The aim of this section is to explore 
how unmarried cohabitation is related to networks of 
support provided by kin, in particular in relation to 
living arrangements.  
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The vast majority of the respondents live in extended 
households, as allegados. Around a half of these share a 
household with one other family unit; with the remainder 
sharing premises with two or three other family units. An 
average of 8 people live in these extended households, 
ranging from a minimum of 4 to a maximum of 15 people. 
Around half live with the man’s family of origin, and the 
other half with the woman’s family of origin. A quarter of 
the study respondents live in a nuclear family household, 
and do not share accommodation with other relatives. Those 
who do not live as allegados mostly live in rented 
accommodation, except for one woman who lives with her 
partner and children in an illegal land occupation. The 
nuclear family households studied have a maximum of five 
people. 
Women and men prefer to live with their own parents, 
in particular with their mothers. Yet practical 
considerations, in particular the availability of space, 
are usually more decisive in determining where they 
actually live. Living as allegados commonly entails the 
couple and their children living in one bedroom. Couples 
living in extended households usually share meals, bathroom 
and laundry facilities with the main householders, and 
split utility bills. Living as allegados therefore involves 
receiving significant financial assistance, as allegados do 
not pay rent and only contribute part of the household 
expenses. 
 Couples who live as allegados do not want to rent 
accommodation, as paying rent is considered a waste of 
money. As one man says, ‘I’ve never liked to pay rent, if 
we can stay with our parents it is a bad use of money. You 
have to pay 90 or 100 lucas6, and with that money you can 
buy clothes or food’ (León). A woman interviewee makes a 
similar point: ‘he wanted to live in a rented place, but I 
said no. If every month we pay rent we won’t have 80,000 or 
100,000 pesos (…) cash that we need for our son’ (Jessica). 
Some couples fear that they would not have enough money to 
maintain a household by themselves.  ‘I decided that we 
                     
6
 ‘Luca’ is a slang term for 1,000 Chilean pesos. 
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should move to our own place, but, what is the problem? 
Paying the bills! Maybe if we lived by ourselves we 
wouldn’t have enough cash to pay utility bills’ (Jessica). 
Many couples say they live as allegados because they 
want to apply for housing subsidy. Housing subsidy requires 
applicants to save a minimum amount of money to be 
eligible. Yet participants say that it is difficult to save 
because of their low incomes and job instability. Thus most 
are forced to live as allegados. As a man points out, ‘I 
wanted to begin to live in a rented place, but then, I 
thought it would be better if I wait another six months so 
as to have my own house thanks to the housing subsidy. I 
rather stay and wait, than to start spending money on rent’ 
(Albert).  
 Even though they highlight the economic advantages of 
living as allegados, interviewees also acknowledge 
difficulties. Indeed, most of them say they would stop 
living as allegados if the opportunity arose. As one woman 
says, ‘we just want to leave, because we have too many 
problems with my mother’s partner, too many. Last week we 
had an argument. We don’t get along at all’ (Diana). Or, as 
another woman reports, ‘we live with my mother-in-law. We 
leave, we come back, we leave, we come back. We have 
problems with my mother-in-law, she has a bad temper, I 
have problems with her’ (Verónica). 
 People report that living in someone else’s home is a 
source of constant friction. Some say they feel uneasy and 
others speak of quarrels with other relatives, or step 
relatives, living under the same roof. One woman recalls 
when she moved in with her in-laws, ‘in my first pregnancy 
I was crying all the time, at that time we lived in the 
house of my partner’s grandmother, and we don’t get along. 
They are not like my family, we are more conservative, I 
don’t like his family’s lifestyle, so everyday I felt very 
lonely as he left for work’ (Paulina).  
Lack of privacy and arguments over bills and living 
expenses are common. One man explains how he looks forward 
to living in his own house and to have privacy, ‘if you go 
to the bathroom you won’t have to stand with people looking 
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at you, or if you go to the kitchen, to cook something to 
eat, you won’t have to stand with people looking at you’ 
(Andrew). Or as Verónica, explains in relation to her 
mother-in-law, ‘because [my partner] works, he is the 
pillar of the house. When he doesn’t receive his pay or 
when he has no work, they attack him and that makes me 
angry. If other men live in the house and work, why don’t 
they give something for the house? My mother-in-law is only 
interested in money, and if we don’t give it to her, we 
have problems’. 
Because of the difficulties involved in living as 
allegados, many couples report moving around and living 
with different relatives. Usually, if relationships become 
too strained, they begin looking for another place. A woman 
who used to live with her mother-in-law, explains her 
frustration. ‘We lived in a hut right next to my mother-in-
law’s house. We had problems there because once my son was 
born she began to tell me how to bring up my child. I was 
fed up. I didn’t say anything to her, but when my partner 
came back I told him, “that cunt of a mother of yours is 
poking her nose into my life, and into my son’s life too! 
You must take me away from here!”’ (Leocadia). Another 
woman describes why they have been living in different 
places: ‘we stayed a year here with my parents. Later, 
because we did not get along with my sister, we went to 
live with my mother-in-law, but then my sister-in-law went 
to live there, so we came back here; by that time my sister 
had left’ (Giovanna). 
All in all, living as an allegado is a mixed blessing. 
Couples who live in the parental home do not simply receive 
assistance from their parents: they also remain under their 
control. Young people are freed of the responsibility for 
running their own home but at the price of giving up part 
of their autonomy. They need to adapt to the requirements 
of the parental household and to accept interventions into 
their personal lives.  
Furthermore, and in a subtle way, allegados lose the 
incentive to seek their own accommodation. As one woman 
says, ‘when you live in someone else’s house, you already 
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have all that you need, so you don’t worry about saving to 
buy the bare necessities’ (Diana). Indeed, in purely 
monetary terms, those who live as allegados probably have a 
better standard of living than they would have if they 
lived by themselves. 
The interviewees point out that living on their own 
signalled a new kind of status for their relationship. 
Being home owners entails a big step forward in terms of 
settling down as a couple and as a family. As one man 
asserts, ‘I would like to have my own house, there I will 
do many things, I will have another child and I will get 
married. I think that when you have your own house, it is 
easier to plan your family life’ (Eugenio). Having their 
own home is something couples wish for, but it is not an 
easy step to take. 
 Couples who live in rented accommodation highlight the 
independence that they enjoy. Men, more than women, 
emphasize that as something positive, as opposed to living 
as allegados. All the couples who live in rented 
accommodation had formerly lived as allegados. As one man 
says, ‘now we have our own place, we can decide things for 
ourselves. I don’t have to ask for permission from anybody 
if I want to take something from the fridge. That’s what I 
like about having our house, the independence, to do 
whatever we like, to do what we like to do’ (Celio). 
Another man reflects, ‘we are happier because we rent a 
house, we are not living in anybody’s house, we can decide 
what we want to do. That’s for me the best thing about our 
relationship, not to inhibit yourself, because I don’t have 
to justify to anyone the things I do’ (Eugenio).  
The majority of the participants report that their 
parents used to live as allegados. Thus most interviewees 
had lived part of their childhood in their grandparents’ 
house. Living in the grandparents’ home entailed developing 
close relationships not only with their grandparents, but 
also with aunts, uncles, cousins, and other relatives who 
lived there or went there to visit. Living as allegados 
promotes the development of a wider web of ties with 
different relatives.  
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Unsurprisingly, most young couples turn to their kin 
when in need. For example, most interviewees report that 
they regularly ask for cash to make ends meet, and the 
majority get it from relatives. Some also say that their 
relatives provide opportunities for finding a job. 
Likewise, many say that they prefer to live near their 
relatives because of the support they provide. Even though 
most young people do not like living as allegados, this 
does not mean that they want to cut their ties with their 
parents and other close relatives. Eugenio, who lives in 
rented accommodation, reports ‘we stayed in this 
neighbourhood because our relatives live here. If you live 
far away from your kin, you will never get their support’. 
However, some say that they would like to live far 
from their parents if they could get their own house, 
precisely because of the problems they have faced while 
living as allegados. As one man says, ‘we are applying for 
housing subsidy. Very far away from here would be the best, 
so we can start from zero, far away from her and my 
parents’ (León). 
In addition to their families of origin, interviewees 
also mention friends and local communities as possible 
sources of support. It seems, however, that friendship is 
not a particularly significant bond for these young people, 
in particular for the women. The men usually say that they 
have many friends, who they socialize or play sport with. 
Yet commonly they also say that they are not close to them, 
though there are exceptions. One man reports, ‘I have lived 
all my life in the same place. All my friends are from 
there, the ones that I used to have and the ones that I see 
now, thanks to the reggae. We smoke weed, we listen to 
music, and we chat about the music, the lyrics, the bands’ 
(Iván).  
By contrast, the women tend to say that they have few 
girlfriends. Some even say that they do not have friends at 
all. As one reports, ‘I used to have some girlfriends in 
this neighbourhood but then we had problems. They didn’t 
like me, I don’t know why. So I decided not to have more 
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girlfriends and I don’t have girlfriends. I have always 
been here alone’ (Jessica). 
The respondents report that community ties have 
deteriorated due to increased criminality, drug dealing, in 
particular. As one man says, ‘now you have gangs here, they 
shoot each other. I just want to be out of here, especially 
because of my son’ (Albert). Another man says, ‘we want to 
move to a safer neighbourhood, with not so much crime, 
where I won’t see so many bastards stealing’ (Cristián). A 
woman also reports ‘my son once asked me, I will never 
forget it, “Mum, when will there be a day when I wake up 
without hearing a shot?” It hurt me so much, I told him 
“some day”’ (Karin). 
 
 
 
On the whole, even though most couples live as allegados, 
many wish to have their own accommodation. On the one hand, 
living as allegados offers economic support. On the other 
hand, it adds to the strain on relationships owing to the 
difficulties involved in living alongside at least one 
other family. Moreover, living as allegados is a constraint 
on the couples’ autonomy. The evidence also suggests that 
for those in the study, the family is the main source of 
support. The women appear to be even more limited to family 
ties than the men, something which is confirmed by other 
evidence from Chile (PNUD 2010). The young people’s lack of 
significant social ties beyond their immediate family makes 
for a difficult situation. In the next chapter I deal 
further with the influence of family ties on their lives 
 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
 
Young people face difficult living conditions, which affect 
how they form a family. The young people in the study have 
few qualifications and low quality jobs. Their 
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vulnerability is worsened by conventional gender roles, as 
only the men tend to be in paid work. Typically, they 
experience intermittent unemployment and short-term 
employment, which not only threatens their chances of 
planning and saving, but also of gaining the autonomy to 
form their own families. The fact that most live as 
allegados illustrates their lack of autonomy, as they 
remain living under parental authority. 
Furthermore, it seems that the current young 
generation is reproducing, rather than overcoming, the 
deprived living conditions experienced by previous 
generations. Their limited social mobility in relation to 
the previous generation exemplifies how a decrease in 
poverty has not narrowed inequality. Although these young 
people are more educated and have better living conditions 
than their parents, they continue to belong to the lower 
strata of Chilean society.  
It is nonetheless difficult to assert that 
unemployment and job insecurity lead to or encourage 
cohabitation, as marriage remains more popular among low 
income groups. In my view, job insecurity rather promotes 
the dependence of the younger generation on the previous 
one. This may in turn have an impact on the type of 
partnerships that are formed. In any case, independence 
from the family of origin can be promoted through social 
welfare policies.  
As social policies have increased their coverage and 
become more targeted, deprived groups are beginning to 
receive state support. For women who have never been 
married nor are involved in formal paid work, universal 
provision of healthcare and of state pensions has ended 
their marginalization from the social welfare system. 
Single mothers have also benefited from policies focused on 
them. The case of housing subsidy seems particularly 
relevant. Young mothers may be reluctant to marry if 
marriage jeopardizes their access to housing subsidy. In 
other words, the findings suggest that both the expansion 
of social welfare and the introduction of social policies 
targeted at single mothers have led to a decrease in 
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marriage as the privileged form of access to social welfare 
for women, in particular mothers.  
 Policies targeted at single mothers nonetheless 
continue to promote motherhood as the definitive role for 
women. Enhancement of motherhood through social welfare is 
in tune with the predominance of conventional gender roles 
among interviewees. Women and men expect the man to be the 
breadwinner and the woman to be a mother and housewife. 
There are incipient signs of change, as female employment 
is becoming more acceptable, but it is still seen as a 
threat to the exclusively feminine role of childrearing. 
 The situation of women’s reliance on their families of 
origin, partner, and social welfare, needs special 
attention. Women appear to be more socially isolated than 
men. The emphasis on motherhood, as opposed to paid work, 
reinforces their isolation and dependence on either their 
families of origin or their partners. The expansion of 
social welfare has somewhat limited this dependence, but 
policies targeted at the single mother have reinforced 
motherhood. Thus it seems that family ties are particularly 
significant for the women in the study. In addition, as job 
insecurity makes it more difficult for the younger 
generation to achieve autonomy, it seems all the more 
important to study families of origin. In the next chapter 
I will analyse the familial backgrounds of the interviewees 
and how this has affected their decision to live together. 
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Chapter 5 - PARENTS AND MARRIAGE 
 
Currently you live together instead of marrying like in the old days. 
Then, if you had a child, they forced you to marry. Not now, now it is 
freer. (Leocadia) 
 
My father doesn’t say anything, but I think he would’ve liked me to 
have got married, and to have gone from his house straight to the 
church! (Paulina)  
 
Today nobody punishes the kids. My parents tell my youngest brother 
not to go out and he just goes out. That’s the way it is today. (León) 
 
In my home my mother never said to us “I love you”, or “I am fond of 
you”. Neither did my father. (Adrian) 
 
My mother started to work because the situation was very bad. At that 
time my eldest sister with the help of the next sister looked after 
the younger ones. Later my sister looked after me. Everybody used to 
think that she was my mother. (Dalila). 
 
 
 
 
The reports of the young people in the study about their 
families of origin help us to understand why they came to 
live together rather than marrying. The focus on these 
young people’s early years sheds light on issues of family 
relations, ties, roles, obligations, and reciprocity. In 
addition, the families of origin are the backdrop against 
which the interviewees live their own lives, choose 
partners, and formalise, or not, their relationships. The 
relationship of the parents of the participants provides a 
pattern against which we can trace continuity and change 
between them and the previous generation. This chapter 
focuses on exploring the role played by the older 
generation in the lives of the young people in relation to 
cohabitation. The point is that we can only grasp social 
change in relation to past structures which are disrupted, 
but continue to be reproduced. 
Parental authority, and more specifically patriarchy, 
the father’s power, is at the core of this chapter. I will 
analyse how marriage and cohabitation were experienced by 
previous generations, and parents’ reactions to young 
people’s decisions to cohabit. As I will show, it is 
possible to see a significant change in parental 
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intervention in relation to their children’s union 
formation. 
Since any generation is defined by particular 
sociohistorical conditions, in this chapter I also study 
interviewees’ perceptions of past and present. Here the 
focus is on their views of cohabitation in a socio temporal 
perspective. The idea is to study how the respondents 
perceive social tolerance towards cohabitation in past and 
present times. The evidence suggests that they believe that 
a transformation has taken place in the social status of 
cohabitation. 
In addition to parental power and patriarchy, the 
chapter deals with issues of kinship. The literature on 
families in Latin America has highlighted a strong bond 
between mothers and children, which can promote 
cohabitation (see Chapter 2). In what follows I explore 
parent-child relationships, considering gender as a key 
element. On the one hand, the chapter considers the reports 
of young people about their relationships with their 
mothers and fathers. On the other hand, it studies the 
accounts of how their parents treated their daughters and 
sons differently. The analysis will focus particularly on 
the relationships with the first son and with the first 
daughter.  
I begin by studying the relationship between the 
parents of the interviewees. I analyse it in terms of 
marital status, trajectory, and presence of difficulties. 
In the next section, I move on to study the childhoods of 
the participants. My attention is on the ways in which they 
perceived their relationships with their parents when they 
were children. The following section continues to focus on 
childhood, but now in relation to the differences 
introduced by their parents among their children. I 
conclude with an examination of the changing status of 
cohabitation across generations of parents and 
grandparents, and among the current generation of young 
people. 
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Resilient Families 
 
 
 [My parents] met and started to live together. Each already had a 
child. My mother had my eldest brother and my father my eldest sister. 
Both had separated, and they met and started to live together. I am 
the eldest child of their relationship, we are three siblings from my 
mother and father, but we are five in total. (Iván) 
 
 
[My father] likes drinking, but now he gets drunk only three times in 
a month, before it was every day, he drank the cash we didn’t have! 
Those were the main problems, almost always related to drinking and 
women. They have had big arguments, with physical violence, throwing 
things at each other. My mother throws things at him and he beats her 
with his hands. The last time the police came and the shit hit the 
fan! (León) 
 
 
 
Most interviewees say that their parents were married, 
while a quarter report that they cohabited. One man reports 
that his parents have a visiting partner relationship, and 
one woman says that her mother was a single mother. 
Therefore all the parents, except the lone mother, were 
originally in a formal or informal partnership. At the time 
of the study, around a half of the parents who were 
formerly in a partnership were still together. Around two 
fifths have separated, and the rest were not together 
because one partner had passed away. Married parents were 
more likely to have stayed together than cohabiting 
parents. This section is focused on the parents of the 
interviewees, on their relationship as a couple, and on 
their partnering trajectories.  
 
Interviewees’ parents are relatively young, with the 
fathers on average 53, and the mothers 48, years old. The 
parents had started to live as a couple, whether married or 
not, when the mothers were aged on average 19, and the 
fathers 24. Most were born in Santiago, but some came from 
other regions of the country and subsequently migrated to 
Santiago. Most are Catholic, and around a fifth are 
evangelical Protestants. Yet, according to the 
interviewees, religion is not important to their parents, 
particularly not to their fathers. In terms of politics, 
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while most of the parents, especially the mothers, support 
the centre-left coalition Concertación, a third has no 
reported political preference. For data about the main 
characteristics of interviewees’ parents, see Appendix 2. 
Most say that their parents have or have had a bad or 
very bad relationship. As might be expected, children of 
couples who have separated report that their parents did 
not get along. However, almost half of the interviewees 
whose parents are still together say that the couples get 
along badly. The most common problems reported were 
affairs, heavy drinking, and domestic violence. Economic 
hardship was not often mentioned as a source of conflict 
between parents, although life histories show that economic 
deprivation is a source of strain in their parents’ 
relationships. A few also indicate use of illegal drugs or 
a parent being in prison. 
According to the interviewees, sexual affairs, heavy 
drinking, domestic violence, and economic hardship are 
closely related, and prompted frequent arguments between 
their parents. As one woman says, ‘he is a good father, but 
sadly he is dominated by his vices. He tried to make a 
family with my mother. But he preferred to go out with his 
friends, to drink, to smoke weed. That’s why he separated 
from my mother. He also used to beat her when I was 
younger’ (Diana). 
 Heavy drinking is a problem for the parents and for 
fathers in particular. According to the young people, heavy 
drinking fuels other problems, and contributes to their 
parents’ constant arguing. As one woman says, when asked 
about how her parents get along, ‘very badly! They are 
together only because they are used to it, my mother does 
everything for him, you can say that she almost dresses 
him! My dad doesn’t know how to do anything without her. My 
dad still loves her a little bit, but not my mother, she 
completely lost her love for him because he started to 
drink heavily. She lost her love and fondness for him. They 
are always arguing!’ (Giovanna). A man says, ‘my dad was 
bad with my mum, he had other women, he used to go on the 
booze, and then come back home pestering. Once he turned 
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over the table with the dinner. I think that my mother got 
fed up with all that. I don’t think they had a good 
relationship, they had a bad relationship’ (Andrew). 
However, if heavy drinking does not prevent the 
fathers from being earners, and is not related to domestic 
violence, then it is not necessarily condemned. As one 
woman says, ‘my dad has always been very responsible. My 
mother didn’t want for anything, so she got used to it. My 
dad has never stopped drinking, when they met he didn’t 
drink, but after a while he started and never stopped. In 
spite of this he was never rude to her, he never hit her. 
He drinks every day, on the weekend he gets plastered’ 
(Elaine). Furthermore, the interviewees report that it is 
expected that fathers keep part of their income for their 
vicios (vices), such as heavy drinking. As the same woman 
explains, ‘he kept part of his money for his vices, and 
then handed the rest to my mum’ (Elaine). 
In many cases the relationship of the parents got so 
bad that it ended in separation. In practice this often 
meant that one partner left the family home. Fathers 
deserted more frequently, though one man reports being 
abandoned by his mother. The respondents report that their 
fathers usually already had an extra marital relationship, 
prompting them to leave when things turned sour with their 
mothers. One man, whose father had deserted his mother and 
five children, says, ‘they argued all the time, they argued 
about everything. I think that because of that he formed 
another family. He was a coach driver, and there he met 
another woman, and he made a family with her’ (Eugenio). 
Likewise, another man – whose father, who left his mother 
and ten siblings – says ‘they got along well, until my 
mother started to be jealous for nothing. My father met 
another woman, and he left. He started to come home later, 
then they had a terrible fight, they started to argue, not 
with violence, but swearing. That was the turning point’ 
(Adrian). 
According to the participants, the overwhelming 
majority of separated parents soon found new partners and 
made new families. The young people report that when their 
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parents separated, their mothers were forced into paid 
work. Working outside their homes gave the mothers a chance 
to meet men and to find a new partner. As one woman says, 
‘my mother took drastic action. She separated from my dad 
when I was four years old. She knew he was like that. She 
always loved him, she never gave up hope of him changing. 
But she realised that she would never have anything serious 
with him, that he would never work and pay the bills. So 
she decided to continue alone, she started to work, she met 
Juan, they went out together for some years, then they got 
married and had my sister’ (Jessica). Another woman says, 
‘they had been married for eighteen years when my mother 
said “enough, I am tired”. She found a job in the town 
hall, my dad was very upset, it was the first time that my 
mum had worked. She was doing very well at work, until she 
met a man, who was nice with her, talked to her 
beautifully, he had no vices, didn’t like to go out. He was 
the opposite of my dad in everything’ (Danae). 
Most of the interviewees’ families of origin are 
stepfamilies. They report that they were raised in 
stepfamilies because many parents have separated and then 
made new families. But stepfamilies are also frequent among 
parents who are still together, as some have children from 
previous partners. Having been raised in a stepfamily is 
more frequent among those whose parents cohabit. As one man 
explains ‘my mum married a man, and they had one son. After 
one year they separated, and my mother went back to live 
with her mum. Later on she met my father, and they had my 
sister, then my brother, and then me. So we are four 
siblings, but three are from my mum and dad, and one only 
from my mum’ (Cristián). 
 Having children is the main explanation participants 
offer as to why their parents were or are still together. 
One woman says, when asked about her parents’ relationship, 
‘they get along well, they have never argued too much, they 
almost never argue. They are together because of us, we are 
five siblings. Anyway they should love each other still, my 
mother loves him more, the same goes for my father. I think 
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because they have grandchildren, they love each other, they 
love us, they don’t get along badly’ (Dalila).  
However, there is one case in which a young man says 
that his parents are still together because they love each 
other. ‘They are in love, always they have talked about 
everything, they never hide anything, good communication as 
a couple, I think that’s the most important thing’ 
(Albert). Even though most young people say that their 
families of origin were marked by conflict and instability, 
there are some exceptions. Indeed, four people report not 
only that their parents are still together, but that they 
have a good relationship. All the parents reported getting 
along well are married.  
Questions of power underlie young people’s reports 
concerning their parents’ relationship. Their accounts show 
that fathers are most typically the head of their families. 
Note that this refers to participants’ reports about who 
they believe is the head of the family. Fathers are the 
main authority in the families of origin, whether they are 
married or cohabiting. Young people report that their 
mothers are the authority within the household, being in 
charge of running the house and bringing up the children. 
The fathers are the authority outside the household, and 
hence their power is wider in reach. As one woman asserts, 
‘decisions about children -  my mother. Important decisions 
- my father’ (Danae). Another woman says ‘my mum can’t go 
out if my father isn’t at home. My father doesn’t like my 
mother to go out, he doesn’t like when she isn’t at home. 
He should work and she should stay at home’ (Elaine).  
Nevertheless, around a third of the interviewees who 
have or had cohabiting or married parents say that their 
mother is the head of the family, while only one says that 
both parents are equally in charge.. Typically, the mothers 
who were described as heads of the family were seen as 
having a strong personality, with the respective fathers 
seen as submissive. One woman says that her mother has the 
last word: ‘my father is a quiet man, he can be 
manipulated, if he is told that something is white, then it 
is white for him, he is quiet, he is meek’ (Leocadia). 
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Their reports however show that family authority is 
not a fixed quality, but can be subject to change. Economic 
power is closely related to the issue of family power. . As 
time passed, most mothers became involved in paid work. 
Thus, most gained some economic independence, which could 
entail certain challenges to paternal authority. As one man 
says, ‘in my family my father was the head of the 
household, because he used to work at that time […]. But 
now that my mum works, it’s like that both of them are’ 
(Pedro).  
Alcoholism, job instability, and affairs tend to 
undermine paternal authority. One woman, whose father is a 
heavy drinker, reports that ‘when I was a child, [the head 
of the family] was my dad, but as I grew up, my mum didn’t 
want to be told what to do. If my father wanted to beat 
her, she defended herself from him, she hit him back! At 
the beginning it was my father, but then he couldn’t 
control her as he pleased’ (Diana). Consequently, the 
reports of the young people show that their fathers’ 
authority could be eroded.  
On the whole, the younger generation’s families of 
origin can be described as both fragile and resilient. On 
the one hand, the evidence suggests that the parents’ 
relationship has experienced significant difficulties. 
Unsurprisingly, many young people have witnessed how their 
parental home crumbled. On the other hand, most separated 
parents partnered again and made new families. In this 
context of changing family arrangements, cohabitation no 
doubt offers a more practical alternative than marriage.  
The findings also show that although the parents’ 
relationships are structured in terms of conventional 
gender roles, even though mothers eventually gain economic 
power, as they start to work, and might even contest male 
hegemony. In the next section I will turn to the 
relationships the young people in the study had with their 
parents as children. 
 
 
 
 148 
Parenting 
 
I didn’t have the support of my father either. And when you grow up 
you miss that. Now that I am grown up I miss everything, everything, 
everything that they didn’t give me. Not in terms of material 
possessions, but in feelings. (Diana) 
 
I didn’t have too much communication with my father either. My father 
never took us to the doctor. He never helped us with our homework! Nor 
did he ask us how we were doing at school, if we failed or got an 
excellent mark it was the same for him. (Paulina) 
 
My mother hit me and I said “it doesn’t hurt”. She hit me and I 
shouted at her “it doesn’t hurt, it doesn’t hurt!” Once she left my 
head bleeding, but I still told her “hit me, it doesn’t hurt, it 
doesn’t hurt. I am not going to cry!” (Karin) 
 
In a few words my father is like poison to me, he is like poison […]. 
There weren’t any presents or dinner for Christmas. He went out to get 
drunk at Christmas and he wouldn’t come back until past the New Year. 
Because of those things I am suspicious of him, I deeply hate him 
still. I don’t care if he eats or not, because he didn’t care if we 
ate or not. (Danae) 
 
 
 
 
Childhood is not something most of the interviewees like to 
talk about. Some even say they do not remember anything 
about it. When they do talk, happy memories are scarce. 
Looking at the young people’s upbringing will help to 
illuminate their motives in forming families. In what 
follows, I focus on how they remember their childhoods and, 
in particular, their relationships with their parents. Most 
say that their parents were rather inexpressive and cold. 
Some say their parents never said they loved them or hugged 
them. One man says, ‘for my father, if you had enough food 
and enough clothes, if you had a TV set, if you had all 
these things, that was all that mattered. There wasn’t 
anything else for him’ (Iván). Similarly, one woman 
reports, ‘they never beat me, but they never played with me 
or took me out either. When I was a child I was closer to 
my girlfriends than to my parents. You need to trust your 
parents. Actually, I don’t feel love from them’ (Giovanna). 
Likewise, some say that their parents never gave them 
presents for Christmas or for their birthday: ‘as far as I 
remember they never gave me a birthday party when I was a 
child’ (Elaine). So most people still feel there is a lack 
of intimacy in their relationships with their parents. 
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Most say that, when they were children, they felt 
alone and neglected by their parents. They say they missed 
parental guidance in matters such as sexuality, studies, 
work, or forming a family. As one woman says, ‘my father 
has never told me “daughter this is bad” or “daughter do 
this”. No, my father never got involved in our lives’ 
(Leocadia).  
The parents’ pattern of conventional gender roles 
probably contributed to their style of distant parenting. 
Interviewees describe how their mothers looked after the 
home and children almost single handed. The mothers ran the 
family budget, did the shopping, cooked, cleaned, washed, 
and so forth. ‘At home my mother took all the decisions, 
since she was at home all day, she managed the cash, 
decided what to buy’ (Celio).  
Mothers are described as the authority in the home, 
the ones who set the household rules. They are remembered 
as always giving orders and talking in a loud voice. 
Indeed, interviewees frequently describe their mothers as 
having a bad temper. As one man says, ‘[my mother] was 
strict, harsh, but she was right, as I was not so good 
anyway’ (León). They also say that their fathers were 
rather distant, as they worked all day away from home. 
According to them, when their fathers came home they wanted 
to eat and to rest, and not to be disturbed by their family 
or domestic problems. 
Interviewees do say that as children, they had a 
closer relationship with their mothers. As one woman 
reports, ‘my mother is good. She is a good friend, a good 
mother… loving. There are so many things that I can say 
about my mother. I have good memories of her when I was a 
child. She brought us up, she never worked, she was always 
with us’ (Elaine). Likewise, a man says, ‘I love my mother 
very much. I love her. She is my mother. She is the one who 
has been always by my side. My father was more distant’ 
(Iván). 
Interviewees’ descriptions of their parents as distant 
does not imply that their parents did not intervene in 
their lives. On the contrary, most of the young people 
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portray their parents as authoritarian. The authoritarian 
upbringing experienced by most is illustrated by reports 
that they were beaten by their parents as a form of 
discipline. 
They say that both of their parents used physical 
violence as punishment. Some say that their mothers were 
harsher than their fathers, because mothers were the ones 
who looked after them. As one man recalls, ‘my mother was 
always with us, she was the firm hand’ (Albert). Another 
man reports ‘my mother was mistreated physically and 
psychologically after her own father died. There was a 
break there. Every time we screwed up she clobbered us’ 
(Celio). 
A few say that the violence applied by their parents 
was not restricted to slapping or smacking, but 
occasionally involved serious beatings. As one man says, 
‘if I got bad marks at school [my mother] knocked me to the 
ground and kicked me about’ (Albert). Another man reports 
‘[my father] kicked me, he kicked me out of the kitchen, he 
gave me one kick and I flew almost two metres. I was little 
and skinny, that was the worst beating he gave me’ 
(Andrew). Some say that their parents did not treat 
daughters and sons differently: both were beaten in equal 
measure. 
Interviewees say that their parents and grandparents 
were themselves frequently beaten when they were children, 
and that it is said that in the past parents used to be 
even more heavy-handed. They also say that as their parents 
got older, they became less strict. As one man explains, 
‘my older siblings endured the worst beatings, my sister 
tells me that they suffered a lot. My mother used to be 
very irritable, and she often hit them. Then, as she got 
older, and separated from my father, she started to calm 
down, she did hit us sometimes, but less than my older 
siblings’ (Eugenio). 
Even though the young people did not like being 
beaten, most now say that their parents did the right 
thing. They thank their parents for being strict, because 
they learnt how to behave. As one man says, ‘when my mum 
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told me, “you don’t go there” and hit me, I learnt that I 
shouldn’t do that, and I didn’t. But if she hadn’t hit me, 
maybe I wouldn’t have learnt. I think it was necessary, 
yes’ (Eugenio). But a few say that their parents were too 
harsh, and that there is no justification for their 
beatings. One man says ‘I think my father is bad, because 
he shouldn’t have beaten us like he did when we were 
children. I don’t know what he wanted to teach me, he just 
thrashed me!’ (Andrew) A few say they have never been 
beaten by their parents. These illustrate how good their 
parents were by saying their parents never hit them. As one 
woman says, ‘[my parents] gave me everything for Christmas. 
I had lots of dolls, they never beat me!’ (Dalila). 
These accounts suggest a connection between parents’ 
relationships and interviewees’ own styles of parenting. A 
significant proportion of the parents have separated, which 
made for an even more distant relationship with their 
father, and a closer one with their mother, since 
interviewees usually stayed with their mothers after their 
parents split up. Those who have experienced desertion by 
one parent report feelings of abandonment mixed with anger. 
They say that what hurts is not their parents’ separation, 
but the fact that afterwards the parent who left rarely 
looked after them, either in emotional or economic terms. 
For example, one man whose parents were together until 
he was eight years old replies, when asked about his 
father: ‘they split up and he never came back, never, 
never, never! And then when I was seventeen I went there to 
see him. It was like a Sunday visit from the evangelicals. 
They want to stay and you want them to leave soon. It was 
dull. I am not interested in him any more, even he being my 
father. [He] is not enough of a man; he left like a 
bandit and never returned. He could have said “I have 
another woman, things didn’t work out, let’s talk about 
it”. I think when he left he didn’t even think of me!’ 
(Ernesto). 
Similarly a woman says, ‘I don’t love my father very 
much. I don’t like to talk about him, no, no, no. His name 
is Marcelo. I don’t know how old he is. I don’t care 
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anyway. I don’t want to talk about him. It hurts me to talk 
about him! I don’t want to! He deserted us when we were 
very young. He never worried about us. And I did need him. 
I missed him so much, especially when I ran away from home. 
I needed him so much! But he wasn’t there’ (Karin). 
Those whose parents had separated usually praise their 
mothers. These young people value the fact that their 
mothers did not abandon them as their fathers did, and that 
their mothers went through many difficulties when raising 
them. Their reports give an idealised image of their 
mothers, and they assert that their mothers are the best. 
They praise their mothers’ determination and capacity to 
provide for them when they were children, sometimes without 
any help from anybody. One man says ‘as a mother she is a 
great example. She sacrificed herself a lot for our sake. 
She reared four children on her own’ (Cristián). A woman 
also asserts, ‘she is the best mother! Since my father 
left, she has been my mother and my father. She is hard 
working. She has all the good qualities!’ (Verónica). 
A few interviewees, whose parents had separated, 
showed more sympathetic feelings for their fathers. These 
interviewees believe that their fathers tried to be good 
but had been overcome by life’s difficulties. They describe 
their fathers as victims of alcoholism, drug abuse or even 
of their mother’s bad temper or jealousy. They say that 
anyone can fail and that it is not their role to judge 
their parents, but to love them. As one woman reports, ‘[I] 
always [feel] great pain, and sadness, and anger, because 
of him. But I do love him anyway, because he is my father. 
He is a good person anyway. Sadly, he was defeated by his 
vices’ (Diana).   
Separated parents frequently repartnered. Thus several 
participants were reared with stepsiblings, and some were 
looked after by a stepparent. The majority of those whose 
biological parents are not together because of separation, 
death, or the mother’s lone parent status, report having a 
stepparent, in all but one case, a stepfather. Most of 
these report that their relationship with their stepparents 
is neither bad nor close. As a man reports, ‘my mother’s 
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husband never displaced my father, he looked after me and 
my mother. Very good, whatever you want. But I didn’t feel 
a son-father relationship’ (Fernando). A woman reports ‘I 
never called him “dad”, he was Mr. Nicanor for me. I didn’t 
think he was good for my mother. I knew he wasn’t my dad, 
but he was my idea of a father, because he lived with my 
mum since I was a little child’ (Frances).  
Some say they did not get along with their 
stepfathers. ‘I’ve always wished that we were like the 
other families, that we were together. But it wasn’t like 
that, and that makes me angry. My mother married someone 
else. That also makes me angry, since [otherwise] I 
wouldn’t have gone through all the things that I have’ 
(Jessica). By contrast, others say that their stepfather is 
their real father since he had looked after them as their 
biological fathers had not. They quote a saying: ‘a father 
is the one who rears, not the one who conceived’. One woman 
reports, ‘for me, my father is Esteban, our stepfather. He 
raised us since we were very young. I call him ‘daddy’. He 
looked after us. He bought us a TV and duffel coats. He 
took us to the doctor on his bicycle. He did that, not my 
father’ (Karin). 
Some young people say that they were not raised by 
their parents, but by a relative. This was usually because 
their mothers had paid work. These young people say that 
they were looked after by a grandmother, usually on the 
maternal side. Yet some also mention an aunt or an uncle. 
They tend to report having had a maternal relationship with 
their grandmothers. For example, one woman says that her 
grandmother was like a mother to her, ‘my Mummy Rita 
[grandmother] was everything to me. Since I was born she 
was like a mother to me. She loved me, she indulged me! We 
used to live with her and I stayed with her, not with my 
mother. I slept with her, if I argued with my mother I came 
to her to complain about my mother. She gave me all the 
love, all the affection’ (Leocadia).  
There are, however, exceptions. Another woman reports 
‘my grandmother raised me since I was a baby. She took me 
from the hospital, just after I was born. Anyway she wasn’t 
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very loving with me when I was a child […]. We used to 
quarrel a lot. I lived with her until I was twelve years 
old […]. Every time that I went to my mother’s for the 
weekend, I didn’t want to go back to my grandparents. I 
wanted to stay with my mother’ (Verónica). 
 
 
All in all, participants report their childhood as a 
difficult time. They miss having had a close and 
affectionate relationship with their parents. They also say 
that their parents were heavy-handed. Yet in spite of these 
recollections, the majority identify their mothers as the 
most significant person in their childhood. The evidence 
also shows that families of origin were by no means fixed 
structures but flexible arrangements, where separation and 
repartnering were not uncommon. In the next section, I will 
continue exploring participants’ accounts of their parents, 
focusing on the differing relationships of parents with 
sons and with daughters.  
 
 
 
Sons and Daughters  
 
 
We nicknamed [my eldest brother] “my mum spoils me” since my mother 
always gives the best to him. With my younger brother sometimes we 
cried because of this […]. Even now she makes his breakfast, something 
that she doesn’t do for my father, and she takes it to him in bed. She 
also takes his dinner to his bed. Everything is like that! (Leocadia) 
 
To this day, I think I am very mamón with my mother and with my 
partner. I am terribly spoiled; even today I believe I am still like a 
child. (León) 
 
When my little brothers and sisters started to grow up, I began to be 
in charge of them, I was twelve years old. In the morning I did the 
cleaning, cooked, and I bathed them before they went to school. (Jane) 
 
 
 
The interviews show that parents relate differently to 
daughters and sons. Respondents also report birth order 
affecting their parents’ behaviour. The families of origin 
are relatively large, as both fathers and mothers have an 
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average of four children (not but not always the offspring 
of their current partnership; see Appendix 2). The purpose 
of this section is to analyse how the parents related to 
their children in terms of gender, birth order, filiation, 
and race. The aim is to see if differences in parental 
treatment might be linked to the likelihood of 
cohabitation. 
According to the interviewees, gender is important to 
their parents. They say that their parents clearly favoured 
sons over daughters. Parents gave greater privileges to 
their sons, in particular to their firstborn. One man says, 
‘since the eldest was also the first son, everything was 
always for him. Always the best things for the eldest […]. 
That the eldest always had precedence over the rest of us 
left a mark on me. For him everything was “yes, yes, yes”, 
but for the rest of us it was “no!”‘ (Adrian). Similarly a 
woman reports, ‘we are four sisters and one brother […]. He 
is the only son, and he is single, and has no children, so 
he says “I want this” and my parents buy it for him’ 
(Dalila). 
Most say that their mothers always gave the best of 
everything to their sons. The maternal preference for the 
son was made clear through material and emotional 
privileges, such as better food, better clothes, more 
attention, and intimacy. As one man, the eldest son, 
reports, ‘my mother is very special. She is closer to me. 
My sisters have always said that I am the favourite of my 
mother. I have a very good relationship with my mother. I 
don’t know how to explain it to you. We have an excellent 
relationship’ (Albert). 
Fathers also favoured sons, for example, by going out 
with them. However, as the fathers are usually described as 
being rather distant, the interviewees do not highlight 
this very often. They say that in the absence of the 
father, the eldest son was expected to be the man of the 
house. Albert, who reports having a close relationship with 
his mother, says: ‘I am the male sibling; I am responsible 
for the house. They made me grow up very quickly. My father 
was a lorry driver so when he was away, he said to me “you 
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are the man, you are in charge of everything, of your 
mother and of your sisters”‘. 
It seems that the privileges enjoyed by sons go hand 
in hand with the obligation to be a surrogate father and 
partner. The expectation that sons will be surrogate 
fathers and partners is probably more relevant for mothers. 
If the father died or deserted the home, mothers would be 
much more dependant upon their sons to provide for the 
family. 
In addition some young people, men in particular, say 
that they still feel like children. For them, being an 
adult did not imply no longer being childlike. They say 
they are childlike in that they need to be loved, and like 
to play and to have toys and hobbies. They also admit to 
being childish in that they cannot stop doing things that 
they say they feel they should not do, such as partying, 
drinking heavily, taking drugs, or flirting.  
One man observes, ‘I believe that you grow up a little 
bit but you never stop being like a child, because you need 
someone by your side, someone who loves you. You need that 
support, or sometimes I want to do stupid things, that I 
know will make them angry, but I do them anyway […]. You 
are born like a child and you die like a child’ (Cristián). 
Likewise, a few young women say they are childlike in that 
they are immature and stubborn. Moreover, some 
participants, men in particular, say they are childlike in 
that they feel closely attached to their mothers. In Chile, 
a man like this is called mamón, metaphorically, a man who 
still suckles from his mother.  
The closeness between mother and sons may be an 
obstacle to sons making their own families. If sons 
contribute to the parental home, it is difficult for 
mothers to let them go. In addition, the mother-son bond 
can affect the relationship between daughters-in-law and 
mothers-in-law. As one woman says, ‘[my partner] is a 
mamón, he is very attached to his mother, he is very close 
to his mum, he is the only son who behaves responsibly, 
who’s always worked, who has lived with her, who gives to 
her. When my mother-in-law separated, he became the father 
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of the house. He is the eldest son, he was the boss in the 
house. I think I clashed with my mother-in-law because of 
that’ (Frances) 
Another man reports that his mother did not like him 
to have girlfriends as she feared he would leave home. ‘My 
mother was jealous of my girlfriends because I am a man 
[…]. My mother was always jealous because as a woman she 
doesn’t want to lose her sons’ (Adrian). Similarly, another 
man who lives with his partner and child in the parental 
home says that his mother is not happy with his plans to 
move to his own accommodation. ‘I would like to have my own 
house, and not to live with my parents any more. But my old 
lady doesn’t want to let go of me’ (León). 
In a similar way, daughters are expected to be 
surrogate mothers. Daughters, in particular the firstborn, 
should help the mother with housework and childcare. When 
asked who helped with the domestic chores in the parental 
home, one woman reported ’me, the woman! Not the men, 
because they are men. My mother didn’t allow my brothers to 
help, because she and I were at home’ (Elaine). Another man 
says of his eldest sister, ‘my sister is ten years older 
than me, and when I was three, she was thirteen, and she 
looked after us. When my mother was out at work, my sister 
took care of us. She woke us up, she gave us our breakfast, 
and she dressed us’ (Cristián). Yet in the case of 
daughters, their obligations in running the parental home 
did not give them special privileges. Some say that 
sometimes the firstborn daughter got more attention and 
affection from her parents, in particular from fathers. 
However, it is not possible to identify concrete privileges 
enjoyed by daughters. A few women also say that they never 
helped with housework, as their mothers did everything. 
The interviewees also say that their parents would 
differentiate between their biological and non-biological 
children. Those raised in stepfamilies could not take it 
for granted that they would be treated similarly to the 
children born of the new relationship. Suspicions about the 
real biological father of a child also introduced 
differences. For example, one woman says she was told by 
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her paternal grandmother that the man she thought of as her 
uncle was actually her father. Though the truth was never 
established, her grandmother treated her badly. As she 
says, ‘my grandmother didn’t love me. When I was born, she 
told my mother that I wasn’t the daughter of my father but 
of my uncle. On my tenth birthday she asked me what I was 
doing living with my father, because he wasn’t my father 
but my uncle. Since then I have always asked myself “who is 
my father?” I am pale and my brothers are dark-skinned, so 
the doubt is there!’ (Leocadia). 
Similarly, the interviewees report family histories in 
which the paternity of one parent or grandparent has been 
kept a secret. These family secrets, in turn, raise 
concerns of infidelity and illegitimacy that usually lead 
to discrimination. As one woman reports, ‘my grandmother 
doesn’t want to tell my father who his father is. [My 
father] doesn’t know his father. I think the doubt is 
between two cousins’ (Dalila). 
Illegitimacy, or being born out of wedlock, can also 
be a source of parental discrimination among biological 
siblings. Most of the young people do not report 
illegitimacy as a reason for being discriminated against by 
their fathers, even though around a third were born out of 
wedlock. Respondents born of cohabiting parents say that 
they were recognised by both their parents. One man, born 
of a visiting relationship, also says that his father 
acknowledged him.  
Yet the only woman in the study born of a single 
mother says that her father did not acknowledge her. This 
woman reports how her father finally recognised her once  
new paternity legislation was introduced (see Chapter 1). 
‘My father recognised me only when I was fifteen years old. 
Before, there used to be two types of birth certificate, 
one yellow and one green. The yellow one was for children 
recognised by the father, and the green one for children 
recognised only by the mother. Then when this new law came 
in, around that time he called me, saying that he wanted to 
meet me’ (Jane). 
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Physical appearance is another factor which caused the 
parents to prefer some of their children over others. The 
interviewees speak of two main issues here: the similarity 
to a loved or hated partner, and race or colour. If the 
parents had separated on bad terms, then the resemblance to 
the partner who left the home was sometimes a reason for 
mistreatment. As one woman recalls, ‘[my father] used to 
hit me because he said that I looked like my mother’ 
(Danae). The opposite also happened: the loss of a loved 
partner prompted the projection of that love onto a child 
who looked like them.  
Race or colour is less frequently quoted by the 
participants, yet it played an important role too. They say 
that children with blue eyes, blond hair, and white skin 
were usually preferred not only by their parents, but by 
everybody. As one woman states, ‘my grandmother indulges my 
mother more than my aunt, because my aunt is brown and my 
mother is pale-skinned’ (Leocadia). Indeed in Chile, as in 
the rest of Latin America and other parts of the world, 
light skin is widely held to be a sign of social status. 
Therefore, the attitudes of the parents of the interviewees 
are yet another example of widespread racial prejudice.  
Finally, the data suggest that the parents gave more 
attention to their lateborn child. The respondents tend to 
talk about the youngest sibling, girl or boy, as the 
spoiled one. According to them, their parents wanted to 
have a lateborn child, especially a girl, so as to have 
someone who would look after them as they get older. As one 
woman says, ‘my youngest sister is the last bit that my 
parents had, so as to look after them as they get old’ 
(Leocadia).  
 
 
On the whole, the parents of the young people in the study 
reproduced ingrained patterns of social discrimination in 
their relationships with their children. They 
differentiated among their children mainly according to 
gender, legitimacy, biological as opposed to legal 
parenthood, and race. Sons were favoured over daughters, 
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biological children over stepchildren, and light-skinned 
over dark-skinned siblings. Eventually, these differences 
may affect how women and men approach making their own 
families. In the next section I will turn to the influence 
of the older generations on union formation 
 
 
 
Enforced Marriage 
 
 
 
My mother got pregnant. Then when I was three months old my 
grandmother arrived and told my parents “tomorrow you are going to get 
married, tomorrow you are going to get married!” She brought all the 
family for the wedding. My parents didn’t want to get married. The 
next day […] they were married, they had a civil wedding. (Leocadia) 
 
Now people don’t care if you don’t marry, nowadays it doesn’t matter 
who marries, who lives together. Now it is your problem. (Giovanna) 
 
Fathers never want you to get pregnant, they want you to get married 
and then to have children, they don’t want to have a daughter who is a 
single mother. (Elaine) 
 
My father didn’t say anything. He said that he would support me, that 
I would pull through, that he would stay by my side. (Dalila) 
 
My mother supports me in not getting married, the mother of my partner 
too. (Cristián) 
 
 
 
 
Interviewees say that their parents and grandparents were 
reared in an old-fashioned way (a la antigua). They relate 
that in the past cohabitation was frowned upon, and only 
marriage was accepted. Parents, fathers in particular, 
often forced offspring into marriage, if necessary. In this 
section I explore the reactions of the parents to the 
decision of the respondents to cohabit. Have parents tried 
to force them to marry? What role have they played in the 
young people’s decisions to cohabit? These questions are 
addressed in the following section. 
Most parents were formerly married, and some were 
cohabiting (see Appendix 2). Usually, cohabiting parents 
could not legally marry because one partner was already 
married. The grandparents show a similar pattern: most were 
married, and only a minority lived together without 
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marrying. Thus it is clear that in cohabiting, interviewees 
are not reproducing the pattern of partnership passed on by 
previous generations. In addition, it seems that the 
marital status of the parents is not related to the 
decision of the participants to cohabit. However, those 
whose parents were married more often report that they do 
not want to get married in the future. By contrast, those 
whose parents were cohabiting tend to say that they do wish 
to marry in the future. 
According to the respondents, it was not uncommon for 
their mothers and grandmothers to have been forced to 
marry. They say that, in previous generations, having 
sexual relations or being pregnant were the main reasons 
for a woman being forced to marry. One woman, talking about 
her grandmother, says, ‘my grandma was married, you know, 
in the old-fashioned way. In past times women were married 
when they were twelve years old, if they kissed someone, 
they were told “you have to get married”. She was forced to 
marry when she was around fifteen’ (Jane).  
Another woman described a similar situation for her 
grandmother. ‘In the past, you were expected to marry when 
you were twelve years old, that’s what my grandmother tells 
me. She met my grandfather and her parents forced her to 
marry him. She says that she was just a girl […]. I don’t 
know how they met, but I do know that they were caught 
kissing each other and they had to marry the next day’ 
(Karin). 
They also say that, in past generations, having sexual 
relations and being pregnant mean being thrown out into the 
street. One woman reports what happened to her mother when 
she became pregnant without being married. ‘My mother was 
five or six months pregnant when her father noticed it and 
threw her out of the house. He had always said that if he 
caught my mother or my aunts pregnant they should leave’ 
(Diana). 
In addition, they say that sometimes it was not 
necessary to be caught having sexual relations or 
discovered to pregnant in order to be forced to marry. 
Sometimes the parents just decided on behalf of their 
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children. As one woman explains, ‘my grandmother forced my 
mother to marry my father. My mother wasn’t in love. My two 
grandmothers were friends. It was like a medieval 
arrangement between them’ (Danae). 
Some interviewees report the opposite situation: how 
in the past, parents sometimes forced couples who were 
living together without being married to separate. One 
woman reports this happening to her parents. ‘Both families 
intervened to force them to split up […]. My mother says 
that they got along well, that they loved each other a lot 
but that it finished because my paternal grandmother 
together with my maternal grandfather separated them’ 
(Verónica). 
Interviewees have not been forced to marry, even 
though they have at least one child with their cohabiting 
partner. That the majority of the young couples are living 
in the parental home is further evidence that most parents 
do not reject their cohabitation. Yet they say that when 
they got pregnant their parents did try to intervene in 
their relationship, either encouraging or discouraging 
marriage. 
Most report that their parents reproached them for 
bearing children, as will be described in the next chapter. 
But their parents’ condemnation did not mean that they 
pressurised them to get married. Most parents, mothers in 
particular, are rather wary of marriage, and some openly 
reject it. Interviewees say that this is because of their 
own parents’ bad experiences of marriage, particularly when 
they were forced into it. As one woman, whose mother was 
forced to marry, reports, ‘before I had my daughter my 
mother asked me if we would marry. My mother was forced to 
marry, that’s why she likes the idea of us living together’ 
(Danae).  
Yet even when parents have relatively good 
relationships, they are still cautious about marriage. 
Parents advise their children to wait and see if their 
relationship is working out. For example, one woman, who 
became pregnant when she was nineteen, says ‘we thought 
about getting married when we knew that I was pregnant. But 
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my mother said that it was too soon, that it would be 
better if we waited a little bit longer because we were 
very young, that maybe things wouldn’t work out’ (Dalila). 
Another woman describes her mother’s view on marriage thus 
‘why would you want to get married? You are okay like this’ 
(Paulina). 
In addition, interviewees state that nowadays there is 
more tolerance towards cohabitation. Today marriage is not 
the only accepted way of having a sexual partner. As one 
woman says, ‘nowadays people think in a different way, 
currently almost everybody lives together first. It is not 
like in the past, when they used to say “first you marry my 
daughter, then you can go out with her”. Today everybody 
lives together first, and if it works, it works’ (Jessica). 
Furthermore, participants assert that today children 
born outside marriage are less discriminated against. As 
one woman says, ‘before, cohabitation was frowned on by 
people, but not today. Today there is more tolerance. For 
example, before, children of single mothers only had the 
mother’s surname, they were discriminated against, but not 
today […] now it is better for the children’ (Paulina). 
Those who say that their parents would like them to 
get married, say it is only wishful thinking on their 
parents’ part. As one man reports, ‘my mother has always 
told me that she would have liked it very much if I had got 
married. She has always said so, but I am not really 
interested’ (Fernando). Only a few interviewees say that 
pregnancy entailed their parents trying to force them to 
get married. As one man reports, ‘I didn’t have work, it 
was terrible for our parents and siblings, they were upset, 
her mother slapped me, my mother-in-law slapped me. She 
wanted me to marry her, they really put pressure on me’ 
(Eugenio). Likewise, two women say that their father or 
maternal uncle opposed them living with their respective 
male partners instead of gettin married to them. These 
women ran away from the parental home to live with their 
partners.  
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To sum up, interviewees have not been forced to marry, and 
their parents are cautious about marriage.  Parents may 
want to help their children in this regard, as they know 
from personal experience how difficult is to raise children 
after separation. Increased tolerance towards cohabitation 
is also perceived to be a wider phenomenon in Chile today.  
 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
 
The families of origin of the interviewees have faced great 
difficulties, and many have ended their original status. 
Most parents were formerly married, but many separated, and 
then repartnered. Family disruption was prompted by diverse 
situations such as affairs, heavy drinking, and domestic 
violence. Difficult living conditions did nothing to help, 
and probably much to exacerbate, these problems. A 
significant number of interviewees reported having a 
stepparent. Even more reported having stepsiblings. Thus 
the families of origin were by no means fixed structures 
but flexible arrangements.  
Participants describe their childhood as a difficult 
time. They remember their relationships with their parents 
as distant and authoritarian, and they miss having had a 
close and affectionate relationship. They also say that 
their parents were heavy-handed. Thus for most of the 
interviewees, their childhoods were a rather painful 
memory. Yet they perceive an incipient change towards a 
less violent, and thus less authoritarian, kind of 
upbringing. In spite of the distant relationship with their 
parents, the majority of the interviewees identify their 
mothers as the most significant person in their childhood.  
In relation to union formation, it could be argued 
that the young people’s experiences of family disruption 
and harsh childhood might prompt a desire to leave the 
parental home early. In turn, this willingness to leave 
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soon could be related to their entering into cohabitation 
instead of marriage.Parents are also portrayed as 
reproducing social sources of discrimination with their 
children. Differences due to gender and birth order seem to 
be relevant for patterns of union formation. Daughters are 
seen as surrogate mothers, who should help to run the house 
and to look after younger siblings. In a similar way, sons 
are treated as surrogate fathers. This means they enjoy 
special privileges from their mother. The findings also 
suggest that gender differences may be accentuated in large 
families. As daughters carry the burden of housework and 
childcare, they will be particularly keen to leave the 
parental home. By contrast, sons will be more reluctant 
because of a closer link with their mother.  
The evidence also indicates a change in parental roles 
related to increased cohabitation. For women of previous 
generations, premarital sexual intercourse or pregnancy 
meant forced marriage or being thrown out into the street. 
Indeed, several mothers of the young people in the study 
were forced to marry due to pregnancy. Parents are 
themselves wary about marriage due to their own 
experiences. Nevertheless most of them believe that young 
couples with children should live together, whether they 
are married or not. In practice most offer support to the 
young couples, consisting of accommodation and financial 
aid (see Chapter 4). Therefore parents are supporting 
interviewees in staying together with their partner and 
children. This parental backing is probably underpinned by 
the belief that separation could risk the wellbeing of the 
child and the position of the woman, who would become a 
lone mother. 
Parental tolerance towards cohabitation is facilitated 
by a perception of increased social acceptance. Social 
tolerance is more relevant for women than for men, as women 
have been subjected to tighter sexual control. Thus forced 
marriage seems to be declining, and so cohabitation is 
rising. The fact that parents do not force marriage does 
not however mean that they do not exert any influence on 
union formation. In the next chapter I explore how the 
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young people met and started to live together. As we will 
see, parents are significant actors in the lives of the 
interviewees both before and after they form a partnership. 
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Chapter 6 - SEX AND PREGNANCY  
 
Three months after we met I was pregnant, we met in December and in 
March I was pregnant. He was my first man. It didn’t take too long 
really. (Elaine) 
  
 
 
Pregnancy sparks cohabitation. The great majority of young 
people report pregnancy as the main reason for beginning to 
live together. The few couples who began to live together 
before bearing children soon started a family, aside from 
one couple who had a child after nine years of being 
together due to infertility problems. Hence pregnancy and 
cohabitation are intimately connected. If pregnancy prompts 
cohabitation, then we should pay attention to how the 
interviewees understand and experience their sexuality. In 
addition, cohabitation itself might entail a distinctive 
sexual arrangement, one that involves advantages but also 
drawbacks. Cohabitation is, therefore, an outcome of 
particular views about sexuality, and in turn, embodies a 
distinctive sexual arrangement. Even though sexuality is an 
intimate matter, in practice it is socially structured.  
In this chapter I will explore participants’ views of 
sex, relating these to parental practices of sexual 
surveillance and the use of birth control. The first 
section focuses on sexual identities before and after 
partners live together. The next section deals with 
courtship, particularly, how courtship was undertaken in a 
context of parental opposition. Then I move to the issue of 
contraception, relating it to sexual roles and to state 
provision of birth control. In the last section I analyse 
in detail the issue of pregnancy and its relation to 
cohabitation. 
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Sexual Arrangements  
 
I didn’t want to go to bed with just anyone. My idea is to be with 
someone forever, I can’t go to bed with one person and then another. 
(Diana) 
 
Anyway I have had many girlfriends, but did not have a romantic and 
sexual relationship with all of them, with many it was just a sexual 
relationship. (Cristián) 
 
 
 
 
Each partnership entails a particular sexual arrangement. 
Marriage, cohabitation, and dating imply specific sexual 
scripts that cannot be explained by individual 
characteristics such as, age, education, religion, or race 
(Laumann, Gagnon et al. 1994). Views about sexuality, in 
particular sexual roles, are key to understanding 
distinctive sexual arrangements. Evidence from developed 
countries relates cohabitation to a more active and less 
exclusive sexual arrangement than marriage (Laumann, Gagnon 
et al. 1994). In this section I explore the young people’s 
views concerning sexuality and their sexual identity, and 
the issue of sexual exclusivity within cohabiting 
relationships.  
 
Interviewees say that first impressions are the reason why 
they were attracted to their partners. Men report that they 
were drawn to their current partner mainly because of 
physical attraction, while women to men who made them 
laugh. Most men, and some women, say that at the beginning, 
their partner’s good looks were what they liked the most. 
Men say that as they entered a relationship with their 
current partner, they also began to develop feelings of 
love and affection. As one says: ‘[I liked] everything! 
Herself! I found her so beautiful, I found her so 
beautiful. Everything starts with the first glance, and 
then, later on, feelings are born’ (Iván). 
Most women say that they were initially drawn to their 
partners because they were funny and amusing. As Paulina 
says, ‘he was cheerful, and affectionate, I didn’t have 
that kind of relationship with my father, my life had been 
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so monotonous, with him I started to do crazy things, to 
have a more enjoyable life’. After appearances, some also 
report being attracted to those who showed what is commonly 
regarded as good behaviour. Women say that they liked their 
partner because he was sano (healthy), by which they mean 
men who do not drink alcohol, smoke cigarettes, or consume 
drugs. Likewise, men say that they liked that their partner 
was modest or not loose. However, some, women in 
particular, say having felt attracted precisely because 
their partner did not display good behaviour. Starting a 
relationship with a partner who behaved badly was seen as a 
way to rebel against parents and convention.  
Interviewees also mention affinity, friendship, and 
trust as appealing qualities. As one man says, ‘she was 
like my best friend! She understood me, she was my support, 
my friend, and that was terrific, that’s what I liked about 
her’ (Andrew). Similarly, one woman says, ‘he was such a 
loving person, as a friend, I could trust him, he 
encouraged me, he gave me good advice […], so that I would 
do the right thing. After a while I started to like all 
that about him’ (Diana). 
As the couples developed a more intimate relationship, 
they began to be involved in sexual activity: kissing, 
petting, and sexual intercourse. Sexual intercourse was a 
turning point. On average, they report having had their 
first sexual intercourse when they were 16 years old. Women 
and men report a similar minimum age of 12 years, and a 
maximum age of 21 years, for first sexual intercourse. 
There is only a minimal gender difference in age at first 
intercourse: men report starting slightly younger than 
women (at 16.1 and 16.4 years old respectively). This age 
range at first sexual intercourse is in accordance with 
national data (see Chapter 1), but the women in the study 
are slightly younger. 
Among the interviewees and their partners, the men are 
usually slightly older than the women (see Appendix 2). On 
average, the men are 26, and their corresponding female 
partners 24, years old. The fact that the men in the sample 
tend to be slightly older may explain why they are somewhat 
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more sexually experienced. As many women had no previous 
sexual experience beyond kissing and petting, they report 
having learnt almost everything about sex from their 
current partner. As Giovanna says, ‘everything I know about 
me, about everything, I was taught by my husband [partner]. 
Everything about the woman’s body, how it works’. Other 
research has reported a similar situation (Raczynski and 
Serrano 1985). 
The fact that men are more experienced is suggested by 
the fact that they report more sexual partners than women. 
Most men are living with someone who was not their first 
sexual partner. By contrast, most women are living together 
with the man with whom they first had sexual intercourse. 
Evidence from Chile also shows that young men tend to 
report more sexual partners than young women (INJUV 
2010:table 124). 
A few men had their first sexual encounter with their 
current partner. Two of them say they had been focused on 
sports throughout their youth, and their social life 
network came from this. These men reject alcohol and drug 
abuse, joining a gang, or committing criminal offences. 
They say that they wanted to find a woman to form a family, 
and not to have sex with just any woman. Like the women, 
they relate sexual relations to love and commitment. The 
study sample also includes four women who did not have 
their first sexual intercourse with their current partner. 
Two of them cohabited before, and had sex with that first 
cohabitee. Another woman had her first sex with her former 
boyfriend, but then they split up. The fourth woman reports 
her first sexual intercourse as a one night stand, while 
she was dating her current partner. 
The men say that as teenagers they sought sexual 
relations with women. In their own words, sexual desire was 
the driving force of their quest for women. Frequently, 
they speak of sexual appetite as an urgent need for sexual 
intercourse, to unload themselves. As teenagers, they just 
wanted to have some kind of sexual relation, not 
necessarily sexual intercourse. Thus they did not care 
about developing long-term relationships. On the contrary, 
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short-term relationships were useful to meet their sexual 
needs. As Celio recalls, ‘I was just looking for the 
pleasure; I sought satisfaction for my body. I have had 
many girlfriends, with all of them I didn’t care if we had 
a good or a bad relationship, I didn’t care, as long as I 
had someone to kiss and to hold’.  
By contrast, women tend to see sexual intercourse as a 
sign of love and commitment. They report that when they had 
sex for the first time, they expected a loving and lifelong 
relationship. Elaine, who lives with her first sexual 
partner, says ‘I was drawn to him because he was my first 
man, if I began my sexual life with him I should stay with 
him’. Furthermore, they condemn other women who have had 
many boyfriends, and who like to socialize. Those are loose 
women, and they make it clear that they are not that sort 
of woman. It might be that they fear they may be labelled 
as loose women. As Dalila says of her teenage years, ‘I 
didn’t want to be like my friends. I didn’t want to be like 
them, they were with one person after another’. 
By comparison, men tend to portray their early youth, 
as full of revelling, liking to hang out with friends, get 
drunk, smoke marijuana, and meet girls. As Celio says, ‘I 
went out everywhere. I went wild from the time I was 
fourteen until I was twenty years old, pure partying! I 
knew the entire place here, everybody knows me here. I 
didn’t have a particular group of friends, we drank and 
smoked, sometimes we just went out to hit others’. 
For the interviewees, falling in love was crucial in 
deciding to have a more stable relationship. However, it is 
not clear when they did fall in love. Usually they report 
having sexual intercourse with their current partner 
between two or three months and up to one year after they 
began to date. So probably the women took between a couple 
of months and a year to fall in love. By contrast, men see 
casual sex as an opportunity to enjoy sex without having an 
intimate relationship. They report that their quest for 
different women usually ended once they began to have a 
relatively stable partner. For them, falling in love is 
probably an outcome of having a regular sexual partner. 
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Indeed, they say that love enhances sexual pleasure. 
Consequently, women and men report falling in love at 
different times. Women tend to fall in love before having 
sex, men afterwards. So when the women agreed to have sex, 
they probably had more expectations than men of developing 
a lasting relationship.  
Eventually the women became pregnant and began to 
cohabit. For men, sex is a key aspect of cohabitation. They 
say they value that they can sleep with and have sex with 
their partner. As one says, ‘I like living together because 
you have your woman next to you, warm, every night. We 
sleep in the same bed. Sometimes you get your scratch [like 
a lottery scratch card], and you might win or you might 
have to keep participating!’ (León).  
Interviewees say that as they began to live together - 
and more precisely after they had their first child - their 
sexual life declined. Pregnancy and its aftermath affected 
their sex lives, and the frequency of sexual intercourse 
was reduced. The demands of looking after a child 
contributed to limiting their sexual lives, as having time 
and privacy became more of a challenge. The fact that most 
live as allegados also makes it more difficult to have 
opportunities for sex. For example, Andrew complained about 
how difficult it was not to have sex was for the 
traditional 40-day abstinence period after birth: ‘the 
quarantine was difficult, a hell of a lot! I had a very 
active sexual life, flying every day, so imagine the 
quarantine, it was terrible!’.  
By contrast, women barely refer to sex as a 
significant part of living together. Some are concerned 
about not meeting the sexual needs of their partner. As 
Jessica explains about how having a child has affected her 
sex life with her partner, ‘he was very supportive [during 
pregnancy] but [silence] eh (…) but not in relation to sex, 
not so much. I made a lot of fuss, always something was 
hurting me! My head, my tummy, I couldn’t sleep. He was 
upset, but he understood. [When my daughter was born] I was 
with her all the time, we couldn’t carry on with our life 
as a couple […]. After three months we tried again, but I 
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was still feeling bad inside. He began to feel angry, I was 
worried, I didn’t want him to be upset because of that. I 
made an effort so he would be fine on that level. Now it is 
not as it used to be, before the girl was born it was 
around three times a week, now it’s twice a month’.  
For all the participants, sex is a man’s issue, and 
the focus of it is to meet the man’s expectations. 
Likewise, men are entitled to ask women to meet their 
sexual needs. Women’s reports about their sex life show 
that they perform a passive role. Neither women nor men 
refer to women’s sexual pleasure. Unsurprisingly, men’s 
orgasm signals full sexual intercourse. Women say they have 
sex because their partner takes the initiative. Some women 
complain that they do not want to have sex as often as 
their partner does. One woman reports that she was raped by 
her previous cohabiting partner. Some women also say that 
their mother has told them in confidence that they too were 
forced to have sex by husbands or partners. 
In spite of men’s sexual privileges, the interviewees, 
women in particular, say that cohabitation entails sexual 
exclusivity. They say that as they live together, they 
should only have sexual intercourse with their cohabiting 
partner. As Paulina asserts, ‘I don’t see myself with 
another partner […]. I like fidelity very much’.  
However, they acknowledge that sex outside 
cohabitation attracts less social condemnation, than 
extramarital sex. As one man says, ‘the ones who conviven 
[live together] are freer, they feel freer. She or he can 
leave because of some prat. It doesn’t matter, they are not 
married. They can leave, and do leave. But the ones who are 
married can’t’ (Eugenio). Similarly, Leocadia says,’if you 
are married, and he leaves for another woman, he is wrong. 
He is the one who failed the marriage. We know who is to 
blame! While with cohabiting couples we don’t know. If he 
went elsewhere, something was wrong. In the same sense I 
can be attracted to other men and don’t have problems!’. 
The respondents also say that cohabitation, as an 
informal sexual arrangement, makes it easier to leave an 
unfaithful partner. Cohabiting couples are not exempt from 
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breaking up, but if they do, they do not have to go through 
all the formalities involved in divorce. Divorce is 
analysed more fully in the following chapter: for present 
purposes, it is sufficient to underscore that, women 
cohabitees, particularly, value the lack of formal 
constraints to them leaving their relationship due to an 
affair. However, the relatively easy exit from cohabitation 
brings mixed feelings. On the one hand, uncertainty 
encourages each partner to care for the relationship. On 
the other hand, distrust is not helpful for building a 
loving relationship. Around a third of the young people 
spontaneously report at least one affair in their current 
relationship. In two cases the woman reported having had an 
affair, and in five cases the man did so.  
Women are troubled by affairs, even when they were the 
ones having sex outside of the cohabiting relationship. As 
Frances reports of her own affair, ‘I broke down, and I 
told him to leave. I have met another person. I had an 
affair for three months. Then we got back together again’. 
Similarly, Elaine reports how she felt when she knew that 
her partner was having an affair. ‘I took it badly! I 
asked, “Why is this happening to myself?” I have always 
looked after him, everything clean, his clothes ironed, 
everything. I was the perfect housewife’. By contrast, men 
who report having had affairs seem to be less troubled by 
them. For example, Adrian says, ‘anyway, I have behaved 
badly, I have behaved badly, I have had some affairs, but I 
haven’t had any more children’. 
 
 
To sum up, the participants have a pattern of conventional 
sexual roles which is intimately related to gender. Men 
should actively seduce women by being talkative and 
amusing, whereas women are considered attractive if they 
are beautiful and modest. For women, sex is a consequence 
of love or a way of showing love for a particular person, 
but not an end in itself. By contrast, men talk about sex 
as a bodily pleasure, and it does not need to imply a 
romantic or affectionate relationship. Within cohabitation, 
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men would like to have sex more frequently, and women feel 
pressured to meet the sexual needs of their partner. 
Unsurprisingly, for men a key aspect of cohabitation is 
access to an available sexual partner, whilst women 
emphasize love and affection.  
Simultaneously, it seems that cohabitation is a 
similar sexual arrangement to marriage. Sexual exclusivity 
is valued and expected. However, if affairs take place, 
cohabitees face less social condemnation than spouses 
would, and it is easier to establish and end cohabitation. 
The interviewees, especially women, appreciate that they 
face no legal hurdles, as they would with divorce, in 
ending a cohabiting relationship. In the next section I 
explore how participants met their partners and began the 
relationship which led to cohabitation.  
 
 
 
Courtship  
 
My parents didn’t allow me to have boyfriends, so I did it in secret. 
(Giovanna) 
 
 
 
Parents play a significant role in the sexual lives and 
partnering patterns of their offspring. Parents’ influence 
is particularly relevant in relation to courtship and 
dating. In the following sections, I look at participants’ 
accounts of their parents’ attitudes and actions in 
relation to dating. 
 
 
Most interviewees say that their youth began when they were 
around 14 or 15 years old, and many date it to the 
beginning of secondary schooling. Secondary education in 
Chile starts when children are aged 14, and lasts for four 
years. At school, young people have privileged 
opportunities to meet peers and be free of parental 
control. Thus many report that starting secondary school 
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was the moment which signalled the end of childhood and the 
beginning of youth. Elaine says, when asked when she ceased 
being a child, ‘when I started the secondary. There I met 
older people, I couldn’t be a little girl any more; for 
them, little girls were silly […]. That was where I learnt 
how to put on makeup, how to wax my eyebrows, I had to 
learn! I met boys there’. 
 As teenagers, the participants began to look forward 
to meeting people of the opposite sex. Yet at the same 
time, most report that their parents opposed them 
developing any kind of romantic or sexual relationships. 
Women report stronger parental supervision than men. They 
say that their parents limited opportunities for them to go 
out. Their parents did not allow them to date, wanted them 
to be home early, and resisted or even forbade them to have 
boyfriends or girlfriends.  
Paulina reports how her father tried to stop her from 
relating to men. ‘I wasn’t allowed to go to parties […]. My 
father was overanxious, he didn’t want me to have 
boyfriends […]. Later on when I started secondary school, 
he didn’t allow me to go to a school away from our area, 
because he didn’t want me to have to take a bus, because 
buses are cramped, and someone could grope you’. Similarly, 
Leocadia reports being beaten after she was discovered 
kissing her boyfriend. ‘That was the first time that I fell 
in love. I fell in love with him and we started petting in 
the square, but I was seen by a friend of my Mum’s, who 
told her, then I was given a hiding!’ 
Parental control is less frequently reported by men, 
but is nonetheless not irrelevant. For example, Andrew 
reports that until he did his military service, when he was 
eighteen, he was under his father’s harsh rule. ‘My father 
marked my youth, because I lived with him until I left for 
military service. I couldn’t go to parties, I couldn’t go 
out with my friends’. Another man, who was born in the 
countryside, says ‘you know how parents are in the 
countryside; they don’t allow you to have girlfriends’ 
(Mauricio). 
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In spite of parental control, most interviewees report 
having had many brief relationships, usually involving 
kissing and petting, but not necessarily sexual 
intercourse. They call this kind of relationship pololeo, 
and so kissing and petting are commonly referred to as 
pololear. Yet pololear could also involve sexual 
intercourse. For example one woman, who reports that her 
parents did not allow her to go out, says ‘when I was 
fourteen I started secondary school, I stopped seeing my 
friends from the street. I grew further apart from my 
girlfriends because I met men, I was pololeando’ 
(Giovanna). Similarly the man born in the countryside, who 
also reports strict parental control, says ‘my youth was 
good, all the time I was just pololeando, I didn’t care 
about anything, I just wanted to be with my girlfriend’ 
(Mauricio). 
Consequently, parental control has not generally been 
successful in preventing sexual contact between young women 
and men. On the contrary, parental supervision promoted 
eroticized gender relations. Indeed, daily life is 
permeated by eroticized gender relations in the 
neighbourhoods where my study took place. Groups of young 
men are commonly on the streets, talking, drinking, and 
smoking marijuana or freebase cocaine. They flirt with 
every young woman who passes by, in more or less pleasant 
ways. Thus many women prefer to stay at home, or to go out 
accompanied by friends or relatives, to avoid walking the 
streets alone. 
Accounts suggest that what parents really opposed was 
young people having premarital sex. This parental 
opposition means that dating was typically forbidden. 
Therefore, young people could usually only develop romantic 
relationships in secret. As one woman recalls, ‘my Mum 
didn’t want anything to do with him […] my family didn’t 
let me stay with him, […] I had to run away from home to 
see him. He called from his mobile, and I said I was going 
to see a friend and thus we were able to meet’ (Dalila). 
Another woman describes a similar scenario. ‘I didn’t have 
freedom to go out, my mother didn’t let me go out, but I 
 178 
did it anyway. I had so many problems at home because I was 
seeing him, I wasn’t allowed to go out with him, but I did 
it anyway, in secret’ (Jessica). 
If the parents did not relinquish control, the young 
people were forced to flee the parental home in order to 
have a partner. As the women were supervised by parents to 
a greater extent, they were the ones most likely to desert 
the family home. As Paulina says, ‘we ended our 
relationship because of my mother, we had lots of trouble 
because of her, she didn’t let us stay together. So we 
continued seeing each other, but in secret, because it was 
so much trouble, until I took the decision to leave so I 
could live with him’. Jane says similarly, ‘[there was] 
just trouble all the time, my mother didn’t want to see him 
in the house, arguments every time, so I ran away, and we 
went to live with his Dad’. 
Yet in many cases parents eventually softened, and 
allowed their children to have a partner. It seems that the 
key issue for being allowed to date was that the man should 
get permission from the woman’s parents.  Adrian explains, 
‘at the beginning we saw each other in secret, when she 
went shopping we met in the corner. Then I talked to her 
mother, […] I told her that I wanted to date her daughter. 
Her mother said that I should look after her and should not 
do grown up things. I was eighteen and she was fourteen’. 
One woman also reports ‘we were seeing each other in secret 
from my parents, my parents never met my boyfriends. He 
went to talk with my father, it was something more serious, 
it was a month after we had started seeing each other. 
After they talked, everything was okay’ (Elaine). 
A few even report that their parents eventually 
allowed their partner to stay and to sleep at the parental 
home. As Dalila, who initially reported that she was not 
allowed to have boyfriends, says, ‘I never had official 
boyfriends, the father of my son was the only one who I 
introduced to my parents […] when we had been together for 
six months, my mother gave permission to him to sleep over 
here, in the living room’.  
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Men were less controlled than women. Most say they 
were allowed to go out. As one man says, ‘I never asked my 
parents’ permission to go out, I just let them know… I 
wasn’t like my eldest sister. If she wanted to go out my 
mother, my father or both of them had to give her their 
consent. Instead, I said “I’ll be back tomorrow, at 
sunrise”’ (Albert). Thus men tend to recall their youth as 
a good time, when they were free to do as they pleased. 
Some men say that they were involved in more unruly 
activities, such as consumption of harder drugs (typically, 
freebase cocaine), gang fights, and criminal activities 
including shoplifting and mugging.  
Although women were subjected to closer parental 
control, finding a partner was very important for them. 
They say that if they had not been able to find a partner 
they would have had to continue living in the parental 
home. Family relations were often strained, and daughters 
were regularly expected to help with housework and 
childcare. Unsurprisingly, the women wanted to leave so as 
to have their own lives, and to be free from parental 
control. The desire to leave was stronger when family 
relations were very conflicted and when young women felt 
they were not allowed any kind of autonomy.  
One woman says ‘the best thing I could do was to leave 
to live with my partner. It was good to leave my parents’ 
home (…) they were always arguing, my father was drunk 
every weekend (…) I did it because I wanted to be more 
independent; they allowed me so little freedom’ (Giovanna). 
Another woman says ‘I just started to go out when I began 
to live with my partner… only then I did have freedom!’ 
(Paulina). 
 
Strict parental control, in particular over young women, 
promoted eroticized gender relations. The parents of 
participants tried to limit opportunities to relate with 
the opposite sex. Parental opposition to premarital sex 
made it difficult for young people to date or to develop 
open or visible long-term premarital sexual relationships. 
Thus the interviewees, women in particular, tried to make 
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the most of their limited chances to find a partner. Most 
respondents say they started a relationship soon after 
seeing someone a few times. Sexual relations usually began 
not long afterwards. In the next section I explore how 
these people have managed their sexuality in relation to 
contraception. 
 
 
 
Contraception 
 
We looked after ourselves with Tina [his partner], though sometimes we 
didn’t! (Cristián) 
 
I was looking after myself with the pill, but I stopped it for a few 
days, and then I got pregnant. (Paulina) 
 
I used it [a condom] once with her, the third time we had sex, but I 
didn’t like it, and neither did she. (Albert) 
 
I had my first sexual intercourse when I was fifteen years old. We 
never looked after ourselves, I couldn’t take the pill because we did 
it in secrecy. We couldn’t buy condoms because we were very young, we 
felt embarrassed. (Danae) 
 
I am one hundred percent against abortion! (Diana) 
 
 
 
 
Modern contraception offers the opportunity to choose in 
advance whether or not to have children, how many to have, 
and their timing. All the interviewees have had at least 
one child with their current partner. As they began to have 
sex, they had to deal with the possibility of pregnancy. 
Contraception was a challenging matter. Before having 
sexual intercourse, they needed to agree on whether to 
practise birth control, then they need to obtain it and, 
finally, to use it correctly. Here I focus on 
contraception, as this helps us to understand the 
participants’ approach to sexual intercourse and pregnancy. 
Their beliefs about sex and pregnancy will in turn shed 
light on their views about cohabitation. 
 
Most report having used some method of contraception before 
bearing their first child, although a significant number 
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had never used any method of birth control. The pill and 
condoms were the most common methods of contraception for 
pre-cohabiting sex. A few also indicate coitus interruptus, 
and some say they used a combination of methods, typically 
a condom and the pill. It should be noted that coitus 
interruptus is probably underreported because it was not 
referred to as a method of contraception.  
By comparison with other data (INJUV 2010), the 
participants show low levels of use of contraception as 
teenagers. Slightly more than half report using 
contraception prior to cohabitation. Other national data 
from Chile on contraception use among young people shows 
take-up at around 70 percent among those with completed 
secondary education. Levels are lower among those from 
socioeconomic group D, and for teenagers.  
In addition, most interviewees report an inadequate 
use of birth control methods for pre-cohabiting sex. Almost 
half report irregular use, and only around a third reported 
always using contraception. But even they probably did not 
use it correctly, as the women eventually became pregnant. 
By contrast with these low and irregular levels of use of 
contraception for pre cohabiting sex, the take up of 
contraception became more widespread and probably more 
effective for post-pregnancy sex. Indeed, all interviewees 
expect three (cases in which the woman is currently 
pregnant) report using some method of birth control in 
their current cohabiting relationship. The most typical 
method of contraception for cohabiting sex is the 
intrauterine devices, IUD, followed by use of the pill and 
condom. A few people report simultaneously using IUDs, 
condoms, and the pill. This data on cohabiting 
contraception is consistent with other data from Chile 
(Schiappacasse, Vidal et al. 2003). For users of the state 
health system, in 2001 IUDs accounted for almost 60 percent 
of users, followed by contraceptive pills at 30 percent. 
The evidence from the present study suggests that 
interviewees’ usage of contraception changed radically 
after the women become pregnant. It seems that pregnancy is 
the turning point in relation to contraception use. After 
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pregnancy, all say they are using contraception. How can we 
account for this transition from significant, but 
inadequate, use of contraception, to universal and more 
effective use? 
 Interviewee reports show that obtaining contraception 
for pre cohabiting sex was challenging. They faced three 
main difficulties. The first is related to privacy, the 
second to cost, and the third to professional advice. 
Particularly for the women in the study, it was crucial to 
have confidential access to contraception. As they often 
had to date in secret, they were wary about being 
discovered obtaining contraception. Local doctor’s 
surgeries did not offer privacy, and so most bought 
contraception in pharmacies. As one woman says, ‘I never 
looked after myself. I thought about going to a chemist, 
not to the surgery, because if you go there you have to 
wait for hours and everyone can see you!’ (Dalila). Most 
men bought condoms in pharmacies, and a few got them in the 
local surgery. Available data (INJUV 2010: figure 122) 
confirms that young people in Chile overwhelmingly tend to 
go to pharmacies for contraceptives for their first 
experience of sexual intercourse.  
By contrast with their pre-cohabiting experiences, 
after having their first child all couples obtain 
contraception from surgeries. After pregnancy, privacy is 
no longer an issue. It is easier for surgeries to target 
contraception at women after pregnancy, as women attend 
prenatal and postnatal health checks. Family planning is 
usually offered and discussed during postnatal checks. 
 Cost was another difficulty. Those who obtained 
contraceptives in pharmacies had to pay for them. The 
problem is that they did not always have enough money. As 
one man recalls, ‘sometimes we ran out of money, when you 
are younger, your hormones want you to be fucking the whole 
day, and then you run out of condoms’ (Fernando). 
 In principle, surgeries provide contraception for 
free, yet some women report that this is not always the 
case. These women refer to contraceptive injections. One 
points out that at her local surgery she had to pay for 
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these, and she became pregnant at a time when she did not 
have money to buy them. As she observes, ‘I tended to 
forget to take the pill, so I asked [in the surgery] to be 
given the injection, and so I had the injection every 
month. I had to buy this injection, but for two or three 
months I didn’t have cash to buy it, and then I got 
pregnant’ (Frances). Another woman reports, ‘this month 
there weren’t any [injections] in the surgery and we don’t 
have [money] to buy them. In the surgery they don’t care at 
all, so this month I haven’t had an injection’ (Diana). 
A third problem in getting contraception was that, as 
teenagers, they lacked good health advice on sexuality and 
reproduction. Most report incorrect use of contraceptive 
methods such as the pill and condoms. In addition, some 
have wrong ideas about birth control methods. For example, 
one woman refused to use condoms because she feared that 
they could get stuck inside her (Danae). I did not ask them 
directly about sources of information about contraception, 
but it seems that friends and schools are the main sources 
of advice. As one woman says, ‘my mother never talked about 
sexuality with me, but in the school they teach you’ 
(Elaine).  
The fact that most interviewees got contraception for 
pre cohabiting sex in pharmacies did not help them to 
improve their knowledge of available contraceptives. Lack 
of expert advice meant that they might buy unsuitable 
methods, or even use no contraception at all. One woman 
reports ‘I used to buy contraceptive pills. But when we 
went to a pharmacy the woman gave me pills for the 
menopause instead of contraceptive pills. They made me feel 
bad, and they didn’t work’ (Diana). There is other evidence 
from Chile that links poor contraception usage by teenagers 
with lack of access to good health advice (Fétis, Bustos et 
al. 2008). 
The interviewees relate condoms almost exclusively to 
contraception, and not to the prevention of sexually 
transmitted diseases (STDs). Most say that, during pre 
cohabiting sex, they considered the chance of catching 
STDs. None of those who report using condoms however say 
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they did this to avoid STDs. The only STD that they mention 
is Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). This is in 
accordance with other Chilean data (INJUV 2010: table 129). 
The participants only find out if they have a STD when they 
get pregnant and have prenatal health checks.  
Their views on sex also contribute to their low and 
irregular use of contraception for pre cohabiting sex. 
Women say they were reluctant to use contraceptives as it 
would have implied that they were not in love, and that 
they just wanted to have sex. For example, Frances says she 
did not use contraception the first time she had sexual 
intercourse, as she was in love. But then she decided to 
use contraceptives with her current partner, since at the 
beginning she was not in love. She reports, ‘with the first 
one I was deeply in love, that’s why I think I didn’t look 
after myself. But with Samuel [current partner] I wasn’t in 
love at the beginning, so we started to look after 
ourselves even before we had sexual relations. When we 
started touching I went to see doctor to ask for 
contraceptives’. 
Trust in the partner is also cited, by women in 
particular, as another reason for avoiding contraception in 
pre-cohabiting sex. Many women say that they trusted that 
their partners would look after them. As one woman reports, 
‘I have no idea how he did it, but supposedly he was 
looking after me, I never looked after myself! I didn’t 
take anything, the pill, nothing. He didn’t look after 
himself either, no condom, nothing! He said to me, “you are 
not going to get pregnant, I’m going to look after you”’ 
(Leocadia). Some men make a similar point, one recalling, 
‘she told me that she was looking after herself […] I 
didn’t use anything because I trusted her’ (Pedro). 
Men are reluctant to use condoms since they see these 
as a threat to their sexual pleasure and performance. 
Negative male views about condoms are not restricted to pre 
cohabiting sex, but are also present in cohabiting sex. As 
one man reports, ‘I didn’t like condoms, they are 
uncomfortable, I knew that it was essential to use them, 
but it couldn’t be, I didn’t like them!’ (Eugenio). 
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Unsurprisingly, men do not reject methods of female 
contraception that do not affect their performance, such as 
IUDs or contraceptive pills, injections, or implants. 
 Interviewees also indicate a strong resistance to 
abortion. One man, Ernesto, reports an abortion, which he 
condemned. According to him, the abortion was performed by 
an aunt of his partner without him knowing. Rejection of 
abortion is in accordance with public opinion in Chile (see 
Chapter 1). 
A few women say that their mothers encouraged them to 
use contraception for pre-cohabiting sex. These women say 
that their mothers offered to get contraception for them. 
One woman says that her mother volunteered to buy the pill 
for her, and another that her mother took her to see a 
doctor. ‘My mother started to look after me. I was spending 
too much time with my boyfriend, so she talked to me and 
took me against myself to see the doctor. I was fourteen’ 
(Jessica).  
 
To sum up, the young people in the study did not practise 
effective birth control for pre-cohabiting sex. They did 
not have strong incentives for using contraception 
correctly, and they did not get support from the health 
system. Hence pregnancy is likely to occur sooner rather 
than later in their lives. The focus of the next section is 
their experiences of, and following, pregnancy. 
 
 
 
Expecting a Child 
 
It wasn’t unwanted, but it wasn’t planned either. (Celio) 
 
We were expecting it, because we didn’t look after ourselves to avoid 
getting pregnant. If Id’ve got pregnant and hed’ve said beforehand 
that we should look after ourselves, I would’ve been worried. But 
since we never looked after ourselves, it was as if we wanted it and 
didn’t at the same time. We wanted it, but not straightforwardly. 
(Elaine) 
 
When I first learnt that she [my partner] was pregnant I felt an 
incredible happiness, then I thought “this is the woman with whom I am 
going to stay forever. If God gave me a child with her, there must be 
a reason”. (Iván) 
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When asked about expecting a child, almost all the 
interviewees say that the pregnancy took them by surprise. 
They claim that they did not plan it, and many say it 
happened because of ineffective contraception. Data from 
Chile show that 60 percent of young people who experience 
pregnancy as teenagers report it as unplanned (INJUV 2010: 
figure 179). Data from the same source shows that unplanned 
pregnancy is reported more frequently by women and by those 
in low socioeconomic groups (2010: table 275).  
Yet nowadays, when contraceptives are available, it is 
difficult to believe such high figures for unplanned 
pregnancy. Even in the case of those interviewees who faced 
difficulties in obtaining contraception, it seems 
improbable. In this section I analyse their accounts of 
becoming pregnant, and of how pregnancy is related to 
cohabitation. As we will see, they are probably telling the 
truth in as much as they did not plan the pregnancy; but 
that is not the same as saying that they did not expect it. 
 
 
Most interviewees began to live together because of 
pregnancy or childbirth, and a few women who were not 
expecting a child at the time when they began to cohabit 
soon became pregnant. On average, the participants were 16 
years old when they had their first sexual intercourse, 
with no significant differences by gender. Yet women were 
younger than men when their first child arrived: on average 
women and men were aged 19 and 22, respectively. Female 
interviewees got pregnant around two years after their 
first sexual intercourse, a shorter time span than that 
reported in other data from Chile (see Chapter 1). By 
contrast, male interviewees impregnate their partners 
around five years after their first experience of sexual 
intercourse. Therefore, the women in my study who begin to 
have sex will get pregnant rather soon. They also got 
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pregnant at a similar age to their mothers. Thus it seems 
that they are following a pattern of early pregnancy. 
Men’s data concerning age at first sexual intercourse 
and at first birth of a child is rather inconsistent. Male 
interviewees report irregular use of contraception for pre 
cohabiting sex. Men also report a more active sexual life, 
involving more sexual partners. Yet they had their first 
child later than women. One possibility is that they are 
exaggerating their sexual experience, in particular the 
number of sexual partners. Indeed, it is well documented 
that men tend to overstate their sexual experience, while 
women tend to understate it (Laumann, Gagnon et al. 1994). 
It could also be that men used contraception more 
frequently than they acknowledge, in particular for casual 
sex. 
Although participants say that they did not plan to 
get pregnant, the majority state that they wanted to have 
children with their partner. Almost all women say they 
wanted to have children. The only woman who did not say so 
has a medical condition which means that she would have a 
high-risk pregnancy. By contrast, most men say they were 
not looking forward to having children. Another indication 
that the interviewees, particularly the women, were looking 
forward to pregnancy is that around a half say they had 
previously talked as a couple about having children. These 
people say that pregnancy was suggested either by the 
woman, or the man, or by both. However, some interviewees 
who did not talk about the possibility of pregnancy say 
there was a tacit agreement that having children was to be 
expected. As Giovanna explains, ‘we never talked about that 
matter, but we knew. We never talked openly, we just didn’t 
talk about it. But we both knew that I would get pregnant, 
and we both wanted it’. 
Nevertheless, to have talked about wanting to have 
children does not mean that they had a thorough agreement. 
They report a willingness to have children, but not having 
planned it. As Leocadia recalls, ‘one day he said to me “do 
you want to have a child with me?” I said, “I don’t know, I 
have to think about it (…) all right, let’s have a child!” 
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It didn’t take me too much time to think about it! 
[laughing]’. They do not refer to discussions about what 
they would do if they did get pregnant. Nor did they talk 
about a need to meet certain goals as couples before having 
children, such as having enough income, living in their own 
accommodation, or improving the quality of their 
relationship. 
Their reports show that they had good reason to have 
children. They looked forward to having children because 
they wanted to have something of their own. Besides, if 
they had children their parents, peers, and community would 
begin to see them as adults. Having children means no 
longer living under parental authority, and it provides 
social status and recognition. In short, they wanted to 
have children in order to become someone. As one man 
explains about why his partner wished to become pregnant, 
‘she wanted to have a child, because she wanted to have 
something of her own. At her age, in her home, she didn’t 
have anything of her own! She didn’t have anything, also 
she didn’t have a ‘voice or vote’. She always wanted to 
have something of her own, and what is more yours than a 
child?’ (Cristián). 
Social expectations, family and peer pressure also 
encouraged the interviewees to have children. According to 
the interviewees, the expected age for childbearing is 
around the end of secondary school. Indeed, most had become 
pregnant by that time. So when the interviewees, women in 
particular, finished school, they began to feel that they 
should have children. Elaine, who had her first sexual 
intercourse when she was 21, reports that she wanted to 
catch up with her female friends. ‘He [her partner] used to 
say to me that all his friends had children, and that he 
was the only one with no children, just like me! I told him 
that all my girlfriends had children and that I was the 
only one left with no children!’. 
Women also report wanting to have children as a source 
of affection, and as an antidote to loneliness. Some say 
that they were looking to have children to stave off 
feelings of loneliness. One says, ‘I felt lonely. I have 
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always felt lonely! Always. Even when I was with my partner 
or with my mother. I had a void, and I wanted to fill it. I 
wanted to look after someone else, which was mine and also 
from him, what else then?’ (Jessica). Similarly, others 
wished to have a big family, so as to always have company, 
especially when they were elderly. Moreover, women say 
having children was an attempt to discipline their 
partners. They believed that pregnancy would help to 
discourage their partners from going out, partying, 
flirting, and so forth. As I will show later, most men 
report that having children was a turning point in their 
lives.  
Slightly more than a half of the men claim not to have 
wanted children, but this does not mean that they rejected 
becoming fathers. To begin with, men confer great symbolic 
significance to pregnancy. Most say that impregnating a 
woman, in a context of a more or less serious relationship, 
meant that she was the chosen one for them. As one man 
says, ‘with her, before she was pregnant, I didn’t know if 
I wanted to stay forever with her […]. Later, when she got 
pregnant, I told to myself “this is it! This is my 
future!”’ (Mauricio). 
 All the men who did not plan to have children say that 
eventually they changed and were happy with the 
eventuality. It seems that being involved in health checks, 
particularly scans; and in accompanying their partner’s 
labour, contributed to changing their attitudes. The state 
health system has only recently allowed fathers to be 
present during labour and at pregnancy health checks. As 
one man explains, ‘it was difficult when I knew. My first 
reaction was to reject it. But then, her tummy began to 
grow and I started to feel something for her tummy, I began 
to love that tummy. Then, for the first scan, when I saw my 
daughter on the screen, I cried. I looked at the screen, 
and I cried. It was so beautiful. It was the most beautiful 
thing I have ever experienced’ (Fernando).  
Even though women more frequently report that they 
wanted to get pregnant, they were also extremely 
ambivalent. Most say they looked forward to becoming 
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mothers, but at the same time, they worried about the 
consequences. If they got pregnant they would be 
challenging their parents’ authority, and risked being 
thrown out of the parental home. If they were rejected by 
their parents, they would become dependent on their male 
partner. They were worried about this dependency, as they 
doubted their abilities as providers. Although women were 
looking forward to getting pregnant, in doing so they 
risked breaking with their parents and losing what little 
security they had.  
The ambivalence experienced by women faced with the 
possibility of becoming pregnant is illustrated by the 
following account. ‘He said to me that he wanted to have a 
child with me. I told him ‘later’. Anyway, I don’t think it 
was really a mistake because if I didn’t look after myself 
it was obvious that I would get pregnant. So it was as 
though the two of us wanted it. I thought, “OK, if I get 
pregnant, I get pregnant”, but then I thought, “but I 
can’t! What I’m going to do! What are they going to say at 
home?”’ (Dalila). 
Women were right to be worried about becoming 
pregnant. The great majority recall their pregnancy as a 
difficult time, and, on the whole, as a rather negative 
experience. By contrast, almost all men report pregnancy 
mainly as a positive experience. For most women, being 
pregnant was hard, because their parents condemned it. As 
Dalila says, ‘I took a pregnancy test, it didn’t take a 
minute. I wanted to die. I was hiding behind the door 
crying, kneeling on the toilet crying. My mother cried and 
cried and cried. She said how could I betray her? […]. My 
mother didn’t talk to me, I didn’t eat in the whole day. My 
mother didn’t talked to me again for six days. She wanted 
to kill my boyfriend’. 
Getting pregnant was a source of conflict with 
parents, fathers in particular. Most interviewees say that 
at the beginning, the woman’s parents were upset, and 
opposed the relationship. However, parental opposition 
decreased if men assured their fathers-in-law that they 
would not desert the daughter and would provide for the new 
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family. As one man recalls, ‘at the beginning it was a 
disaster, when we told her parents that she was pregnant, 
especially because of my father-in-law […]. But it was only 
once, then we talked, and everything was sorted out. He was 
afraid that I would leave her on her own’ (Adrian). 
 As relationships in the parental home were often 
strained, a pregnancy provided another source of tension. 
As one woman recalls, ‘since my husband [her partner] was 
working, I stayed at home with my mother, quarrelling. I 
almost had a miscarriage because I was so stressed. Lots of 
arguments with my father, he drank a lot and reproached me 
because of my pregnancy’ (Giovanna).  
  In addition to problems with their parents, the women 
were anxious about their partners. They expected them to 
get a job to provide for the coming baby, and that they 
would stop going out and partying. But for the young men 
that was not an easy change, and many continued partying as 
usual. As one woman says, ‘during my pregnancy I was 
lonely. I don’t know if it was his instinct or what, 
because every day he needed to go out at night. He went out 
to drink. All day I was alone because he worked, and then, 
at night, he went out with his friends and bye, bye!’ 
(Leocadia). Unsurprisingly, many women report having felt 
abandoned by their parents and by their partners during 
their pregnancy. 
 Pregnancy was less difficult for the young men. With a 
few exceptions, it was not a turning point in their lives. 
Although some began to worry about how to provide for the 
mother and child-to-be, and had to deal with their fathers-
in-law, it was not until the baby was born that they had to 
do something about it. In the meantime, most dreamed about 
becoming a father, and carried on enjoying their lives as 
young, single men. One man says ‘[my partner] turned into a 
real pest. She wanted me to stop smoking weed, to stop 
going out, she wanted me to do as she told me. But I 
couldn’t stop being myself […]. While she was pregnant she 
cried a lot because of the weed. But she chose me, and she 
knew that I love to smoke weed!’ (Cristián). 
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To sum up, the accounts of how couples came to expect 
children suggest that men, but especially women, were 
looking forward to having children. They see children as 
their opportunity to have something of their own, to be 
emancipated from the parental home, and to gain affection 
and social recognition. As the interviewees were involved 
in a relatively stable relationship, pregnancy was 
expected, but not planned. Irregular use of contraception 
is probably related to this underlying willingness to have 
children. Pregnancy was experienced by the young women as a 
difficult time. Young people began to live together soon 
after getting pregnant. The following chapter focuses on 
interviewees’ lives once they had begun to cohabit.  
 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Participants hold conventional or essentialist views on 
sexuality. Men are seen as sexually active; women as rather 
passive, and focused on affection. As sex is driven by men, 
sexual practices are structured so as to meet male demands. 
Women and men conceive of sex as a natural need which is 
closely linked to reproduction. The parents of the 
interviewees also exhibit a similar understanding of 
sexuality. Sex and contraception are additionally 
considered subjects to be avoided. I Interviewees avoided 
discussing them either with partners or parents.  
 Parents rejected the idea of premarital sex, 
especially for women, and so they limited or forbade 
dating. Parental rejection of premarital sex also meant 
that most interviewees had to date in secret, which made 
obtaining contraception difficult. Women were also 
reluctant to use contraceptives, as this would have implied 
that they were loose women. They expected the man to be 
responsible for preventing pregnancy. Yet men were not keen 
on contraception, as they dislike condoms. Officially, 
birth control policies are moreover focused on married 
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mothers, meaning that interviewees found it difficult to 
access contraception and qualified health advice during 
their teenager years. Unsurprisingly, once the young people 
began a relatively stable relationship, they became 
pregnant rather soon. 
Deciding to have sex was harder for women than for 
men, as it implied a greater possibility of breaking with 
their families of origin. Furthermore, as women tended to 
relate sex with love and trust, they expected a long 
lasting relationship, and were not willing to use 
contraceptives. However, if pregnancy occurred and the 
relationship did not last, they would have borne the burden 
of being lone mothers. Thus when the young women decided to 
have sex, the stakes were higher and the risk greater. 
The interviewees had good reasons for wanting to have 
children. Having children was seen as providing 
emancipation from the parental home, affection, and social 
recognition. It also enabled the interviewees to have a 
regular sexual partner. As women were subjected to more 
parental control, and were not usually involved in paid 
work (see Chapter 4), they had stronger reasons for wanting 
to have children. The participants’ social conditions did 
not, either, offer higher education or better quality jobs 
if parenthood was postponed (see Chapter 4). Accordingly, 
although pregnancy was not planned, it was not unexpected 
either. The participants could not have children in a 
visible and planned way, as they did not have the 
wherewithal to do so. This would have required  informed 
access to contraception, and the possibility of having 
premarital sexual partners tolerated by parents. 
 Even though interviewees wanted to have children, they 
had to deny their responsibility for this eventuality, so 
as to deal with parental and social condemnation of 
premarital pregnancy. Irregular use of contraception is 
probably an example of this. If interviewees could claim to 
have become pregnant because of ineffective contraceptives, 
they would face less disapproval than if they had simply 
taken no measures. Indeed, one woman reports how she lied 
to her stepfather about getting pregnant, claiming 
 194 
ineffective contraception, so as not to be cast out of the 
house. 
Although women were particularly willing to have 
children, once they got pregnant they faced more 
difficulties. As they were allowed less autonomy by their 
parents, pregnancy meant a bigger break with parental 
authority. They had to endure not only their parents’ 
disapproval, but also anxiety about their partner’s level 
of commitment and capacity to provide for the child to 
come. Pregnancy was consequently a harsh experience for 
them.  
Interviewees see cohabitation as a similar sexual 
arrangement to marriage, inasmuch as both are expected to 
involve sexual exclusivity. Yet affairs are somewhat less 
condemned for cohabiting couples, who also face fewer 
restrictions in leaving their relationship. Thus increased 
tolerance to sexual affairs comes at the price of being in 
a more fragile partnership. In a context of predominantly 
conventional gender roles, women might endure rather than 
value cohabitation’s decreased sexual exclusivity. In 
Chapter 7, I will explore how the young people experience 
cohabitation as a daily practice and in relation to issues 
of power. 
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Chapter 7 - LIVING TOGETHER 
 
 
You don’t need to sign a legal document to be together, because we are 
a family without having signed any legal document. We wanted to live 
together, and to have our own things. (Celio) 
 
I think that convivir and to be married are the same, there is no 
difference. Marriage is just paperwork, that’s the difference, the 
marriage papers. Getting married will bring trouble, because tomorrow 
you might want to separate, because we are still young, and she will 
start, “I’m going to sue you for this and that”. So no, I don’t choose 
to be married with papers. (Adrian) 
 
I look at my folks, and then I look at ourselves [me and my partner], 
and the only difference that I see are the years and the wedding. 
(Fernando) 
 
We’ve thought about getting married, I’ve told him “let’s get 
married”. He says yes, but that he wants to give me a beautiful 
wedding party. (Verónica) 
 
I would like to have both, a civil and a church wedding, but the 
church wedding is more difficult. I don’t think we could have a church 
wedding for the time being, because you need more money, because of 
the wedding dress. (Diana) 
 
 
 
 
Marriage is on the horizon for the interviewees. As 
marriage is the prevalent arrangement for sexual 
intercourse and procreation, they will at some point have 
to consider it. Some say that cohabitation is so similar to 
marriage that there is no need to get married. For others, 
cohabitation is the opposite of marriage, as it is based on 
love and not on social conventions. These views about 
marriage and cohabitation have specific origins. In order 
to have a better understanding of the views of participants 
concerning cohabitation and marriage, it is necessary to 
study the context from which these opinions originate. 
 This chapter focuses on the participants’ cohabitation 
experiences. The purpose of exploring their experiences of 
living together is twofold. Firstly, it will shed light on 
what this form of partnership entails, so as to identify 
its distinguishing features. Secondly, if we become 
acquainted with their experiences of convivir, then we will 
be in a better position to understand their views about 
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cohabitation and marriage. Furthermore, we need to analyse 
these experiences of cohabitation if we wish to grasp why 
some interviewees are looking forward to getting married, 
whereas others are not. 
 I will begin by looking at the interviewees in 
relation to their partners. I focus on the backgrounds of 
both interviewee and partner, and on how these might affect 
their partnership. I analyse their accounts of the 
difficulties in their relationship, as well as their 
reasons for being together. In the second section, I will 
pay attention to the impact of having children. Most of 
this analysis will be centred on the women, since having 
children is a particular turning point for them. Then I 
will study gender relations within the relationship, 
especially in connection to issues of power. I explore 
discourses around power and access to sources of power. The 
chapter ends by identifying the main discourses shaping 
interviewees’ ideas about cohabitation and marriage, and 
their decisions to wed or not. These discourses are 
analysed in relation to the findings of previous sections, 
so as to shed light on the underlying conditions which 
might influence them. 
 
 
 
 
Couples 
 
The best thing in our relationship is that we truly love each other. 
Our son is our fruit and he unites us even more. I think that with my 
partner we have a real relationship. We are not together because she 
got pregnant! No, it is because we are really in love with each other 
and we want to form a family. (Cristián) 
 
I am still in love with him, but not as I used to be. I don’t know if 
what I feel now could be called to be in love. I don’t know. (Jessica) 
 
We are still together because of the children [silence], if there 
weren’t children I don’t know if we would be together. (Jane) 
 
 
The participants have been living together for five years, 
with a minimum of one and a maximum of twelve years. Around 
 197 
a third of the sample had been cohabiting for more than a 
year but less than three years. Another third had cohabited 
for between three and six years, and the remaining third 
for seven to twelve years. The majority reported having a 
good relationship with their partner, but women were less 
satisfied than men. All the men except one claimed they had 
a good relationship with their partner, whereas only 
slightly more than half of the women reported a good 
relationship.  
When asked about what keeps them together, most of the 
men mentioned love, trust, and companionship. Indeed, many 
men explicitly state that it is their love as a couple, and 
not their children, that keeps them together. As one man 
observes: ‘the affection, the love that we have for each 
other […]. We can’t say that we are together because of the 
kid. It is because we are fond of each other and we get 
along well’ (Ernesto). For others, women in particular, 
having children is something that enhances their love for 
their partner. As Giovanna says: ‘love and the children. We 
love each other a lot, and even more now because we have 
two children’.  
However, a few say that they are not in love. They say 
that they are together because of their children. As one 
man says, ‘my children, sometimes we have arguments and 
I’ve thought about leaving everything, but my children stop 
me’ (Adrian). Similarly, some women say they do not want to 
leave their partner, in spite of the problems, because that 
would entail returning to their parental home. Elaine, who 
once left her partner because he had an affair, says ‘we 
were separated for a month, but I didn’t want to live in my 
Mum’s house any more. I’ve got used to living by myself. My 
Mum didn’t allow me to go out, there I had to be all day at 
home with my daughter’. 
Even though most interviewees, men especially, say 
they are in a good relationship, they report various 
difficulties. Economic hardship is the most common problem 
they face, but affairs, heavy drinking, domestic violence, 
and the use of illicit drugs also feature. Unsurprisingly, 
given their differing levels of satisfaction in their 
 198 
relationships, women tend to report more difficulties than 
do the men. There are also gender-based differences in the 
type of problem reported. Men mainly refer to economic 
hardship, whereas women refer to affairs and domestic 
violence.  
To better understand these problems, we should analyse 
other variables which might affect participants’ 
relationships. Around a fifth of their own families are 
stepfamilies, s factor which brings fresh complexity to 
their relationships. As one woman says, ‘at the beginning 
it was difficult because he didn’t accept my son. He used 
to give him the cold shoulder and played more with his own 
son. It was difficult, we argued. I told him that he should 
be the same with both of them. When we began to live 
together, we did it knowing that each of us had a son, so 
he should be the same with both of them’ (Verónica). 
Socio-economic backgrounds also influence 
relationships. Most interviewees have completed secondary 
vocational education, even though a significant number left 
school early. Most of the men are in paid work, usually in 
unskilled manual jobs. They are the main providers, whereas 
women are most commonly housewives. In terms of age, within 
the mid-20s average, the men are slightly older than the 
women (see Appendix 2 for the main characteristics of the 
interviewees and of their partners). 
 I also collected data on religion and political 
affiliation (see Appendix 2). Around a half of the 
interviewees describe themselves as Catholics, some are 
evangelical Protestants, and some profess no religion. 
Women are more religious than men, as more say they are 
either Catholic or evangelical Protestant, and fewer have 
no religion. Both the overall distribution in terms of 
religious affiliation, and the more pronounced religiosity 
on the part of women, accord with other studies (ICSO 
2008).  
In relation to political affiliation, a third say they 
support the centre-left coalition Concertación; a third, 
the centre-right coalition Alianza, and the final third 
report no political affiliation. More women support the 
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Concertación, whereas men preferred the Alianza. It should 
be noted that, at the time of the study, the Concertación 
was in power and Chile had a female president for the first 
time in its history (Michelle Bachelet, 2006-2010). In 
comparison with their parents, interviewees show less 
support for the Concertación and more for the Alianza, 
which eventually acceded to power in the 2010 presidential 
election.  
It is not possible to compare the study data on 
political affiliation with official Chilean figures, given 
that surveys commonly report that around 50 percent of 
young respondents have no political orientation (INJUV 
2010). Furthermore, as most young people do not vote 
because they are not on the electoral roll, their political 
preferences remain uncertain.7  
The fact that cohabitation is less stable than 
marriage has been explained by its lower homogamy (Herrera 
and Valenzuela 2006; López-Ruiz, Esteve et al. 2009). In 
this view, cohabitation is likely to be more fragile than 
marriage since cohabiting partners are less similar in 
terms of social background.. In this study, interviewees 
were found to be similar to their partners in relation to 
age and education. This similarity is however partially 
related to the method of sample selection, as one of the 
qualifying criteria was that the main provider did not have 
more than secondary education. Age homogamy might also have 
been affected by the selection criteria, as both partners 
were required to be aged 18 at least. This high level of 
homogamy in age and education might have been expected to 
produce a particularly egalitarian relationship between the 
partners. Interviewees and their partners are also somewhat 
similar in relation to place of birth, which along with 
                     
7
 Prior to 2012, Chile had an electoral system of optional voter 
registration combined with compulsory voting for those registered. In 
December 2011, Parliament approved a change to automatic registration 
for those aged 18 and over, combined with voluntary voting. The aims 
included to foment greater political participation among young people. 
BCN. (2011). "Histórica Aprobación de Ley sobre Inscripción Automática 
y Voto Voluntario."   Retrieved 12 January, 2012, from 
http://www.bcn.cl/carpeta_temas_profundidad/historica-aprobacion-de-
ley-sobre-inscripcion-automatica-y-voto-voluntario.. 
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educational homogamy, suggests that participants have 
chosen partners of similar social strata or class. 
By contrast, participants and their partners are 
dissimilar in terms of religion and political affiliation. 
These differences bring tensions to their relationships. 
Some say religion is a source of stress, in particular in 
relation to their prospects of getting married. In the last 
section of this chapter, I will return to the issue of 
religion and how it can influence respondents’ views and 
desires about whether to carry on living together or get 
married. Even though they report no arguments due to 
differing political affiliation, one should not dismiss its 
relevance. Pinochet’s dictatorship not only divided Chilean 
society but also Chilean families. Since then Chilean 
families have been divided in political terms. Thus it is 
not unreasonable to imagine that even though the young 
people in the study say they are not interested in 
politics, their lives may have been influenced by it. 
 
 
To sum up, most participants report a good and loving 
relationship with their partner. Men are happier in their 
relationships than women, and they usually say that love, 
and rather than children, is the main reason for staying 
together. As women have had a more negative experience, 
they have more mixed feelings about their partners. For 
those who doubt their love for each other, children and the 
threat of having to return to the parental home are the 
main reasons to stay together.  
Various difficulties are reported. Economic hardship 
is the main problem, but affairs, domestic violence, heavy 
drinking, and drug usage are also mentioned. Women report 
more difficulties than men. Some families are stepfamilies, 
which brings new tensions. The couples are not very similar 
to each other in terms of religion and political 
affiliations. These differences introduce conflicts, with 
religious differences likely to be a contested issue if the 
couple plan to get married. In the next section I explore 
how having children has impacted on their relationships. 
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Children  
 
My son was born and everything seemed happy, the sun shone. It gave 
more sense to everything, to keep going, to keep working, to keep 
living. His birth gave me a reason for living. (Giovanna) 
 
I am in love with my daughter in the same way that I am in love with 
my partner. I am very happy, she fulfils me completely […]. You can’t 
explain this kind of love, she is everything to me. (Fernando) 
 
My role with my children is to be a good father and a friend at the 
same time. I am proud of becoming a father so young. When he grows up 
he will have a friend and a father. (Adrian) 
 
Only when you become a father do you realise that your parents 
sacrificed a lot for you. You never noticed that, you didn’t even say 
thanks to them. But now I know that having children involves a lot of 
effort. (León) 
 
It is difficult. You don’t do what you please any more. I have to tidy 
up our place. When I didn’t have a son, my mother did everything for 
me, she made my bed, folded my clothes, I didn’t do anything. Now I 
have to do everything. (Dalila) 
 
I feel that I’m not given a very important role, just to look after 
the children, that’s all. (Diana) 
 
 
 
Having children was a major turning point for the 
interviewees. The arrival of children was also a milestone 
for their partnership. But why was having children such an 
important event in their lives? If children are so 
relevant, what kind of relationship do interviewees want to 
develop with their children? Does this mean that they would 
like to have more children? These issues are explored 
below. 
 
 
Respondents have an average of 1.4 children, with the women 
having slightly more children than the men (1.5 and 1.3 
children, respectively; see Appendix 2). The couples have 
an average of 1.3 biological children per current 
relationship, with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 3 
children. Even though five people have stepchildren, these 
only live with the current couple when they are the woman’s 
biological offspring. If we include these stepchildren, on 
average the couples have 1.4 children. Including both 
biological and step children, most couples live with one 
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child; around a quarter live with two children, and two 
live with three children. The children are young: 4.2 years 
old on average. The oldest child is 10 years old, and the 
youngest is 1 month. So most couples have at least one 
child of preschool age, i.e. younger than six. Even though 
the state provides free childcare, most children do not go 
to nursery, as women prefer to look after them themselves. 
Interviewees value their children highly, feeling that 
they have given purpose to their lives. Children also give 
comfort in their daily struggles. As one man says, ‘as a 
man, you work very hard, and when you come back home, your 
children start playing with you, and that changes 
everything, all the problems that you had in your job, the 
bad day, the stress. They change all that’ (Adrian). All 
the respondents report feelings of love, joy, and 
satisfaction when talking about their offspring. Indeed, in 
their life histories their positive feelings are almost 
always, and sometimes exclusively, related to having 
children. One woman points out, ‘I didn’t have a very happy 
childhood. The most beautiful time was when I had my 
daughter’ (Danae). 
 For men to become fathers means they have to provide 
for their children and their partner, and so get a job. 
Whilst for many men this is not easy, all say that having 
children has helped them to settle down and to have a more 
fulfilling life. As one man says, ‘what has left a mark on 
me is what my wife [his partner] has given to me, my 
daughter […]. It was good to change, because before I was 
completely lost’ (Celio). 
 Participants also say that having children has 
improved the quality of their relationships, as they feel 
more attached to their partners. Having children has 
encouraged them to seek a better understanding with their 
partner, and to try to get along well. As one man says, 
‘after my son was born our relationship has changed for the 
better, we have grown up! Now we get along with each other 
much better’ (Cristián). Similarly, one woman says, ‘since 
my daughter was born we get along better. Before we had 
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arguments about very silly things, now we think before 
starting to argue’ (Jessica). 
Nevertheless, they acknowledge that having children 
has a price. For most, children have brought loss of 
freedom. They cannot do as they please; now they have to 
think about their children. They are responsible for 
rearing their offspring, which is a burden for both women 
and men. Unsurprisingly, most interviewees equate having 
children with the end of their youth, with growing up and 
becoming adults. As one woman reports, ‘when my first son 
was born, I was seventeen, I started to know what starving 
was about. I didn’t know what I have to do to get food. I 
never did anything before! I learnt to cook, to clean. I 
learnt to be a mother!’ (Karin). One man says ‘I began to 
be like an adult. Before that I only worked to have money 
to party, but after that I completely changed, I left my 
party friends, I focused on my work, on my son, on my wife’ 
(Adrian). 
Interviewees want to have good relationships with 
their children, and to have affectionate, close, and 
trusting bonds. They want to develop a different kind of 
relationship from the one that they have had with their own 
parents (see Chapter 5). Many women and men say that they 
are happy to be young mothers and fathers, because it will 
be easy for them to be friends with their offspring in due 
course. As one woman says, ‘I won’t be too strict, but I 
won’t give them too much freedom either […]. I would like 
to have very good communication with them, that they would 
trust me. I would like to gain their confidence so they 
could talk with me about everything, about their sorrows. I 
would like to give them what I didn’t have with my mother’ 
(Leocadia). 
Whilst participants wish to have more equal and 
affectionate relationships, they also hold beliefs and do 
things which contradict this. They are similar to their 
parents in that they believe in the use of physical 
discipline. As one man says, ‘if he [his son] does 
something that I don’t like I scold him, but if he keeps 
doing it I slap him. He is not going to bleed, I don’t like 
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to beat him . But if I give him a good slap then he will 
understand and he will stop doing it, and he won’t try to 
do it again. My partner also slaps him from time to time, 
but usually I am in charge of the punishments’. (Albert). 
Most say that only limited violence should be used, 
such as a slap on the cheek or on the buttocks. It is 
impossible to be sure from this whether this generation 
uses less physical punishment compared with previous 
generations. This nonetheless seems likely to be the case, 
as other available evidence shows a decline in serious 
physical child abuse (see Chapter 1). Thus, it seems that 
interviewees’ wish for more egalitarian relationships does 
not imply that all aspects of authoritarian parenting are a 
thing of the past.  
 
 
Most interviewees, especially the men, say that they would 
like to have more children in the future. One man says ‘I 
would like to have more children, three, four or five! I 
believe five more, lots of children! I like children and I 
would love to have many more! But she doesn’t, she says 
three at the most’. (Cristián). In contrast, women are 
somewhat more divided in their opinion. 
That the women do not have a stronger desire to have 
more children might seem unexpected, as almost all women 
reported wanting to have children with their current 
partner. But now, after having had at least one child, 
their positions have changed. It is generally men who want 
to have more children, whilst women are more ambivalent. It 
may be that as most women are the ones who in practice look 
after their children, they are more cautious about having 
more. As one woman explains, ‘he wants another one right 
now, but I am the one who spends the whole day with them. I 
am the one who has to deal with the nuisance! [laughs]’ 
(Frances). 
Those who report fewer difficulties with their 
partners tend to want more children. As discussed above, 
these difficulties tend to be related with heavy drinking, 
use of illegal drugs, affairs, economic hardship, and 
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domestic violence. However, lack of money, and in 
particular lack of their own accommodation, are strong 
additional disincentives to having more children. As one 
man says, ‘I like children, I would like to have more, but 
we don’t have the economic situation. First I want a place 
where I can bring them up, a house, that’s my biggest 
desire, so they can have their own space’ (Adrian).  
The women have a less positive experience of their 
relationships than do the men. It seems that for the women 
in the study, at least, children do not only bring 
happiness, but also problems. Indeed, it is telling that 
most couples are currently using contraception. The reports 
of some of the women also show that even though they wanted 
to have children, once they had them new difficulties 
arose. Jessica, who is the mother of a baby girl, says when 
asked if she wants to have more children: ‘in my current 
state I wouldn’t have another child. I know I’m 
contradicting myself, because I wanted to have her! But I 
got depressed, I was jealous of her, I slapped her! I was 
angry, because I couldn’t sleep. I started to hate her’. 
 Even more revealing is the expressed view of another 
woman who says that when she realized that she was 
expecting her third child ‘I started to cry because I 
didn’t want it, what was I going to do? It can’t be! I am 
working! I thought my world was falling apart. What am I 
going to say to my Mum? My mother thinks that poverty 
equals children, more poverty […]. I was feeling down, 
because I didn’t want to have another one, I didn’t, I 
didn’t, I didn’t. I didn’t want to go to health checks, I 
didn’t want the baby to be born, no, no, no. At my work I 
carried heavy things, I went up the stairs. I had sickness 
and I felt upset. I didn’t want to eat. All my world was 
falling apart. I thought, I am doing well in my work, and I 
won’t be able to work, not another guagua [baby], not 
again! It was like my death’ (Karin). 
 Data on maternal depression in Chile (Wolf, De Andraca 
et al. 2002) confirms its prevalence among working class 
women. Wolf’s study, which was conducted in four working 
class urban communities in Santiago, reports an incidence 
 206 
of 47 percent depression among mothers of children less 
than a year old. It drew connections between maternal 
depression and fewer years of schooling on the part of both 
the mother and the father, a greater number of people 
living in the household, more people per room, and 
inhabiting a multi-generational household.  
 
 
To sum up, the evidence shows that both women and men not 
only want to be parents, but also friends with their 
children. Thus they show a more egalitarian understanding 
of the parent-child bond. Respondents, especially women, 
are moreover rather cautious about the possibility of 
having many children. This may also indicate a preference 
for a closer and more intimate relationship with their 
offspring. However, their wish for a less authoritarian 
style of parenting is intertwined with harsh methods of 
child rearing, as parents retain their penchant for 
physical punishment. 
 Findings indicate that even though interviewees feel 
strongly about the value of children, in practice children 
have brought unexpected consequences. The women experience 
a paradox. They were the ones who most actively sought to 
have children. Yet, as they fulfilled their desire to 
become mothers and housewives, things turned sour. Most are 
now stuck in their homes, looking after their young 
children, and doing all the housework. Gender roles play an 
important part in these matters. In the next section I 
discuss how the understanding of identities as women and 
men shape the relationships of the interviewees with their 
partners. 
 
 
Women and Men 
 
We both rule, I don’t tell her what to do, and she doesn’t tell me 
what to do. (Albert) 
 
The division of the housework is equitable, but she does the majority, 
all the things. (Celio) 
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Anyway, I try to lend her a hand as much as I can. But it is very 
difficult for me because I get home very tired, very tired, very 
tired. I only want her to say hello to me, and to give me a cup of 
tea, and to relax! But she is tired of carrying our son in her arms 
for the whole day, she only wants to give him to me. I can’t say that 
her job is small. If she says “change the nappy!” I do it. (Cristián) 
 
I am the bad tempered one! He plays Playstation with them [children], 
he plays wrestling, football, he plays with them as if he were another 
child. I am the one who establishes the rules. (Karin) 
 
I am the head. If I don’t think, if I don’t do things, he is not going 
to do anything, he is very slow. He just brings the cash. I am the one 
who thinks about everything! (Jessica) 
 
He! Without doubt! He rules in everything. He rules in the house. 
Sometimes I try to have a say, but no, he is the one in charge. 
(Verónica) 
 
 
 
All the interviewees, except one, say that in their 
relationship the woman is the one in charge of childcare 
and housework. Even those women who are in paid work also 
look after their home and children, with the exception of 
one interviewee’s female partner who works full time. The 
interviewee himself, who is unemployed, is the only man who 
does the housework and looks after his daughter. All female 
interviewees describe themselves as ‘mother and housewife’.  
Respondents believe that the mother is the one who 
should bring up the children, particularly if they are of 
preschool age. The women report distrust of other possible 
sources of childcare, such as other relatives, 
acquaintances, neighbours or nurseries, with the exception 
of their own mother or grandmother.  
All believe that the home is the place for women. Most 
women report that they are home-loving. As one says, ‘he 
knows that I respect him, because if he goes out to work I 
don’t go out, I stay at home. If he is working far away he 
knows that I won’t fool around, so he can work without 
worrying about me. I’m a home-loving woman’ (Verónica). 
If the home is the woman’s place, the man’s place is 
outside, in the street. But this distinction can be a 
source of tension. Many women describe quarrelling with 
their partner because men go out while they stay at home. 
As Dalila, who has a baby a few months old, says, ‘when he 
goes out I am upset for a week, because I can’t go out. I 
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feel angry. He goes out and he doesn’t understand me. I 
haven’t gone out since my son was born. I can’t! He is my 
responsibility!’  
Though childcare and housework are considered female 
responsibilities, the men say they do lend a hand, in 
particular with childcare. If they are at home, and their 
partner asks for their help, they do what they are asked. 
Usually they help with doing things such as changing a 
nappy, giving a bottle, or doing the washing-up. Men are 
aware that looking after the house and children is hard 
work. Yet they work hard too, so when they get home they 
just want to relax and rest. As Albert says, ‘she looks 
after him [their son] more than me. She has to stay the 
whole day with him. If I am at home, I help her, I mean, if 
I am off one day, and he does a pooh, then I change him. I 
only help her’. 
Respondents say that sons and daughters are similar, 
but different. Daughters need additional care and 
protection, as they are more delicate and fragile. As 
parents they worry, because they see teenage girls as 
vulnerable to sexually predatory men, so they say that 
daughters need to be supervised. By contrast, they see boys 
as rougher, more independent, and able to survive without 
help. In this respect respondents demonstrate views similar 
to those they report for their parents, in believing 
upbringing is or ought to be differentiated according to 
the child’s gender. As one man says, ‘bringing up a girl is 
more difficult. I want to rear my son to be a fighter, so 
if he has a problem he would be able to sort it out, and if 
he falls down he will stand up and keep going. But a girl 
is more delicate. If someone wants to take advantage of a 
boy he can show his fists and defend himself, but a girl is 
more fragile’ (Cristián). 
In relation to issues of gender and power, the young 
people were asked about who has the last word in their 
relationship. The aim was to gauge their perceptions of 
their individual power within their relationship. 
Interestingly, both women and men usually reported that 
they were the one who had the last word. Half of the women 
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in the study claim to be the head of their family, as do 
half of men. It seems then that both women and men ascribe 
most value to their own power. This also suggests that the 
interviewees have a rather hierarchical understanding of 
their relationship, as most describe themselves as ‘having 
the last word’ in the sense of having authority over their 
partner. In other words, most do not see their relationship 
as egalitarian. 
Indeed, some say that they are a mother or a father, 
not only to their children but also to their partners. As 
one woman says, ‘my partner complies with everything I tell 
him. I think he lacked love from his mother and he looks 
for that love in me. He always calls me “mother”. He seeks 
shelter in me. Instead of having one son I have two’ 
(Danae). Similarly, one man says, ‘my role is to be like a 
father, sometimes I am like a father with her, because I am 
very bad tempered […]. My role on those occasions is to be 
very strict, like an ogre’ (León).  
In addition, women and men say they dislike being 
challenged or contradicted, and report getting angry with 
anyone who does this.  Many say they have inherited this 
irritable nature from their own mothers and fathers. As one 
woman reports, ‘my temper, sometimes I get very annoyed 
[…]. I am bad tempered, irritable, that’s what I have 
inherited from my mother!’ (Giovanna). Similarly Adrian 
says ‘[I have] my Mum’s temperament. She is bad tempered, 
she is not easygoing, and with my father, I also think that 
I have the same character, bad tempered’. Some interviewees 
report at least one episode of domestic violence with their 
partner. Only women talk of violence between the partners. 
In two cases the man is said to have hit his partner, and 
in two cases it is the woman. 
 In spite of theses hierarchical views, on the whole 
either the man, or both partners equally, are said to be 
the head of the family. Half of the men and a quarter of 
the women say the man is in charge. Identifying the man as 
the head of the family shows a conventional and patriarchal 
understanding of gender relations. No man reports the woman 
as the family authority, and the men despise other men who 
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live in subjection to their women, referring to them 
pejoratively refer to them as macabeos. By contrast, around 
two fifths of the interviewees (mostly men) report sharing 
the family authority with their partner. This could entail 
a more egalitarian view of their relationship, though one 
should be cautious as it could be no more than a 
politically correct statement not mirrored in actual 
practices. Half of the women say they have the last word, 
which might speak more to their willingness to assert their 
importance than to their effective power. In fact, none of 
these women have their own economic resources to make 
effective their claims of power, as they are neither the 
main providers, nor are they involved in paid work. 
 Though it is particularly difficult in this matter to 
distinguish between what the young people say and what they 
actually do, the evidence suggests that the young couples 
follow a rather conventional pattern of gender roles. Thus 
women are the authority in the realm of domestic family 
life, whilst men have broader power and autonomy. Women set 
the household routine. Usually meals are the yardstick that 
organises the family schedule. The women set standards for 
accepted behaviour within the home: what can be done and by 
whom. They want everybody to follow set times and rules in 
the home. As Verónica says, ‘I like to have everything 
tidy. I don’t like it if they mess up a bed. I yell! I 
don’t like it when they get everything dirty. I like to 
keep my children clean. I like cleanliness, tidiness, 
order. If they make a mess I get very upset, very annoyed’.  
 As women are in charge of running the house, most 
of them manage the daily family budget. Women usually do 
the shopping, pay the bills, and keep some savings. 
Conversely men do not want and do not like to be involved 
in this kind of responsibility. Men value, and many praise, 
their partners for being good at stretching the family 
budget. Most men keep part of their wages to themselves, 
and hand to their partner the amount that is needed to keep 
the house running. Although women look after the finances 
of the home, they are not in charge of the money. As men 
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are the main providers, they are in a stronger position to 
decide where the money goes. This is particularly so in 
relation to bigger investments such as household appliances 
(a fridge or a washing machine). These purchases need men’s 
approval. As Cristián says, ‘I am the head of the household 
[…]. I take the big decisions, for example where to invest 
the cash. I look after that, I am the one who says OK or 
not’. This gender division in relation to money issues is 
in accordance with previous research on low income families 
in Chile (Raczynski and Serrano 1985). 
 
 
To sum up, the interviewees define women as mothers and 
housewives, and men as breadwinners. In fact, women are in 
charge of running the house and managing the daily family 
budget. Men are the main providers and have the last word 
in relation to more significant expenditures. The 
interviewees also say that daughters and sons are 
different, but complementary. In addition, most 
participants have a rather hierarchical view of their 
relationship as a couple and describe themselves as having 
a rather authoritarian personality. Therefore the findings 
show predominance of conventional views and practices in 
relation to gender roles. In this context, one should be 
wary about discourses of equal gender relations and women’s 
empowerment. I shall now turn to the issue of the 
interviewees’ future expectations for their relationship, 
and whether or not they would like to marry their partner. 
 
 
 
Cohabitation and Marriage  
 
The daily routine is the same as if you were married. (Eugenio) 
 
I wouldn’t get married, no! No! No! Married or not is the same thing, 
it is the same life, the same situation. It won’t change anything! 
(Leocadia). 
 
People don’t give you a dirty look if you are not married. (Pedro). 
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Everywhere they look down on you when you are young and not married. 
(Diana) 
 
I feel that they are almost the same for sure. The practical 
difference is the wedding, that society accepts you in some way […]. 
It is almost an obligation and I don’t like to do things because of 
obligation. We are together because we love each other, because we are 
fond of each other, because of our daughter […], not because the law 
says we have to, no! For me what counts is our relationship, how we 
get along. (Fernando) 
 
Anyway, I would like to get married in the future, when we reach some 
stability, to have our home. If some day I manage to have my own 
house, my own things, then I will think about getting married […], but 
we need to be steadier, to be more stable, to have a home. (Eugenio) 
 
 
 
 
When asked if they would like to marry their partner within 
the next three years, most participants say that they would 
like to carry on living together. However, a significant 
minority say they would want to get married. Thus the 
sample is somehow divided as regards individuals’ desire to 
get married or to carry on living together. Gender, a 
variable that has proved so significant in this research, 
makes no difference here. Participants do however mention 
different features of cohabitation and marriage which help 
us to understand why some would like to continue 
cohabiting, whereas others wish to get married. 
The great majority say that in practice, cohabitation 
is the same as marriage. Indeed, they all refer to their 
partner as their husband or wife. They are also already 
living with their partner and children, so their daily 
routine is similar to that of married couples with 
children. They do not see how marriage might entail any 
change or advantage. For them being a family, i.e. having 
children, is what matters.  
As one woman says, ‘if you live together with someone, 
it is because you are with that person, because you love 
him, you are together because you want to. When I began to 
live together with him I did it to be with him forever!’ 
(Frances). Similarly, Adrian says, ‘I think that convivir 
and being married is the same, there is no difference […]. 
I do the same things, I am a father, I bring in the cash 
for the house, it is the same as being married!’. 
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Although the daily routine of convivir and marriage 
may be the same, t is easier to leave or to end a 
cohabiting relationship than a marriage. Participants think 
it is important that if they split up, they will not have 
to go through the formalities of divorce. Divorce is now 
legal in Chile, and deprived groups do not have to pay 
legal expenses (see Chapter 1). Yet they see divorce as an 
inconvenience which demands time and money.  
Some interviewees also fear that if they divorce they 
will be forced to give part of their property to their ex-
spouse. As they have few assets, they worry about being 
granted housing subsidy and then having to share out their 
house. Some women fear that if they marry, their husband 
could take their children away from them; n particular if 
divorce is the result of the woman having an affair. As one 
woman says, ‘if you are married your husband can take your 
children away from you! If he catches you cheating on him, 
he can take the children’’ (Leocadia). Similarly, a few men 
say that if they marry and then divorce, they would be 
forced to pay maintenance not only for their children, but 
also for their ex-wife.  
In addition, some respondents, especially women, say 
that married men believe that they own their wife. In other 
words, they say that marriage encourages spouses, 
especially husbands, to believe that they have authority 
over their partner. As one woman says, ‘if I marry him, he 
would become my official husband, and I think men get above 
themselves when they marry, they have more power over you, 
and I don’t want that’ (Danae).  
According to them, convivir is more convenient than 
marriage not only because there is no divorce, but also 
because a woman can apply for social benefits as a single 
mother (see Chapter 4). Another aspect highlighted is that 
today there is less discrimination against cohabitation 
(see Chapter 5). Many refer in particular to the 
discrimination previously suffered by children born out of 
wedlock. Today, children of unmarried mothers do not have a 
different birth certificate. They can use both their 
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father’s and mother’s surname, and are less bullied at 
school as a result.  
Whilst people are more open to cohabitation nowadays, 
respondents continue to say that cohabitation is less 
valued than marriage. Several people, women in particular, 
report that they have been embarrassed because they are not 
married. As Dalila says, ‘I think it doesn’t look good to 
live together […]. People ask you, “who is he? Is he your 
husband?” And you have to answer, “no, he is my pareja 
[partner]”. It looks terrible!’. Giovanna also says, ‘for 
people [in general] it is not moral to live together 
without marrying. The moral thing is to be married. 
“Finally, that immoral [couple] have got married!”, people 
say things like that’. 
They say they have been frowned upon when dealing with 
formal institutions because they are not married. Diana 
describes what happened to her in dealing with the town 
council: ‘I talked about my husband, and the guy who was 
helping me was very nasty, and he said to me, “you are not 
married, so you can’t say that”. I answered, “but anyway he 
is my partner, it is the same thing”. And he replied, “not 
here, here it is very different”’.  
The fact that marriage is more valued than 
cohabitation affects whether the young people want to get 
married or not. Some say they want to get married precisely 
as a way of gaining social recognition for their 
relationship. Others reject marriage because they want to 
keep their relationship a private matter. Thus a key aspect 
which divides them is the visibility involved in marriage. 
Civil and religious marriage involve a ceremony and, 
typically, a wedding party, which ‘must be seen to be done’ 
(Reibstein and Richards 1992:44). If cohabitees get 
married, their relationship will become visible in social 
and institutional terms. 
Some participants actively seek such recognition. 
Explaining why his partner wants to get married, Iván says, 
‘she sees it as a way of getting acknowledgement; society 
looks at it differently. In addition you can have a 
celebration so you can share it with your family and 
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children’. Similarly, Diana says, ‘now our anniversary is 
only for the two of us, because nobody else remembers it. 
Today it is a greeting and nothing else. It would be nice, 
we could do something, like having a dinner, everybody 
would remember it. It would be more important’. 
However, others do not want to get married because 
marriage is both a social event and a social obligation. 
They say that what they like the most about living together 
is that cohabitation is a private, intimate decision. For 
them, if a couple chooses to live together, the parents, 
the state, and the church do not have a part in that 
decision. As Cristián explains, ‘marriage I think is a 
contract! But you can also do a deal by word and it is more 
valid than one that is signed. Both involve obligations, 
but the difference is that I impose them on myself, nobody 
imposes them on me. I accept them because I wanted to, not 
because anybody forced me to […]. In the future I would 
like to keep living together with my partner. We made a 
marriage pact or deal, but without any contract, church, or 
party. Without any of that, we decided it between the two 
of us, that we would stay together, and that we are going 
to pull through, together the two of us, and our son. It 
was a verbal agreement between her and me’.  
 Getting married is an expensive enterprise. Civil and 
religious fees have to be paid. The wedding party and the 
bride’s dress are expensive too. The expenses of marriage 
are cited by some interviewees as a barrier to marriage. As 
Paulina explains, if she eventually marries her partner, 
she would only have a civil marriage. ‘The civil marriage 
is not as big as the party for a religious marriage would 
be. If you have a civil marriage, you don’t need to do a 
party at night, you could just have a lunch, so you can 
keep it simple. I wouldn’t need to have a wedding dress 
with a long train, as I would like!’. 
They also refer to difficulties faced in their 
relationship as a hurdle to getting married. If we analyse 
the desire to get married according to difficulties, it 
becomes clear that the couple’s hardships make them 
cautious about marriage. Those who do not want to get 
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married report more problems such as economic hardship, 
affairs, heavy drinking, domestic violence, and use of 
illegal drugs. 
When interviewees feel that their relationship is 
facing significant difficulties, they are less willing to 
formalize it. As Elaine, who has been living with a partner 
who has had two affairs, reports, ‘I say to tie the knot 
and to live together is the same. When you get married you 
just sign some papers. Above all because of what happened! 
[her partner’s affairs] I don’t feel sure yet. I love him. 
Nobody knows what can happen. It’s better to live together, 
its better to carry on living together’. 
Differences in religious and political affiliations 
might also lead to tensions as well as difficulties if 
cohabitees wish to marry in the future. Religious 
differences certainly suggest that religious marriage would 
become a contested issue, even if participants tend to say 
that religion is presently irrelevant to them. As one man 
says, ‘she [his partner] is and evangelical, and I am 
Catholic, and we stop there. If both of us had been 
Catholic, we would’ve married long ago’ (Mauricio). Another 
man, who is not religious, says ‘I’ve already told [his 
partner] that we are not going to get married, because I 
don’t believe in marriage. I don’t believe in the Catholic 
Church or, in fact, in any other Church!’ (Cristián). Some 
respondents are critical of the Catholic Church because of 
recent child sexual abuse scandals involving Catholic 
priests. As one man says, ‘I used to be Catholic, but then 
you realize the things that were going on. You don’t want 
to believe in anything again’ (Celio). 
Marriage would enhance the visibility of current 
partnerships. On the one hand, increased visibility means 
that relationships would be subject to more social scrutiny 
(Laumann, Gagnon et al. 1994:232). On the other hand, it is 
easier to make a relationship more visible if it fits with 
each partner’s original social network and family of origin 
(Laumann, Gagnon et al. 1994:236). Hence, it is easier to 
marry someone who is compatible with both partners’ 
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original social networks.  Although parents might tolerate 
cohabitation, marriage usually requires parental support.  
Parental support helps couples meet the expenses of 
marriage, including the civil and religious formalities. It 
should be noted that in Chile, both religious (usually 
Catholic) and civil wedding ceremonies require the presence 
of witnesses. Parents traditionally take that role, 
especially in the case of a religious wedding. Accordingly, 
a ‘proper’ wedding is not possible if one set of parents 
reject or do not approve of the partner. This is 
illustrated by Paulina, who ran away from the parental 
home. ‘My father was very upset when I left home with my 
partner. He doesn’t like my partner. So it was worse when I 
left to live with him. My father and my partner don’t talk 
to each other […]. I don’t like marriage, marriage should 
be something beautiful and I know that probably it won’t be 
like that for me, because maybe my father is not going to 
be present’. 
The interviewees who want to get married plan to do so 
when they have their own home. They did not marry when they 
conceived or when their first child was born. But they 
expect to get married when they become home owners. Being 
home owners signals that they are settled as a couple and 
as a family. As one woman says, ‘I think that [we will get 
married] when we become more stable, when we can live in 
peace in our own house, then I will start thinking about 
marriage’ (Giovanna). 
 
 
To summarize, most interviewees would prefer to carry on 
living together rather than marrying. But a significant 
proportion say they wish to get married within three years. 
Respondents believe that even though cohabitation is now 
tolerated, marriage holds higher social status. They face 
difficulties in getting married. The cost, the lack of 
parental support, and problems in their relationship make 
them wary of marriage. Marriage also offers more visibility 
to their relationships. There is also an incipient 
discourse against marriage, as an old-fashioned institution 
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which perpetuates the power of the church, the state, and 
the parents. 
 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
 
Most interviewees say they wish to be with their partner 
because they are in love and have a trusting relationship. 
They also say that having children has given them a reason 
to live together, and that they would like to have a close 
relationship with their children. However, their accounts, 
especially the women’s, also challenge these stereotypical 
views of love and children. Women are less satisfied with 
their partners than are men, and motherhood has brought 
unexpected difficulties and mixed feelings. Most women are 
housewives, not involved in paid work, who look after their 
children single-handedly.  Women’s social bonds are mostly 
limited to interactions with relatives (see Chapter 4). 
Having children increases their isolation from other social 
ties, other than within their own family, as they have to 
stay at home looking after their children. In addition most 
live as allegados, which is a living arrangement 
characterised by difficult relationships (see Chapter 4). 
Thus having children and living as allegados enhance 
women’s focus on family ties, yet these bonds, at this 
point in the women’s lives at least, are rather strained. 
Therefore women might become even more dependent on their 
partner for social recognition. One should therefore weigh 
discourses about love in relation to actual living 
conditions and the availability of alternatives.  
Discourses of love are also contested by interviewees’ 
rather hierarchical view of their partnership. They expect 
one partner to have the last word, and both women and men 
give a rather authoritarian verbal portrait.  Domestic 
violence against at least one partner is often already 
present. Authoritarian traits are also present in parenting 
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styles. Thus the findings suggest a more complex scenario 
than simple male authoritarian predominance, or machismo.  
The costs of marriage are a hurdle for respondents. As 
personal choices based on mutual affection are becoming 
more relevant, weddings now have greater relevance, as they 
convey the uniqueness of a relationship (Reibstein and 
Richards 1992:43). But weddings are expensive, and most 
people realize that they can only afford something simple. 
A proper wedding involves the bride wearing a white dress 
to church, followed by a wedding party at night. The civil 
wedding is considered less glitzy, meaning also not as 
visible, yet more affordable. The fact that getting married 
is expensive helps to increase the influence of older 
generations, especially parents, over younger generations’ 
capacity to marry. 
For interviewees, cohabitation is similar to marriage. 
They say that their daily routine is similar to that of a 
married couple with children, and believe that cohabitation 
involves sexual exclusivity and children. Furthermore, 
respondents refer to their partner as husband or wife. 
Cohabitation does not challenge conventional views on 
gender. Women are expected to be mothers and housewives. 
Men should be breadwinners, and they belong in the outside 
world. In fact, men are mostly the main earners, so they 
have more power. Therefore men have more resources to 
impose their willpower, in spite of contended discourses 
about who is the head of the family.  
Although cohabitation and marriage are seen to be 
similar, it is also acknowledged that they are not the 
same. Cohabitation is less visible than marriage. If 
cohabitees got married, the visibility of their 
relationship would be enhanced, and so it would be 
subjected to increased social scrutiny. The partner would 
also be required to fit into the social network of the 
other partner. Thus making a partnership more visible 
demands higher similarity with the institutions of origin 
of each partner, in particular with their families.  
The family of origin embodies a particular arrangement 
of diverse social features, such as social class, religion, 
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race, and political orientation. Hence, having the support 
of the family of origin, especially parents, becomes 
crucial for getting married. The visibility of marriage 
explains why those more reluctant to marry are those who 
report more difficulties with their partner, those with 
less religious and political homogamy, and those who lack 
parental support.  
Most respondents say that their reasons for wanting to 
continue cohabiting do not include being against marriage; 
although some, mostly relatively better-off men, do say 
this. This group says that they reject marriage because 
they themselves and their partners are the only ones who 
should decide about their relationship. They see marriage 
as an intervention of the state and the church in their 
personal lives. In practice, decisions about marriage and 
cohabitation are intertwined with several factors which 
play out at different levels. These decisions do not take 
place in a social vacuum: they have a history.  
The following chapter, which presents the conclusions 
of this study, brings together the elements that this 
research has shown to be relevant for explaining why 
interviewees began to cohabit, and why some wish to get 
married whilst others do not.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
This research aimed to answer three questions about 
unmarried cohabitation among young people from low income 
groups in Chile. First, to understand, from the point of 
view of those actually cohabiting, what kind of arrangement 
unmarried cohabitation is. Second, to identify the factors 
that prompt unmarried cohabitation among the group studied. 
The final question was that of why unmarried cohabitation 
among this group has significantly increased in Chile since 
the last decade of the twentieth century. In this 
concluding chapter, I first analyse the findings of this 
research for each of these questions. In doing this I also 
relate the findings of this research with previous 
literature on unmarried cohabitation in Latin America. The 
aim is twofold. First, to ponder the gathered evidence in 
the light of available literature. Second, to highlight how 
this research might contribute to current debates on 
unmarried cohabitation and families in Latin America. Next 
I analyse some policy implications of this research, and 
finally I suggest lines that future research on this topic 
might usefully take. 
 
 
Scholarship has described unmarried cohabitation in Latin 
America as similar to marriage, yet entailing less sexual 
exclusivity (see Chapter 2). Unmarried cohabitation is 
widely regarded as a surrogate marriage of the poor, 
involving conventional gender roles and having children. As 
deprived groups face greater difficulties and barriers to 
formal marriage, they have no choice but to live together 
informally. As an informal arrangement, unmarried 
cohabitation is believed to be in tune with the active and 
informal sexuality described for low income groups (see 
Chapter 2). Unmarried cohabitation is also related to race, 
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as in Latin America coloured populations are predominantly 
lower class (see Chapter 2). 
 The findings of this study show that even though 
unmarried cohabitation is similar to marriage, unmarried 
cohabitation and marriage are not the same. The evidence 
gathered here shows that is not sexual exclusivity but 
social invisibility what sets unmarried cohabitation apart 
from marriage (see Chapter 7). If we turn first to a 
consideration of the similarities, we see that according to 
the interviewees cohabitation is like marriage, inasmuch as 
both involve living together, having children, and sexual 
exclusivity (see Chapters 6 and 7). Cohabitation is not 
experienced as a loose sexual arrangement, although 
interviewees say that affairs are somehow less condemned 
for cohabitees than for spouses (see Chapter 6). Similarly, 
the main reason cohabitees give for living together is 
being in love, though this is entangled with wanting to 
leave the parental home as a way of gaining autonomy and 
social status. Among the young people in this study, at 
least, cohabitation reproduces conventional gender roles 
rather than challenging them. The interviewees refer to 
their partners as husband or wife; most of the women are 
mothers and housewives, and most of the men are 
breadwinners.  
Even though cohabitation and marriage are experienced 
as similar, this research shows that they are not the same 
(see Chapter 7). Cohabitation has layers of complexity that 
make it more (or other) than merely a surrogate marriage of 
the poor. Crucially cohabitation is different from marriage 
in that it is less socially visible. As cohabitation is not 
institutionalised it remains concealed from both social 
recognition and social scrutiny. As cohabitation is subject 
to less social surveillance than marriage, it allows having 
a relationship with a rather dissimilar partner. As a de 
facto relationship, cohabitation does not entail any social 
ceremony or rite. The wedding ceremony, whether civil or 
religious, is what sets marriage apart from cohabitation.  
This research is based on a sample of cohabiting young 
people from low income groups. Accordingly, it focuses on 
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people who belong to a similar social background (see 
Chapter 3). Nevertheless, the study’s findings show that 
cohabiting partners are rather dissimilar in terms of their 
religious beliefs, political affiliation, and social 
prestige (see Chapter 7). The empirical evidence amassed in 
this study shows that cohabitation among people of a 
similar social class or strata is a kind of partnership 
which tolerates partners who are rather dissimilar. As 
cohabitation is less visible than marriage, partners do not 
need to fit in so well with their partner’s social network 
or family of origin. These differences mean that it is 
challenging to incorporate one partner into the family of 
origin of the other partner. Likewise, interviewees facing 
significant difficulties in their relationship are wary of 
getting married. This difficulty can arise in regard to 
just one partner, or to both. Thus even though in day to 
day practice cohabitation resembles marriage, cohabitation 
is an inter-personal arrangement which does not entail the 
same social status nor attract the same levels of social 
control as marriage. 
Therefore this research advances an understanding of 
cohabitation as a mode of living together that is suitable 
not only for those who are status unequal, or who belong to 
different social classes. Cohabitation also becomes 
relevant for those who have a similar socio-economic 
background, yet are different in other attributes such as 
religious beliefs, political affiliation, and social 
reputation. Cohabitation as a type of partnership that 
allows for partners holding different religious beliefs 
appears as particularly relevant.  
 
 
 
 
What factors spark cohabitation? In Chapter 2 I reviewed 
drivers of cohabitation in Latin America identified by 
scholarship. Now I will ponder the adequacy of each of 
those explanations in the light of the evidence produced by 
this research. Next I will reflect on how social changes 
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that have taken place in Chile in the last decades, might 
have affected these factors bringing about a sharp increase 
in cohabitation. Therefore at this stage my analysis does 
not seek to account for rising cohabitation, but for the 
immediate determinants of it. Later on I shall relate these 
immediate determinants to changing social conditions in 
order to explain why cohabitation has been climbing over 
the last two decades. 
Scholarship has identified five factors that prompt 
unmarried cohabitation in Latin America. These factors are 
(i) pregnancy; (ii) parental intervention; (iii) the 
material costs of marriage (class inequalities); (iv) 
machismo (gender inequalities); and (v) a strong mother-son 
bond. Studies on kinship state that cohabitation is 
prompted by pregnancy because if a woman gets pregnant she 
is expected to live with her partner (see Chapter 2). 
Previous research shows how parents believe that daughters 
should only leave the parental home in order to live with 
the father of their children. Former studies have also 
shown that in Latin America marriage holds a higher status 
than cohabitation, thus parents would prefer their daughter 
to marry her partner. However the expenses of marriage pose 
a significant hurdle for low income couples, so unmarried 
cohabitation is tolerated as a second best.  
The expense of marriage is also highlighted by 
research that links unmarried cohabitation to the colonial 
past of the region (see Chapter 2). In this view unmarried 
cohabitation was produced in colonial times by a 
hierarchical racial sexual order, which limited marriage to 
the white elite. Marriage was thus a form of union for 
those who were status equal and with enough means to afford 
it. By contrast, white men developed informal partnerships, 
such as unmarried cohabitation, with coloured women. This 
intensive racial mixing between white men and coloured 
women brought about a distinctive mixed race population 
(mestizos).  
In this view unmarried cohabitation has remained 
significant to the present day as the region continues to 
be riddled by social inequalities. Class and race are still 
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clearly intertwined in the region, and informal 
partnerships might continue to be favoured by inter-class 
sexual relationships. However inter-class coupling is 
believed to be less frequent nowadays. Thus this 
scholarship links unmarried cohabitation to class 
inequalities underscoring that only those who are better 
off can afford marriage. Deprived groups have to content 
themselves with living together informally, as they do not 
have enough means to get married.  
Gender inequalities is the fourth factor prompting 
unmarried cohabitation in the region (see Chapter 2). 
Machismo is seen as the hallmark of gender relations in 
Latin America. As said before, authors have related 
machismo to the colonial past of the region, to the 
formation of independent nation states, and to popular 
religiosity (see Chapter 2). In this scholarship men, in 
particular lower class men, are believed to reject marriage 
as it would curtail their sexual promiscuousness. 
The last factor explaining unmarried cohabitation in 
Latin America, is prevalence of a strong mother-son bond 
(see Chapter 2). Kinship research has highlighted that 
blood ties are dominant in the region, and that the mother-
son bond is particularly close. Marriage, as the strongest 
sexual alliance, is at odds with this blood-based kinship 
system. Because of this significant mother-son attachment 
it is difficult for sons to marry and to leave the parental 
home so as to set up an independent home. 
Evidence gathered by this research shows that 
pregnancy, parental intervention, the expenses of marriage, 
and/or a close mother-son bond are present in cases of 
unmarried cohabitation among young low income couples in 
Chile. This study did not find evidence supporting 
unmarried cohabitation as a form of partnership entailing 
increased gender inequality per se. In what follows I will 
zoom in on each of these five factors.  
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Pregnancy 
 
Most interviewees say that they started to cohabit as a 
direct outcome of pregnancy (see Chapter 6). Pregnancy 
among the interviewees happened relatively early; on 
average women were aged 19 at their first birth (see 
Chapter 6). The findings of this study suggest that 
conventional views about gender and sexuality, working at 
different levels in a context of limited opportunities, 
might prompt early pregnancy. At one level almost all 
parents of the interviewees reject pre-marital sex, 
especially in the case of daughters (see Chapter 6). As 
parents reject pre-marital sex they do not provide advice 
or help for their children in relation to contraception. 
Additionally, most female participants say that they dated 
in secret, as teenage daughters are subjected to more 
parental control than their brothers (see Chapter 6). 
Dating in secret adds to the difficulties of obtaining 
effective contraception. Interviewees also report that 
daughters are considered to have greater family obligations 
than sons (see Chapter 5). Parents of interviewees did not 
encourage their daughters to achieve autonomy through 
further studies or paid work.  
Female interviewees say they were looking forward to 
having a relationship and having children. Their interviews 
also record how as teenagers they wished to have a male 
partner with whom to become a mother, to allow them to 
leave the parental home and gain autonomy and social 
status. Indeed, most female participants left the parental 
home at a younger age than male interviewees. Male 
participants also value having children, since becoming 
fathers signals their status as adults. Furthermore young 
people facing difficulties or tensions in the parental home 
show a stronger desire to leave it earlier. 
Unsurprisingly, given that most participants reported 
wanting to have children, the young people in the study did 
not practice effective contraception for pre-cohabiting 
sex. Their conventional views about sex also contributed to 
discouraging pre-cohabitation birth control. Most women 
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report that to have used contraception would have meant 
that they were neither in love with nor committed to their 
male partner. Similarly, most men say that they disliked 
using condoms, as they limited their sexual pleasure.  
At the macro level, the health care system is also 
informed by conventional views on sexuality and 
reproduction, since abortion is illegal and birth control 
policies are focused on mothers and not on young people who 
want to avoid pregnancy (see Chapter 1). This is 
illustrated by the interviewees’ reports on how difficult 
it was to get free contraception at local doctors’ 
surgeries as teenagers (see Chapter 6).  
This research therefore suggests that having children 
is more unplanned than unexpected, as interviewees 
themselves frequently report. The findings indicate that 
for young people of low income groups, becoming a parent is 
in fact highly valued. As set out above, several factors 
influence their wish to become parents. It ought to be no 
surprise, then, that in Chile teenage fertility shows no 
signs of decline (Larrañaga 2006a). Young people were 
actively looking forward to having children, even if they 
could not say so (see Chapter 6). Living in a context of 
parents and family planning policies that seem hostile to 
pre-marital sex might help to explain why most teenage 
pregnancies, especially among low income groups, are 
reported as unplanned (see Chapter 6). That abortion is 
illegal in Chile further contributes to carrying on with a 
pregnancy, even if it is unwanted. 
 
 
Parental intervention 
 
Once pregnancy happens, parental power is generally 
exercised according to one of two common scenarios leading 
to unmarried cohabitation (see Chapter 5). The most 
frequent of these among study respondents is an absence of 
parental interference. Later on I will show how this lack 
of parental intervention may be key in explaining why 
unmarried cohabitation is rising in Chile. Though the 
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parents regretted their children becoming pregnant, they 
neither encouraged nor discouraged marriage. Thus most 
parents tolerate unmarried cohabitation, and a few even 
support it as a trial phase. Indeed that the parents of the 
interviewees accept unmarried cohabitation is illustrated 
by the fact that most study participants live in one or 
other parental home as allegados (see Chapter 4).  
A second scenario leading to cohabitation is that once 
pregnancy happens parents, fathers in particular, forbid 
their daughters to continue living in the parental home. 
Thus the daughter either runs away or is thrown out of the 
parental home and starts to live with her partner. This 
kind of parental reaction is described by participants as 
typical of previous generations. Even though this situation 
was not particularly common in this study, other evidence 
suggests that it might not be unusual in Chile. Figures 
show that the majority of married mothers living as 
allegadas do so in the household of their own parents. By 
contrast, most unmarried cohabiting mothers live in the 
parental house of their male partner (Larrañaga 2006a: 
Footnote 22). Nonetheless, as we saw in chapter 4, there 
are also specific practical considerations operating to 
determine where young couples live.  
 
 
 
Expenses of marriage 
 
As pregnancy happens relatively early, young people are 
often still dependant on their family of origin when 
pregnancy occurs. Most interviewees are school dropouts and 
face a low quality labour market with widespread short-term 
or intermittent employment (see Chapter 4). In addition, as 
most couples assume conventional gender roles, usually only 
the man is involved in paid work. This combination of few 
qualifications, low quality jobs, and a situation in which 
only one partner provides for the new family means that 
support from parents or family of origin is essential in 
order to survive. This in turn places the parents of the 
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young people in the study in a position of power, enabling 
them to influence how the young people start their new 
family, whether through marriage or cohabitation.  
The wedding ceremony is the event which sets marriage 
apart from any other sexual relationship and makes it 
socially visible, as was said before. For the interviewees 
a ‘proper’ wedding is understood to mean a religious 
ceremony, with the bride dressed in white at the church, 
and a party at night. Getting married is therefore 
expensive, as it involves paying both civil and religious 
fees as well as being able to afford the bride’s dress and 
the wedding party. Figures of unmarried cohabitation in 
Chile show that it is indeed related to class inequalities, 
as unmarried cohabitation is more prevalent among middle-
low and low income groups (see Chapter 1). Therefore 
parental support and assistance seem to be vital if young 
couples are going to be able to meet the financial and 
formal requirements of marriage.  
 
 
Mother-son bond 
 
This research also found evidence of a close mother-son 
bond. The interviewees report how their parents, especially 
their mothers, favoured sons over daughters (see Chapter 
5). Men are described as mamones, by both women and by men 
themselves. In Chile to be called a mamón means, literally, 
a man who still suckles from his mother. The firstborn son 
seems to enjoy more privileges than any other sibling. 
Because of this strong mother-son attachment men delay 
leaving the parental home. This close mother-son bond also 
means that the relationship between the daughter-in-law and 
the mother-in-law is particularly problematic. Further 
evidence of the relevance of this mother-son bond is that 
figures show that in Chile most unmarried cohabiting women 
live in the parental home of their partner (see Chapter 1).  
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Machismo 
 
By contrast this research found little or no evidence to 
support the view that cohabitation is an arrangement 
favourable to the exacerbated masculinity of the macho 
archetype. This study showed no gender differences in young 
people’s self-reporting in relation to their wish to get 
married in the near future (see Chapter 7). If cohabitation 
is a kind of partnership that suits men, most male 
interviewees would have preferred to carry on living 
together, while female interviewees would have preferred to 
marry. This is not the case. In addition, as previously 
said, participants of both genders report expecting sexual 
exclusivity from their cohabiting partner.  
That this research did not find evidence of unmarried 
cohabitation being related to gender inequality is 
puzzling. As was said in the Introduction, figures show 
that domestic violence is related to unmarried 
cohabitation, even after taking into account diverse socio 
economic factors. One possible explanation could be 
associated with the fact that unmarried cohabitation allows 
for dissimilar partners. In fact unmarried cohabiting 
couples tend to be more dissimilar than married ones in 
relation to religion, age, and education (see Chapter 1). 
Differences in relation to educational attainment and age 
group also speak of a rather asymmetric relationship.  
Although this research focused on people with a 
homogeneous socioeconomic background, the interviewees were 
rather different to their partners in relation to religious 
and political affiliation, and to social reputation (see 
Chapter 7). Therefore differences between cohabitees, 
rather than unmarried cohabitation itself, might increase 
the probabilities of domestic violence. Hence unmarried 
cohabitation per se does not need to entail increased 
gender inequality. In fact this study found that those 
interviewees, both women and men, who were more reluctant 
to marry, were the ones who reported more problems in their 
relationship (see Chapter 7). It should be highlighted that 
research linking unmarried cohabitation to increased gender 
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inequality is only based on women, married and cohabiting, 
and does not take into account their male partners (Castro 
Martín, Martín García et al. 2008).  
There is also some literature that sees unmarried 
cohabitation as an act of resistance of poor women towards 
patriarchal marriage (see Chapter 2). Indeed this research 
found evidence that might support this stance, as many 
female interviewees say that they do not want to marry 
their partner. These women say they fear that their male 
partner would become authoritarian, could take advantage of 
their few assets, or could take their children away (see 
Chapter 7).  
In pre-1990s Chile marriage was clearly patriarchal, 
as the wife was under the formal authority of the husband, 
who was also responsible for the marital property (see 
Chapter 1). However, modifications introduced in that 
decade and the subsequent one limited the husband’s 
authority (see Chapter 1). Today, husbands cannot embark on 
any transaction involving the marriage’s communal property 
without the wife’s approval. In cases of separation, 
children stay with their mother. Accordingly, many of the 
formal reasons given by female interviewees to justify 
cohabitation do not today apply in practice. Therefore it 
seems that these claims are indeed rationalizations, and 
not acts of resistance, in the face of the difficulties 
which can impede the formalisation of a partnership. 
 
 
On the whole, the evidence provided by this research 
validates the conclusion that pregnancy, parental 
intervention, the expenses of marriage, and a close mother-
son bond are the immediate factors in prompting unmarried 
cohabitation. Yet it is difficult to conclude from 
exploratory research like this which factor(s) may be 
prevalent. However, it seems that parental influence could 
be the most relevant aspect. On the one hand, fathers’ 
power over their daughters could spark cohabitation through 
throwing them out onto the street if they get pregnant, or 
not forcing them into marriage. On the other hand, mothers’ 
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close attachment to their sons translates into men being 
less willing to enter into marriage. In both cases, through 
different mechanisms, parents exert a significant influence 
on young people’s form of partnership. Likewise, parents 
are key in providing financial aid to help cover the 
material costs of marriage. Next I will develop a tentative 
explanation as to why cohabitation started to rise in Chile 
in the 1990s, which is the third research question that 
guided this study. In particular I will try to interpret 
rising unmarried cohabitation by relating it to the changes 
taking place in Chile at that time having to do with the 
end of the Pinochet dictatorship.  
Scholarship on unmarried cohabitation gives two 
explanations as to why it might show a sharp increase. In 
the case of Latin America, rising unmarried cohabitation 
has been understood as an outcome of growing poverty and 
income inequality (see Chapter 2). Thus during economic 
crises unmarried cohabitation is expected to climb. By 
contrast, periods of economic bonanza are related to the 
prevalence of marriage. However, increased poverty and 
income inequality cannot account for the recent rise in 
unmarried cohabitation in Chile. As was shown before, 
unmarried cohabitation climbed during a period of 
significant economic growth (see Chapter 1). This economic 
growth went hand in hand with an absolute decline of 
poverty and stable (not growing) income inequality. Thus in 
fact occurred the opposite of what this perspective would 
have predicted: unmarried cohabitation rose as poverty 
declined and income inequality was, at least, not getting 
worse. 
A second explanation for rising unmarried cohabitation 
comes from high income countries, in the form of the second 
demographic transition (SDT) (see Chapter 2). In this view 
unmarried cohabitation is linked to debates on modernity 
and modernization. The SDT states that unmarried 
cohabitation is an outcome of increased individual autonomy 
and consumerism, and, particularly, of female emancipation 
(see Chapter 2). Heightened individual autonomy goes hand 
in hand with higher demands for self-fulfilment and an 
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adult-centred orientation. Thus the focus is on the quality 
of the couple’s relationship rather than on childbearing. 
This theory states that since people today impose higher 
expectations upon marriage, unmarried cohabitation gives 
the opportunity to test a relationship. As unmarried 
cohabitation is a manifestation of personal autonomy, it 
rejects institutional intervention such as that performed 
by the state or the church. I will come back to this 
perspective later on, once I have analysed the outcomes of 
this research. 
The evidence gathered here suggests that rising 
unmarried cohabitation among low income groups in Chile is 
an outcome of three drivers: (i) declining patriarchy; (ii) 
social welfare’s focus on the single mother; (iii) 
increased relevance of the wedding. 
 
 
Declining patriarchy 
 
The reports of the interviewees show that parental roles 
have become more affectionate and less authoritarian, as 
children are gaining social recognition (see Chapter 5). If 
pregnancy happens parents, fathers in particular, are 
becoming less inclined to either force their daughters into 
marriage, or to throw them out of the parental home. In 
fact, none of the female interviewees were forced into 
marriage when they got pregnant. By contrast, many 
interviewees report how their mothers and grandmothers were 
forced to marry due to pregnancy (see Chapter 5). In fact, 
those interviewees whose mothers were forced into marriage 
report that those mothers did not want their children to go 
through the same experience (see Chapter 5). There is no 
reliable data about how widespread enforced marriage is 
today or was for previous generations. Nevertheless it 
seems likely that historically it was not unusual, given 
that marriage has, to date, been the prevalent form of 
partnership in Chile (see Chapter 1).   
Likewise, most female interviewees were not thrown out 
onto the street as a consequence of premarital pregnancy. 
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Yet a few women did run away from the parental home, 
because they feared their fathers retaliation. Historical 
evidence from Chile supports the conclusion that daughters 
risked being thrown out onto the street due to having pre- 
marital sex or to becoming pregnant (see Chapter 2). 
However, it seems that enforced marriage should have been, 
or still is, the most common of the two scenarios. In fact 
in Chile marriage predominates even among low income groups 
(see Chapter 1). 
It is impossible to conclude definitively from an 
exploratory study such as the present one whether the 
relative frequency of the two scenarios described is 
changing at a broader social level. Yet the study’s 
findings do seem to suggest an attitudinal change among low 
income parents such that a daughter’s unexpected pregnancy, 
even with a disliked male partner, does not necessarily 
entail forcing her into marriage or throwing her out of the 
parental home. As enforced marriage was more frequent than 
throwing a daughter out of the parental home, unmarried 
cohabitation started to increase.  
 The evidence of this research suggests that parents 
began to stop intervening in their children’s form of 
sexual partnership even before the introduction of 
legislation limiting parental authority. Legislation on 
domestic violence was introduced in 1994, at a time when 
cohabitation was already rising (see Chapter 1). This new 
legal framework most probably backed existing or emerging 
parental reluctance to enforce marriage and to throw 
daughters into the street. Something similar happened with 
legislation giving equal rights to children born out of 
wedlock, which was enacted in 1999.  
The fact that legislation on domestic violence and the 
new paternity law followed and reinforced rather than 
prompted cohabitation does not mean that the rise in 
cohabitation is not related to it. Indeed the return of 
democracy brought in its wake a general atmosphere of 
enhanced freedom and autonomy after almost two decades of 
authoritarian rule. In relation to family life, it may be 
that this less authoritarian context meant that parents 
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moved faster towards a less patriarchal relationship with 
their children. Similarly, young people may have felt more 
empowered to assert their own views in relation to union 
formation. 
 As it seems plausible to state that unmarried 
cohabitation has increased due to declining enforced 
marriage, rising cohabitation may mirror declining 
patriarchy. It should be highlighted that declining 
patriarchy (enforced marriage) does not need to entail 
increased female emancipation or gender equality. As said 
previously, even though in Chile female employment has 
increased from the 1990s onwards, it is affected by 
education and having a male partner (see Chapter 1). 
Women’s participation in paid work shows a positive 
relation to educational attainment and a negative 
association with having a male partner, formal or informal. 
As cohabiting women tend to have less formal education and 
they do have a male partner, they are less involved in paid 
work than single mothers are (see Chapter 1). 
 Furthermore the findings of this research reveal 
pervasive conventional gender roles among the interviewees 
(see Chapter 6). In particular this research found evidence 
to support the view that femininity and masculinity are 
structured in relation to the bifurcation of social space 
between the house (la casa) and the street (la calle). As 
literature on gender asserts, in Latin America la casa and 
la calle define actual symbolic spaces for women and men 
(see Chapter 2). As is shown in Chapter 7, all 
interviewees, women and men, believe that the home is the 
place for the woman; and most women define themselves as 
home-loving. Likewise, men are believed, and believe 
themselves, to belong outside, to the street. The evidence 
gathered here suggests that women are in charge of running 
the house and looking after the children. Women are also in 
charge of managing the family budget, but men maintain 
their power, as most are the breadwinners.  
As cohabiting women show a rather low involvement in 
the labour force, and interviewees reports record 
predominance of conventional gender roles, it is difficult 
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to see how cohabitation could challenge male dominance. In 
other words, these findings suggest that cohabitation 
follows rather than challenges conventional gender roles, 
and so it does not entail female emancipation. 
 
 
Social welfare and the single mother 
 
This tendency of decreased enforced marriage coincided with 
changes in social welfare which facilitated cohabitation, 
however unintentionally (see Chapter 1). These changes 
constitute a focus on unmarried mothers and the expansion 
of social welfare coverage. Targeting the single mother 
started under the military regime and was enhanced by post 
authoritarian governments of the Concertación. The 
Concertación also expanded social welfare coverage. As a 
consequence marriage is no longer the privileged form of 
access to social security for women/mothers not in formal 
employment. 
Under the military regime, neoliberal ideas adopted in 
the 1980s targeted social welfare only for the poorest of 
the poor. The introduction of targeting meant that -
unmarried mothers not in formal employment began to receive 
some social benefits, such as family allowance (SUF). 
Likewise the introduction of a basic state pension (PASIS) 
again meant a great benefit for unmarried women, at least 
in theory. Many unmarried women not in formal employment 
did not in practice receive the new benefits, at a time 
when social spending was also being slashed in the context 
of structural adjustment. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, as democracy returned, 
the first Concertación government laid the foundations of 
the coalition’s welfare provision policies. Subsequent 
governments focused on expanding the coverage and quality 
of welfare. Concertación governments did not challenge the 
logic of targeting. Rather, they defined some groups among 
the poor, such as women and children, as being more 
vulnerable; and significantly increased social spending. 
Therefore as democracy returned, unmarried mothers not in 
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formal employment began to be genuinely favoured by social 
welfare, in particular by housing policies.  
In practice interviewees, especially women, report 
that they have more chances of receiving the housing 
subsidy if they apply as single mothers (see Chapter 4). 
They also report that cohabitation is more beneficial than 
marriage in this regard, since if they were married only 
one spouse could apply for the housing subsidy while the 
other would be prevented from doing so. They and their 
children are also given access to free health care as 
indigents in the state health system (FONASA). Thus it 
seems that once young people are already cohabiting, 
changes in social policies favouring solo parents might be 
an incentive to carry on like that. In support of this 
interpretation, many participants say that they would only 
like to get married once they have received the housing 
subsidy and moved to their own accommodation (see Chapter 
7). 
 
 
Romantic love and the wedding 
 
The idea of romantic love seems to be much more relevant 
than is acknowledged by previous literature on union 
formation in Chile and Latin America (see Chapter 2). In 
this literature, union formation among low income groups is 
seen as driven by instrumental rather than romantic 
reasons. The findings of this study show that instrumental 
reasons such as the desire to leave the parental home 
remain relevant (see Chapter 6). Nonetheless most 
interviewees, and particularly men, say that the main 
reason for remaining with their current partner is that 
they love each other (see Chapter 7). Thus the evidence 
suggests that union formation is at least framed by 
discourses of romantic love. However, the fact that love is 
increasingly quoted as the main reason to form a 
partnership does not of course mean that other reasons have 
become irrelevant. 
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As the idealisation of romantic love has become more 
widespread, the wedding has become if anything more 
relevant. As said before, a ‘proper’ wedding entails a 
religious ceremony, the bride dressed in white at the 
church, and a party at night (see Chapter 7). The wedding 
is expected to show to everybody the unique relationship of 
the spouses to be. As expectations about the wedding have 
increased, weddings have become a bigger issue, and, 
probably, more expensive. If this is the case, this could 
explain why even in a context of economic bonanza, marriage 
is becoming less frequent.  
 
 
 
 
All in all, the findings of this research suggest that 
rising unmarried cohabitation in Chile is connected to a 
process of modernization, but not in the sense asserted by 
the STD. Rising unmarried cohabitation among low income 
groups in Chile is primarily an outcome of declining 
patriarchy. If pregnancy happens daughters are less often 
forced into marriage, and so they have gained autonomy. 
Increased relevance of the wedding, signalling a unique 
relationship between two persons, also speaks of a more 
modern approach to union formation. That unmarried 
cohabitation rose right at the end of almost two decades of 
authoritarian rule further supports this link between 
unmarried cohabitation and enhanced autonomy. Modifications 
introduced by post-authoritarian regimes recognising 
women’s and children’s rights, at the expense of parents 
and men’s privileges, back this link too. 
However it is less clear that rising unmarried 
cohabitation is an outcome of increased female autonomy, or 
increased gender equality. As said above, cohabitation is 
not related with higher levels of female employment. 
Likewise welfare’s new focus on the single mother is based 
on a conventional view of womanhood. First the state cares 
about single mothers because they are mothers. Second, 
single mothers are regarded as vulnerable because they do 
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not have a male partner to support them and their children. 
In spite of common belief, women heads of household are not 
clearly favoured by state benefits as single mothers are 
(see Chapter 1). Moreover interviewees themselves reproduce 
conventional gender roles. That most interviewees started 
living together as a result of pregnancy makes clear that 
childbearing is central to their relationship (see Chapter 
6). Additionally, unmarried cohabitation is not experienced 
as a trial phase for marriage so much as a mirror image 
thereof.  
However a few male interviewees do report being 
against marriage as they do not want any institution to 
intervene in their relationship (see Chapter 7). These 
discourses about individual autonomy should however be 
interpreted with caution, since as discussed above, a high 
proportion of those interviewees who want to carry on 
living together instead of getting married are also 
experiencing relatively substantial difficulties in their 
relationships. These discourses against marriage might, 
accordingly, be rationalizations. 
 
 
 
 
This research also provides fresh insight on three subjects 
that go beyond its research questions. These are parents 
and their role in reproducing discrimination, stepfamilies 
and their complexities, and motherhood and suffering. The 
first two themes have been omitted in research on families 
in Latin America. By contrast, the third one, that links 
motherhood to suffering, has been highlighted in the 
literature about gender roles (see Chapter 2). In this 
concluding section I would like to make a few observations 
about each of these topics. 
The findings of this research support previous 
literature which states that parents differentiate among 
their children according to gender (see Chapter 2). Indeed 
interviewees report that sons, particularly the firstborn, 
are favoured over daughters (see Chapter 5). However this 
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research also shows that parents differentiate among their 
offspring according to legitimacy (biological versus 
legal), colour or race. As was highlighted in Chapter 5, 
interviewees’ reports show how their parents reproduced 
pervasive forms of discrimination in their attitudes toward 
their children. Parents favoured sons over daughters, 
biological children over stepchildren, and light skinned 
over dark skinned siblings. This evidence highlights how 
pervasive these forms of discrimination are in Chilean 
society, as they are operative from early in life and 
through primary bonds. 
This research has also served to highlight the 
relevance of stepfamilies and the complexities that they 
bring to family relationships (see Chapters 5 and 7). Most 
parents of participants in this study were formerly 
married, but many had separated and repartnered. Most 
respondents were therefore brought up in stepfamilies. 
Developing relationships in stepfamilies is particularly 
difficult due to the absence of clear social or cultural 
patterns to follow (Cherlin 1978). In the near future 
stepfamilies are expected to become more frequent in Chile, 
as marriage is declining and divorce is now legal.  
Thirdly, the current analysis also provides a grounded 
explanation of why motherhood is linked to suffering (see 
Chapter 6). This research suggests that gender inequalities 
operating in a context of deprived living conditions make 
pregnancy and motherhood particularly difficult 
experiences. As conventional gender roles predominate, 
motherhood is the privileged way to gain social status. 
Nonetheless, since daughters are restricted in their 
chances of dating and premarital pregnancy is condemned by 
parents, young women who become mothers risk being cut off 
by their parents. It is certainly true that pregnancy was 
reported by women interviewees as a difficult time in their 
life histories. Prevalence of conventional gender roles 
discourages female employment, especially for mothers of 
young children. Thus as women become mothers they may in 
fact become isolated from social relationships other than 
those within their extended families, and may also have 
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less access to other sources of reward, apart from 
motherhood. Lack of independent accommodation often 
aggravates their difficulties. 
In light of this research, claims that link motherhood 
with suffering principally due to the supposed symbolic 
influence of the Virgin Mary seem misguided (see Chapter 
2). Interpretations based on popular religiosity moreover 
help to unquestioningly reproduce the suffering of these 
young mothers, since conventional gender roles and deprived 
living conditions are presented as a quaint but deeply 
rooted folk custom typical of deprived groups. The same 
applies to manhood, which is said to follow the symbol of 
the Child. Here, social sources of power that enable men to 
enjoy sexual privileges and lack of paternal 
responsibilities are omitted. 
 
 
 
 
Here I would also like to highlight that some of the 
study’s findings are in accordance with research conducted 
in the UK and the US. For example, research on working 
class families in these countries show a similar pattern of 
early partnering for young women driven by a desire to gain 
autonomy from parents (Komarovsky 1967; Rubin 1976).  
Likewise, research in the UK (Brown and Tirril 1978) 
has documented that depression is more common among working 
class women. Depression, defined as hopelessness or lack of 
social rewards, is related to experiences such as having 
young children; not being involved in paid work, and not 
having a confiding relationship. Harsh living conditions 
increase feelings of loss and lack of recognition. Thus 
depression is more pronounced among working class women, 
due to their increased vulnerability.  
Similar views on sexuality and contraception among 
young people in the UK and US have also been documented. 
Research in the UK (Schofield 1968; Thomson 2004) and the 
US (Rubin 1976) shows that young women are hesitant about 
contraception, as they tend to relate sex with love and 
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trust. As Rubin puts it, ‘”good girls” do but don’t plan; 
“bad girls” do and plan’ (1976:63). In addition, evidence 
suggests a predominantly conventional understanding of sex, 
which translates into lack of conversation about sexual 
practices and contraception (Thomson 2004:105).  
Schofield (1968) has also highlighted that in the UK 
in the 1960s, family influence on sexual matters was 
stronger for young women than for young men.  Early sexual 
initiation of daughters was related to poor relations with 
parents. Hence for young women to decide to have sex also 
entailed a decision to break with parental authority. A 
teenage girl has to ‘overcome these family pressures and 
derogate her family loyalty before she can be persuaded to 
agree to premarital intercourse’ (1968:208). 
Research in the UK on cohabitation involving children 
also demonstrates significant similarities with the present 
research (Kiernan and Estaugh 1993; McRae 1993). Cohabiting 
mothers in the UK tend, it is said, to belong to low-income 
groups; while cohabitation is seen as a kind of marriage. 
According to McRae, cohabiting mothers report similar 
reasons for remaining single, such as the expense of 
marriage and anticipated difficulties relating to any 
future divorce. She also asserts that cohabitation among 
this group does not imply increased gender equality. 
Cohabiting mothers in the UK, like those in the present 
study, report falling in love as the main reason to begin 
cohabiting, while at the same time intimating that 
unexpected pregnancy is also relevant.  
All these similarities demonstrate that family life 
and views on gender and sexuality in Chile are not as 
unique as some culturalist interpretations assert (Morandé 
1984; Montecino 2001; Morandé 2010). By the same token it 
would be erroneous to assert, as other scholars have, that 
families in Chile are following the same process of 
modernization described for industrialized countries 
(Valdés, Saavedra et al. 2005; Tironi, Valenzuela et al. 
2006; Valdés 2007).  
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What are the policy implications of this study? Firstly, it 
should be acknowledged that there is insufficient evidence 
to demonstrate that cohabitation has a negative impact on 
family life. Such claims are often based on statistical 
analyses that have found links between types of partnership 
and variables such as stability of partnership. Yet finding 
a connection does not mean establishing a causal 
relationship. The findings of this research suggest that 
cohabitation is an outcome rather than a cause. Those from 
low income groups who face greater difficulties and are 
less similar would probably start living together 
informally, while those from middle-high income groups who 
are more similar and face fewer difficulties would probably 
start living together through formal marriage.  
The facts are, firstly, that there are diverse forms 
of union, and secondly, that cohabitation is more common 
among low income groups. To cohabit because it is more 
feasible than to marry does not necessarily mean being 
against marriage (see Chapter 7). Thus alternative forms of 
partnership should not be seen as a threat to marriage, 
especially in a society as conventional as Chile’s. Indeed, 
the latest data indicates that the marriage rate has 
increased since divorce was introduced in 2005 (Cox 2011). 
Therefore to try to impose marriage as the only acceptable 
form of union formation would equate to promoting social 
discrimination.  
In terms of policy implications we should also attend 
to the complex interaction of social policies with family 
arrangements shown here, especially among low income 
groups. In Chile, unmarried mothers have historically been 
neglected by a social welfare system which encouraged 
marriage (see Chapter 1). By contrast, thanks to the 
prevalence of targeted social policies, unmarried mothers 
are today favoured. Cohabitation has unwittingly been 
facilitated. The targeting of social policies is inherently 
problematic, as it tends to introduce diverse and 
unexpected sources of privilege and discrimination. In a 
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universal system of welfare provision, in which every 
person is entitled to similar rights, there would be no 
favoured groups. Yet targeted rather than universal social 
policies will most probably continue to be central in 
Chile. Therefore it would be desirable to have a better 
understanding of assumptions about gender and kinship which 
inform targeted social benefits, and to know more about 
their actual effects on families. 
A third policy implication is the need to improve 
official data on partnerships and families. If union 
formation and families are to be studied properly, studies 
and official data generally need to differentiate between 
marital status, partnership, and living arrangements. The 
current situation, in which official census data overlaps 
living arrangements with marital status, is inadequate. It 
is also necessary to have data on people’s trajectories in 
relation to partnerships. This would include dimensions 
such as type, number, duration, and dissolution of 
partnerships across the life cycle, and would also consider 
the question of re-partnering.  
Current national statistics such as the national 
census and the official Encuesta de Caracterización 
Socioeconómica Nacional, CASEN, are inadequate for the 
study of families, as they are focused on households. 
Families are complex, and usually involve more than one 
household.  Statistics in Chile are based on households, 
which helps promote the idea that families are restricted 
and confined to a single household. This is a distorted 
view. The same focus on the household brings about the need 
to identify the head of the household, which automatically 
translates into assumptions about family headship. Hence 
this way of collecting data about households and families 
is insensitive to changes in family life beyond household 
composition. Therefore, in order to advance in the study of 
families, it would be desirable to improve the accuracy of 
data. 
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As regards viable directions for future research, one 
logical extension of the present findings would be to study 
cohabitation among other social groups, e.g. the middle and 
upper classes. Such research should also be complemented 
with studies of marriage, focusing in particular on how 
people come to get married. Other fruitful lines of 
research might involve looking at the consequences of the 
breakdown of a cohabiting relationship for the partners and 
children involved. Comparisons with post-divorce effects 
would be pertinent, as one should expect more negative 
consequences for cohabiting couples.  
A third line of research should delve further into how 
cohabiting couples and their children relate to social 
institutions. Access to education and financial services, 
and the status of cohabiting couples for tax purposes, need 
to be investigated. All told, cohabitation is an elusive 
and rather invisible arrangement. Yet it is particularly 
frequent among more deprived groups. Future research should 
therefore increase its visibility, so as to shed light on 
ongoing mechanisms of reproduction of inequalities and 
discrimination which affect a growing number of families. 
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APPENDIX 1 - MATRIX OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
CLASSIFICATION 
 
 
 
 
 
Box A1.1: Matrix of socio-economic classification 
Occasional 
work
Manual 
unskilled work
Manual skilled 
work
Administrative 
work
Incomplete primary or less E E D C3
Complete primary                                   E D D C3
Incomplete secondary or complete 
vocational D D D C3
Complete secondary or incomplete 
higher vocational D D C3 C3
Main provider's occupation
M
a
in
 
pr
o
vi
de
r's
 
e
du
ca
tio
n
a
l 
a
tta
in
m
e
n
t
 
Source: Adimark (2000) 
Notes: E refers to the poorest, D to the lower socio-economic group, and C3 to the middle-low, socio-economic group. 
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APPENDIX 2 - MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF 
INTERVIEWEES, THEIR PARTNERS, AND 
PARENTS 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2.1: Interviewees’ main characteristics  
Pseudonym Gender Age (years) Borough
Socio 
economic 
group
Schooling  
(years) Main occupation
1 Giovanna            F 21 CN D 11 housewife
2 Diana               F 23 CN D 12 housewife
3 Leocadia            F 22 LP D 8 housewife
4 Verónica            F 26 CN D 9 housewife
5 Jane                F 27 LP D 10 housewife
6 Frances             F 24 CN D 12 housewife
7 Dalila              F 20 CN D 12 housewife
8 Jessica             F 21 CN D 12 housewife
9 Karin               F 27 LP D 8 sick leave
10 Paulina             F 25 LP D 12 housewife
11 Elaine              F 29 LP D 12 housewife
12 Danae               F 28 LP C3 12 housewife
13 Celio               M 25 LP C3 12 NI
14 Adrian              M 24 CN D 8 unskilled manual
15 Fernando            M 24 LP C3 12 unemployed
16 León                M 28 CN D 10 unemployed
17 Andrew              M 25 CN D 12 occasional work
18 Albert              M 24 CN D 12 unskilled manual
19 Pedro               M 23 CN D 11 unskilled manual
20 Iván                M 27 LP D 12 skilled manual
21 Ernesto             M 29 CN D 12 unskilled manual
22 Eugenio             M 25 LP C3 12 administrative
23 Cristián            M 22 LP D 8 skilled manual
24 Mauricio            M 27 LP C3 12 administrative
 
NI: No information 
CN: Cerro Navia 
LP: La Pintana 
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Table A2.1: Interviewee’s main characteristics (continued) 
Pseudonym Paid 
work
Earned 
income 
(Chilean 
pesos 2008, 
monthly)
Contributes 
to retirement 
pension
Type of health 
coverage 
(Fonasa)
Claims 
family 
allowances
1 Giovanna            no NA no indigent yes
2 Diana               yes 120,000 no indigent yes
3 Leocadia            no NA no indigent yes
4 Verónica            no NA no indigent yes
5 Jane                no NA no indigent no
6 Frances             no NA no indigent yes
7 Dalila              no NA no indigent yes
8 Jessica             no NA no indigent no
9 Karin               yes 80,000 yes wage-earner yes
10 Paulina             no NA no indigent yes
11 Elaine              yes NI no indigent yes
12 Danae               no NA no indigent yes
13 Celio               yes NI yes wage-earner yes
14 Adrian              yes NI yes indigent yes
15 Fernando            no NA no wage-earner yes
16 León                no NA no not specified yes
17 Andrew              yes 110,000 no not specified yes
18 Albert              yes 150,000 no not specified yes
19 Pedro               yes 190,000 yes not specified no
20 Iván                yes 200,000 no indigent yes
21 Ernesto             yes 200,000 yes not specified NI
22 Eugenio             yes 380,000 yes wage-earner yes
23 Cristián            yes 400,000 yes wage-earner yes
24 Mauricio            yes 500,000 yes wage-earner yes
 
NI: No information 
NA: Not applicable 
Note: At March 2012, 1,000 Chilean pesos is roughly equivalent to 2 American dollars or 1 British pound. 
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Table A2.1: Interviewees’ main characteristics (continued) 
Pseudonym
Time 
cohabiting 
(years)
Number 
of 
children
Living arrangements Religion Political 
affiliation
1 Giovanna            4 2 allegados none none
2 Diana               3 2 allegados Catholic Concertación
3 Leocadia            3 1 allegados Evangelical NI
4 Verónica            4 2 allegados Evangelical Alianza
5 Jane                10 2 rented Catholic Concertación
6 Frances             2 1 allegados Catholic Concertación
7 Dalila              1 1 allegados Catholic Alianza
8 Jessica             1 1 allegados Catholic Concertación
9 Karin               10 3 illegal land occupation Catholic Concertación
10 Paulina             7 1 rented Catholic Alianza
11 Elaine              6 1 allegados Catholic Concertación
12 Danae               12 1 allegados Evangelical Concertación
13 Celio               2 1 rented none Communist party
14 Adrian              7 2 allegados Evangelical NI
15 Fernando            2 1 allegados Catholic Concertación
16 León                7 1 allegados Catholic Concertación
17 Andrew              1 2 allegados Catholic none
18 Albert              3 1 allegados Catholic none
19 Pedro               3 1 allegados none none
20 Iván                3 2 rented other none
21 Ernesto             7 1 allegados Catholic Alianza
22 Eugenio             5 1 rented Christian, no denom. none
23 Cristián            2 1 allegados none Concertación
24 Mauricio            9 1 rented Catholic none
 
Allegados: living in the house of another family, typically parents. 
Concertación: centre-left coalition 
Alianza: centre-right coalition 
NI: No information 
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Table A2.2: Partners’ main characteristics  
Partner of Gender Age (years)
Schooling  
(years)
Main 
occupation
Paid 
work
Earned 
income 
(Chilean 
pesos 2008, 
monthly)
1 Giovanna            M 25 12 unskilled manual yes NI
2 Diana               M 24 12 unskilled manual yes 80,000
3 Leocadia            M 32 9 unskilled manual yes 160,000
4 Verónica            M 26 10 unskilled manual yes 175,000
5 Jane                M 27 12 unskilled manual yes 180,000
6 Frances             M 28 12 unskilled manual yes 190,000
7 Dalila              M 21 11 unskilled manual yes 220,000
8 Jessica             M 20 11 unskilled manual yes 220,000
9 Karin               M 30 8 unskilled manual yes 225,000
10 Paulina             M 26 10 unskilled manual yes 250,000
11 Elaine              M 30 8 unskilled manual yes 280,000
12 Danae               M 30 12 administrative yes 380,000
13 Celio               F 29 14 housewife no NA
14 Adrian              F 20 NI NI NI NI
15 Fernando            F 22 12 administrative yes 180,000
16 León                F 23 NI unskilled manual yes 180,000
17 Andrew              F 20 12 housewife no NA
18 Albert              F 23 12 housewife no NA
19 Pedro               F 21 11 housewife no NA
20 Iván                F 25 12 housewife yes 200,000
21 Ernesto             F 23 12 unskilled manual yes 180,000
22 Eugenio             F 23 12 housewife no NA
23 Cristián            F 21 12 housewife no NA
24 Mauricio            F 26 12 housewife no NA
 
NI: No information 
NA: Not applicable 
Note: At March 2012, 1,000 Chilean pesos is roughly equivalent to 2 American dollars or 1 British pound. 
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Table A2.2: Partners’ main characteristics (continued) 
Partner of
Contributes 
to 
retirement 
pension
Type of health 
coverage 
(Fonasa)
Number 
of 
children
Religion Political 
affiliation
1 Giovanna            yes none 2 none Alianza
2 Diana               no indigent 1 Catholic Alianza
3 Leocadia            yes indigent 2 none NI
4 Verónica            yes indigent 2 none Alianza
5 Jane                yes indigent 2 Catholic Concertación
6 Frances             no indigent 1 Catholic Concertación
7 Dalila              yes wage-earner 1 none Alianza
8 Jessica             yes wage-earner 1 Catholic none
9 Karin               yes wage-earner 3 Catholic none
10 Paulina             yes wage-earner 1 Catholic Alianza
11 Elaine              no indigent 1 Evangelical Alianza
12 Danae               yes wage-earner 1 Christian, no denom. Alianza
13 Celio               no not specified 1 Catholic Communist party
14 Adrian              NI indigent 2 NI NI
15 Fernando            yes wage-earner 1 Catholic Alianza
16 León                yes wage-earner 1 Evangelical none
17 Andrew              no indigent 1 Catholic Concertación
18 Albert              no indigent 2 Catholic NI
19 Pedro               no not specified 1 none none
20 Iván                no indigent 3 other none
21 Ernesto             yes not specified 1 Catholic none
22 Eugenio             no not specified 1 Christian, no denom. none
23 Cristián            no not specified 1 other Concertación
24 Mauricio            no indigent 1 Evangelical none
 
Concertación: centre-left coalition 
Alianza: centre-right coalition 
NI: No information 
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Table A2.3: Parents’ main characteristics  
Parents of Mother's 
age
Father's 
age
Mother's 
schooling 
(years)
Father's 
schooling 
(years)
Mother's 
occupation
Father's 
occupation
1 Giovanna            49 58 12 10 unskilled manual unskilled manual
2 Diana               47 49 6 10 housewife unskilled manual
3 Leocadia            40 54 5 3 skilled manual unskilled manual
4 Verónica            43 44 4 NI unskilled manual unskilled manual
5 Jane                44 44 10 NI unskilled manual skilled manual
6 Frances             44 54 11 NI skilled manual NI
7 Dalila              57 62 10 6 unskilled manual unskilled manual
8 Jessica             38 died 10 12 skilled manual skilled manual
9 Karin               53 55 12 12 skilled manual skilled manual
10 Paulina             48 48 8 12 unskilled manual skilled manual
11 Elaine              49 52 8 4 housewife unskilled manual
12 Danae               50 63 10 7 housewife unskilled manual
13 Celio               48 50 9 12 skilled manual skilled manual
14 Adrian              41 45 4 9 unskilled manual unskilled manual
15 Fernando            48 died 10 8 unskilled manual skilled manual
16 León                49 50 10 11 unskilled manual skilled manual
17 Andrew              49 55 12 2 skilled manual skilled manual
18 Albert              49 49 6 10 housewife skilled manual
19 Pedro               47 49 10 NI unskilled manual skilled manual
20 Iván                51 57 7 5 skilled manual skilled manual
21 Ernesto             50 55 12 12 housewife skilled manual
22 Eugenio             NI NI 6 10 housewife skilled manual
23 Cristián            53 55 8 10 unskilled manual skilled manual
24 Mauricio            47 59 8 3 housewife skilled manual
 
NI: No information 
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Table A2.3: Parents’ main characteristics (continued) 
Parents of Mother's religion Father's religion Mother's political 
affiliation
Father's political 
affiliation
1 Giovanna            none Catholic Concertación Concertación
2 Diana               Catholic Catholic Concertación Concertación
3 Leocadia            Evangelical Evangelical NI none
4 Verónica            none none Alianza NI
5 Jane                Catholic Catholic Concertación NI
6 Frances             Catholic NI Communist party NI
7 Dalila              Catholic Catholic Concertación Concertación
8 Jessica             Catholic Evangelical Concertación NI
9 Karin               Catholic Catholic Concertación Alianza
10 Paulina             Catholic Catholic Alianza Alianza
11 Elaine              Catholic Catholic Concertación NI
12 Danae               Evangelical Catholic Concertación NI
13 Celio               Catholic Christian, no denom. Communist party Communist party
14 Adrian              Evangelical Evangelical NI NI
15 Fernando            Catholic Catholic Concertación Concertación
16 León                Catholic Catholic Concertación Concertación
17 Andrew              Catholic Catholic none none
18 Albert              Catholic Catholic NI NI
19 Pedro               Evangelical Evangelical none none
20 Iván                Catholic Catholic Communist party none
21 Ernesto             Catholic Catholic none NI
22 Eugenio             Evangelical Evangelical none none
23 Cristián            Catholic Catholic Alianza NI
24 Mauricio            Catholic Catholic none Alianza
 
Concertación: centre-left coalition 
Alianza: centre-right coalition 
NI: No information 
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Table A2.3: Parent’s main characteristics (continued) 
Parents of
Mother's 
number of 
children
Father's 
number of 
children
Parents' 
original 
relationship
1 Giovanna            3 4 cohabitation
2 Diana               3 4 cohabitation
3 Leocadia            5 5 married
4 Verónica            4 5 cohabitation
5 Jane                5 3 single mother
6 Frances             1 3 cohabitation
7 Dalila              5 5 married
8 Jessica             2 1 cohabitation
9 Karin               3 2 married
10 Paulina             2 2 married
11 Elaine              3 3 married
12 Danae               8 6 married
13 Celio               4 2 married
14 Adrian              10 11 married
15 Fernando            3 2 married
16 León                3 4 married
17 Andrew              6 8 married
18 Albert              3 3 married
19 Pedro               3 3 married
20 Iván                4 4 married
21 Ernesto             3 4 married
22 Eugenio             5 6 married
23 Cristián            4 6 visiting partner
24 Mauricio            4 5 cohabitation
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APPENDIX 3 - DATA COLLECTION 
INSTRUMENTS (translated from the 
original Spanish) 
 
 
 
 
FIRST SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW  
 
 
FAMILY TREE 
 
Introduction 
 
 The idea is first to do a family tree. I would like you 
to tell me about your grandparents and parents. Then we 
will continue with the history of your life, how your 
life has been from your birth to today. 
 
 
Grandparents 
 
 To begin with, could you tell me about your maternal 
grandmother (your mother’s mother)? How would you 
describe her? How is/was your relationship with her? 
What feelings do you have about her? 
 
 Repeat the same with each grandparent. 
 
 
 Then ask about the couple relationship between the 
maternal, then the paternal, grandparents. 
 
 
Parents 
 
 Now can you tell me about your mother? How would you 
describe her? How is your relationship with her? What 
feelings do you have when you talk about her? 
 
 Repeat the same for the father 
 
 
Parents’ partnership 
 
 How do/did your parents get along? 
 
 Type of partnership: marital status, and if they live 
together or not. 
 
 How did your parents form a partnership? Check: Love, 
children, leaving parental home, forced marriage, 
arranged marriage, etc. 
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 How old were they when they formed a couple? 
 
 Once they were together, what kept them together? Check: 
Children, satisfaction with partner, fear, habit, etc. 
 
 Who was/is the head of the family? Who had/has the last 
word? 
 
 Age and marital status of the mother at her first 
pregnancy. 
 
 Did they want to have children? 
 
 Did they have as many children as they wanted, or more 
or less? 
 
 Who was in charge of the children’s upbringing? Who was 
in charge of bringing in the money? 
 
 In your parental home, did children help with the 
housework, such as cleaning, washing-up, or cooking? Did 
children help care for younger siblings? Were there 
differences between sons and daughters? 
 
 
 How were the children recorded in the registry office? 
(as children of both parents, only of the mother, or 
only of the father). 
 
 
Closing 
 
 What traits do you think you have inherited from your 
maternal grandparents? Ask the same for paternal 
grandparents and for parents. 
 
 Is the family in which you were raised an example to 
follow? 
 
 
LIFE HISTORY 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 We all have a life history. Please tell me the story of 
your life from your birth to the present. Feel free to 
tell me anything that you wish. 
 
 
Childhood 
 
 How would you describe your childhood? Check: 
neighbourhood, and experience of school. 
 
 Could you give me a positive memory from your childhood? 
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 And a negative memory from your childhood? 
 
 When you were a child, how did you imagine you would be 
as a grown-up? Did you wish to be as someone? 
 
 When did your childhood end? 
 
 
Adolescence & youth 
 
 How would you describe your youth? Check: friends and 
activities. 
 
 What happened with your studies (school)? Check: last 
year of school. 
 
 How would you describe your experience of paid work? 
 
 When did you become an adult? 
 
 
Closing 
 
 What do you think is the meaning of life? What makes you 
get up every day? 
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SECOND SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW  
 
 
 
PARTNERS, CHILDREN, AND FAMILY FORMATION 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 Now that you have already told me the story of your 
life, I would like to focus on the history of your 
relationships. 
 
 
Partnerships (before current one) 
 
 How would you describe your love life or the 
partnerships that you have had? 
 
 Did you used to go out? How did you make relationships 
with the opposite sex? 
 
 How was the first time that you had sex? What did you do 
about the possibility of pregnancy? What did you do 
about the possibility of a sexually transmitted disease? 
Check: Contraception. 
 
 At that time, how did you imagine your future love life? 
Check: Living alone, living in partnership, marriage or 
cohabitation, with or without children. 
 
 
Current partnership 
 
 Every couple has a story, could you tell me the story of 
your current partnership? How did you meet? Why did you 
feel attracted to him/her? Why was he/she was attracted 
to you? 
 
 How would you describe your partner? 
 
 What is the best thing about your relationship? What is 
the most difficult thing about your relationship? 
 
 Why are you still together? Check: Partner, children, 
etc. 
 
 What is your role in the relationship? What is the role 
of your partner? 
 
 Who is the head of your household? Who has the last 
word? 
 
 
Children 
 
 Now we are going to talk more about your children. 
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 How did you come to have your first child with your 
current partner? 
 
 What was the first thing that came to your mind 
when you knew about the pregnancy? 
 
 Only women: What were your expectations about 
your partner’s reaction? 
 
 At that time, were you looking forward to having 
a child? What about your partner? 
 
 How did you experience pregnancy? Ask also for 
partner’s experience. 
 
 How would you describe the experience of having a 
child? 
 
 Who looks after your child/children? 
 
 How was your child recorded in the registry 
office? (progeny of both parents; only of the 
mother; only of the father) 
 
 How would you describe your relationship after 
your child was born? 
 
 Would you like to have more children? How about 
your partner? What are you doing in relation to 
this issue? 
 
 Does/do your child/children help with the 
housework? Check: Cleaning, washing up, or 
cooking. Does your child help or care for younger 
children? Check: Gender differences in housework 
and childcare. 
 
 Do you have children from other relationships? 
Can you tell me about them? 
 
 
 
Cohabitation 
 
 How did you come to live together as a couple? Check: 
Particular situation that sparked cohabitation. Date 
when you began to live together. 
 
 How did you decide where to live? What other 
alternatives were there? 
 
 How has living together been? 
 
 In the time that you have been together, have you ever 
thought about getting married? 
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o If you have thought about getting married ask 
about possible reasons. Check: Commitment, social 
recognition, wedding. 
 
o Why have you not married yet? Possible hurdles to 
marriage:  
√ Partner does not want to get married (why?) 
√ Partner will feel as though he/she has 
authority over me 
√ Families of origin oppose marriage 
√ First we need our own house 
√ Expense of marriage  
√ Fear of losing social benefits 
√ Avoiding legal divorce 
√ No need to, as we already live as a married 
couple 
 
o If you have NOT thought about getting married, 
what would need to happen in the future, to make 
you change your mind? Check same possible reasons 
as hurdles to marriage. 
 
 Have you cohabited before with another partner? How was 
that experience? 
 
 
Cohabitation and marriage 
 
 Is there any difference between cohabitation and 
marriage? In what ways are they similar? In what ways 
are they different? 
 
 Are there any advantages for married families in 
comparison to cohabiting families? And are there any 
disadvantages? 
 
 In the future would you like to carry on living 
together, or get married? 
 
 
Expectations 
 
 How do you imagine your life in three years’ time? 
 
 
Closing 
 
 Is there anything else you would like to say? 
 
 
Many thanks 
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STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
Interviewer: 
 
Date: 
 
 
P1. Name: 
 
P2. Address: 
 
 
 
 
P3. Contact telephone: 
 
P4. Email: 
 
P5. Gender: 
 
P6. Date of birth: 
 
P7. Age: 
 
 
HOUSING 
 
P8. Do you live in… accommodation?  
 
1. My own 2. Rented 3. Allegado 
 
P9. Who do you live with? Start with the interviewee, and 
continue with other inhabitants of the same household. 
  
No Name Age Gender Relationship with interviewee 
1     
2     
3     
4     
5     
6     
7     
8     
9     
10     
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FAMILY TREE 
 
P10. PARENTS, PARTNER, AND INTERVIEWEE 
 FATHER MOTHER PARTNER INTERVIEWEE 
1. Full name 
    
2. Age (if applicable, 
date/age at time of 
death) 
    
3. Place of birth 
    
4. Place of residence 
    
5. Last year of 
education     
6. Occupation (main 
activity)     
7. Religion 
    
8. Religiosity 
(high/low)     
9. On the electoral 
roll? (yes/no)     
10. Political affiliation 
    
11. Marital status 
(legal)     
12. Number of children 
(indicate if out of 
wedlock)) 
    
13. Agrees that women with 
young children can be 
in paid employment? 
(yes/no) 
    
 
 
PAID WORK, HEALTH, AND SOCIAL SECURITY 
 
P11. Currently, are you involved in paid work? Is your partner 
in paid work? 
 
P12. ONLY FOR THOSE WHO ARE IN PAID WORK: 
- How much do you earn (monthly)?  
- Do you contribute to social security? (Retirement 
pension) 
 
 
 P11 
Paid work 
yes/no 
P12.1 
Monthly income 
(Chilean pesos) 
P12.2 
Retirement system 
No/AFP/INP/other 
Interviewee    
Partner    
 
P13. If you are short of cash, who do you ask for help? Identify 
person/s whom they regularly borrow from, and amount typically 
borrowed. 
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P14. Do you, or your partner, claim family allowance? How much 
do you receive (monthly)? 
 
Claim 
Yes/no 
Monthly amount 
  
 
 
 
P15. Which of the following sentences best describes the 
economic situation of your family? 
1. We cannot cover our needs 
2. We can cover only our basic needs and nothing else 
3. We can afford some small luxuries 
4. We can live comfortably 
 
P16. Which health system do you have? Which health system does 
your partner have? Which health system do your children have?
  
 
Fonasa/Isapre/Armed 
Forces/Do not 
know/none 
Interviewee  
Partner  
Child 1 (name)  
Child 2  
Child 3  
 
 
COHABITATION 
 
P17. On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 means strongly disagree and 7 
means strongly agree, how would you reply to the statement ‘it 
is acceptable for a couple to live together without intending to 
marry’? 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
     Strongly 
agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
P18. Using the same scale, how would you reply to the statement, 
‘it is a good idea for a couple who intend to marry to first 
live together’?  
 
Strongly 
disagree 
     Strongly 
agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
P19. On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 means ‘not sure at all’ and 7 
means, ‘absolutely sure’, how sure are you that you will be 
together with your current partner in three years time?  
 
Not sure 
at all 
     Absolutely 
sure 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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P20. On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 means ‘I would not like it at 
all’ and 7 means, ‘I would like it a lot’, how much would you 
like to marry your current partner?  
 
    
Not at 
all 
     A lot 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
MANY THANKS 
 
 
NOTES: 
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APPENDIX 4: PARTICIPANTS’ INFORMATION 
SHEET AND INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
 
PARTICIPANTS’ INFORMATION SHEET 
 
STUDY OF LIVING TOGETHER AND HAVING CHILDREN IN CHILE TODAY 
Alejandra Ramm (University of Cambridge, United Kingdom) 
 
This study seeks to understand how people come to live together 
and to have children. What are their experiences as a couple? 
What do you like about living together? What difficulties do you 
face? How is the experience of having a child? 
 
You have been invited to take part in this study because you 
live together with your partner, and you have at least one child 
born of that relationship. So you are better placed than anyone 
else to describe the experience of cohabitation involving 
children. 
 
It is very important that you participate in the study because 
it will help us to better understand Chilean families today, 
their histories, the good things, and the difficulties. In 
addition, you will have the opportunity to think about and to 
talk about your family. 
 
Your participation is voluntary. If you decide to take part, you 
are free to stop participating at any time, without needing to 
give any reason. Therefore, you are always free to either carry 
on or to leave the study. 
 
If you agree to participate we will meet you twice, at a place 
and time of your convenience. Each time we will meet for between 
one and a half to two hours at the most. We will ask you about 
your family of origin, your life history, and how you formed 
your current family. We will need to talk about your love and 
sexual life. 
 
It should be emphasized that personal information, such as your 
full name and address will be treated as confidential. Likewise, 
your identity will be kept anonymous in presentations of the 
research results. 
 
The results will be published as a doctoral thesis at the 
University of Cambridge, United Kingdom, and eventually as an 
academic article or book. The study is fully financed by funding 
provided by the University, thus there are no other private or 
public institutions behind it. 
 
If you have any question about the study, or if you need further 
information, please do not hesitate to contact the person in 
charge: Alejandra Ramm, email address, mobile number. Many 
thanks. 
 267 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
 
 
LIVING TOGETHER AND HAVING CHILDREN IN TODAY’S CHILE  
Alejandra Ramm (University of Cambridge) 
Mob:   
Email:  
 
 
 
 
Please tick 
 
 Yes No 
1. I confirm that I have read and that I have understood the 
participants’ information sheet and that I have had the opportunity 
to ask questions 
 
  
 
  
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I can quit at 
any time without need to give any justification 
 
  
3. I agree to participate in the study 
 
  
4. I agree to the interviews being tape recorded  
 
  
5. I agree to photographs being taken of myself 
during the interviews 
   
6. I agree to my identity being made anonymous 
when the research results are published 
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participant’s full name         Date    Signature 
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APPENDIX 5 - QUALITATIVE CODES AND 
QUANTITATIVE VARIABLES 
 
Box A5.1: Qualitative codes 
CORE CODES SUB CODES 
1. Background 
Family of origin, education, work, accommodation, social welfare, 
beliefs, neighbourhood, friends and social bonds, etc. 
2. Partnership 
Advantages & disadvantages of marriage and cohabitation, 
experiences of living together, reasons for beginning to live 
together, reasons to carry on living together, power within 
partnership, etc. 
3. Life stages Childhood, youth (before cohabitation), adulthood 
4. Gender roles Femininity, masculinity, homosexuality. 
5. Parenthood  
Pregnancy, upbringing, reasons for having children, desire to 
have more children, being a parent, etc. 
6. Personality Interviewees self-portraits of their character 
7. People 
Interviewee, grandparents, parents, siblings, step-relatives, in-
laws, children, etc. 
8. Feelings Feelings associated with different experiences. 
9. Sexuality Courtship, first sexual intercourse, contraception, sexual life, etc. 
10. Expectations Past and present expectations 
 
Box A5.2: Quantitative variables 
TOPICS VARIABLES 
1.Contact details Name, address, telephone, etc. 
2. Classification 
Gender, age, education, occupation, residence, religion, political 
affiliation, marital status, birth order, etc. 
3. Paid & unpaid work and 
economic situation 
Involvement in paid and unpaid work, work contract, income, 
housework & childcare, perception of economic situation, attitude 
to female employment, living arrangements, etc. 
4. Social security 
Housing subsidy, contribution to pension fund, health provision, 
family allowance, etc. 
5. Family of origin (parents) Marital status, current relationship, stepfamily, family headship, 
difficulties experienced, etc. 
6. Living together 
Family unit, children, time living together, family headship, 
stepfamily, expectations, etc. 
7. Sex, pregnancy & 
children 
First sexual intercourse, pregnancy, contraception, sexual 
partner, etc. 
8. Cohabitation & marriage Advantages and disadvantages 
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